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PYSEC-2026-544

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-06-29 11:50 - Updated: 2026-07-01 20:23

Details

Summary

The log_file_name parameter in the stata_do API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (GuardValidator) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including shell, python, erase, etc.) by crafting a malicious log_file_name containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators.

Details

In src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py, both _execute_unix_like and _execute_windows construct a Stata command string using Python f-strings:

commands = f"""
capture log close
{self.generate_log_command(log_file, is_replace)}
...
do "{dofile_path}"
...
"""

The generate_log_command method returns:

log_cmd = f'log using "{log_file.as_posix()}", {replace_clause} {log_type} name({log_type}_log)'

Where log_file is constructed from user-supplied log_name:

def generate_log_file(self, log_name: str, extension='log'):
    return self.log_file_path / f"{log_name}.{extension}"

The log_name parameter comes directly from user input (via MCP tool stata_do or CLI stata-mcp tool do) without any validation. Since the path is embedded inside double quotes in a Stata command string, an attacker can break out of the string context and inject arbitrary commands.

Additionally, generate_log_file does not prevent path traversal via log_name, allowing arbitrary file write outside the intended log directory.

Proof of Concept

When calling stata_do via MCP tool with:

{
  "dofile_path": "test.do",
  "log_file_name": "'; shell echo pwned > /tmp/pwned.txt; '"
}

The generated Stata commands become:

 log using "<log_dir>/'; shell echo pwned > /tmp/pwned.txt; '.log", replace text name(text_log)

Stata interprets this as multiple commands, with shell echo pwned > /tmp/pwned.txt; executed as an arbitrary shell command.

Impact

Remote Code Execution via shell command injection
Arbitrary file write/overwrite via path traversal in log_name
Complete bypass of the security guard, as the guard only validates do-file content, not wrapper parameters

Remediation / Fix

Apply strict allowlist validation to log_name (only alphanumeric, underscore, dot, hyphen; max 128 chars)
Resolve and verify the constructed log path remains within the intended log directory
Consider generating safe internal filenames (e.g., UUIDs) instead of accepting user-defined log names for command construction
Apply similar sanitization to dofile_path before embedding it into Stata command strings

References

Issue: #74
Fix commit: https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp/commit/e6f945941ae0c7cf5e74a428e0b3dc82b396382f

Severity ?

9.3 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Impacted products

Name	purl
stata-mcp	pkg:pypi/stata-mcp

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "stata-mcp",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/stata-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.17.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.1.0",
        "1.10.0",
        "1.10.1",
        "1.10.2",
        "1.11.0",
        "1.11.1",
        "1.12.0",
        "1.12.1",
        "1.13.0",
        "1.13.1",
        "1.13.10",
        "1.13.11",
        "1.13.12",
        "1.13.13",
        "1.13.14",
        "1.13.15",
        "1.13.16",
        "1.13.17",
        "1.13.18",
        "1.13.19",
        "1.13.2",
        "1.13.20",
        "1.13.21",
        "1.13.22",
        "1.13.23",
        "1.13.24",
        "1.13.25",
        "1.13.26",
        "1.13.27",
        "1.13.28",
        "1.13.29",
        "1.13.3",
        "1.13.30",
        "1.13.31",
        "1.13.32",
        "1.13.33",
        "1.13.34",
        "1.13.35",
        "1.13.36",
        "1.13.37",
        "1.13.38",
        "1.13.39",
        "1.13.4",
        "1.13.40",
        "1.13.41",
        "1.13.42",
        "1.13.5",
        "1.13.6",
        "1.13.7",
        "1.13.8",
        "1.13.9",
        "1.14.0",
        "1.14.1",
        "1.14.2",
        "1.14.3",
        "1.15.0",
        "1.15.1",
        "1.16.0",
        "1.16.1",
        "1.16.2",
        "1.16.3",
        "1.17.0",
        "1.17.1",
        "1.17.2",
        "1.3.10",
        "1.3.2",
        "1.3.3",
        "1.3.4",
        "1.3.5",
        "1.3.6",
        "1.3.7",
        "1.3.8",
        "1.4.0",
        "1.4.1",
        "1.5.1",
        "1.5.2",
        "1.5.3",
        "1.6.0",
        "1.6.1",
        "1.6.2",
        "1.6.3",
        "1.7.0",
        "1.7.1",
        "1.7.2",
        "1.7.3",
        "1.7.4",
        "1.8.0",
        "1.8.1",
        "1.8.2",
        "1.9.0",
        "1.9.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47708",
    "GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py`, both `_execute_unix_like` and `_execute_windows` construct a Stata command string using Python f-strings:\n\n```python\ncommands = f\"\"\"\ncapture log close\n{self.generate_log_command(log_file, is_replace)}\n...\ndo \"{dofile_path}\"\n...\n\"\"\"\n```\n\nThe `generate_log_command` method returns:\n\n```python\nlog_cmd = f\u0027log using \"{log_file.as_posix()}\", {replace_clause} {log_type} name({log_type}_log)\u0027\n```\n\nWhere `log_file` is constructed from user-supplied `log_name`:\n\n```python\ndef generate_log_file(self, log_name: str, extension=\u0027log\u0027):\n    return self.log_file_path / f\"{log_name}.{extension}\"\n```\n\nThe `log_name` parameter comes directly from user input (via MCP tool `stata_do` or CLI `stata-mcp tool do`) without any validation. Since the path is embedded inside double quotes in a Stata command string, an attacker can break out of the string context and inject arbitrary commands.\n\nAdditionally, `generate_log_file` does not prevent path traversal via `log_name`, allowing arbitrary file write outside the intended log directory.\n \n### Proof of Concept\n\nWhen calling `stata_do` via MCP tool with:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"dofile_path\": \"test.do\",\n  \"log_file_name\": \"\u0027; shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; \u0027\"\n}\n```\n\nThe generated Stata commands become:\n\n```stata\n log using \"\u003clog_dir\u003e/\u0027; shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; \u0027.log\", replace text name(text_log)\n```\n\nStata interprets this as multiple commands, with `shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt;` executed as an arbitrary shell command.\n\n### Impact\n \n- **Remote Code Execution** via `shell` command injection\n- **Arbitrary file write/overwrite** via path traversal in `log_name`\n- Complete bypass of the security guard, as the guard only validates do-file content, not wrapper parameters\n\n### Remediation / Fix\n\n1. Apply strict allowlist validation to `log_name` (only alphanumeric, underscore, dot, hyphen; max 128 chars)\n2. Resolve and verify the constructed log path remains within the intended log directory\n3. Consider generating safe internal filenames (e.g., UUIDs) instead of accepting user-defined log names for command construction\n4. Apply similar sanitization to `dofile_path` before embedding it into Stata command strings\n\n### References\n\n- Issue: #74\n- Fix commit: https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp/commit/e6f945941ae0c7cf5e74a428e0b3dc82b396382f",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-544",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T20:23:05.367908Z",
  "published": "2026-06-29T11:50:52.497266Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SepineTam/mcp-for-stata/issues/74"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SepineTam/mcp-for-stata/commit/e6f945941ae0c7cf5e74a428e0b3dc82b396382f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/stata-mcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47708"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper"
}

GHSA-4P62-HQP5-G644

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 21:00 – Updated: 2026-06-04 21:00

Summary

MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper

Details

Summary

The log_file_name parameter in the stata_do API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (GuardValidator) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including shell, python, erase, etc.) by crafting a malicious log_file_name containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators.

Details

In src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py, both _execute_unix_like and _execute_windows construct a Stata command string using Python f-strings:

commands = f"""
capture log close
{self.generate_log_command(log_file, is_replace)}
...
do "{dofile_path}"
...
"""

The generate_log_command method returns:

log_cmd = f'log using "{log_file.as_posix()}", {replace_clause} {log_type} name({log_type}_log)'

Where log_file is constructed from user-supplied log_name:

def generate_log_file(self, log_name: str, extension='log'):
    return self.log_file_path / f"{log_name}.{extension}"

The log_name parameter comes directly from user input (via MCP tool stata_do or CLI stata-mcp tool do) without any validation. Since the path is embedded inside double quotes in a Stata command string, an attacker can break out of the string context and inject arbitrary commands.

Additionally, generate_log_file does not prevent path traversal via log_name, allowing arbitrary file write outside the intended log directory.

Proof of Concept

When calling stata_do via MCP tool with:

{
  "dofile_path": "test.do",
  "log_file_name": "'; shell echo pwned > /tmp/pwned.txt; '"
}

The generated Stata commands become:

log using "<log_dir>/'; shell echo pwned > /tmp/pwned.txt; '.log", replace text name(text_log)

Stata interprets this as multiple commands, with shell echo pwned > /tmp/pwned.txt; executed as an arbitrary shell command.

Impact

Remote Code Execution via shell command injection
Arbitrary file write/overwrite via path traversal in log_name
Complete bypass of the security guard, as the guard only validates do-file content, not wrapper parameters

Remediation / Fix

Apply strict allowlist validation to log_name (only alphanumeric, underscore, dot, hyphen; max 128 chars)
Resolve and verify the constructed log path remains within the intended log directory
Consider generating safe internal filenames (e.g., UUIDs) instead of accepting user-defined log names for command construction
Apply similar sanitization to dofile_path before embedding it into Stata command strings

References

Issue: #74
Fix commit: https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp/commit/e6f945941ae0c7cf5e74a428e0b3dc82b396382f

Severity ?

9.3 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "stata-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.17.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47708"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T21:00:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py`, both `_execute_unix_like` and `_execute_windows` construct a Stata command string using Python f-strings:\n\n```python\ncommands = f\"\"\"\ncapture log close\n{self.generate_log_command(log_file, is_replace)}\n...\ndo \"{dofile_path}\"\n...\n\"\"\"\n```\n\nThe `generate_log_command` method returns:\n\n```python\nlog_cmd = f\u0027log using \"{log_file.as_posix()}\", {replace_clause} {log_type} name({log_type}_log)\u0027\n```\n\nWhere `log_file` is constructed from user-supplied `log_name`:\n\n```python\ndef generate_log_file(self, log_name: str, extension=\u0027log\u0027):\n    return self.log_file_path / f\"{log_name}.{extension}\"\n```\n\nThe `log_name` parameter comes directly from user input (via MCP tool `stata_do` or CLI `stata-mcp tool do`) without any validation. Since the path is embedded inside double quotes in a Stata command string, an attacker can break out of the string context and inject arbitrary commands.\n\nAdditionally, `generate_log_file` does not prevent path traversal via `log_name`, allowing arbitrary file write outside the intended log directory.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nWhen calling `stata_do` via MCP tool with:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"dofile_path\": \"test.do\",\n  \"log_file_name\": \"\u0027; shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; \u0027\"\n}\n```\n\nThe generated Stata commands become:\n\n```stata\nlog using \"\u003clog_dir\u003e/\u0027; shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt; \u0027.log\", replace text name(text_log)\n```\n\nStata interprets this as multiple commands, with `shell echo pwned \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt;` executed as an arbitrary shell command.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution** via `shell` command injection\n- **Arbitrary file write/overwrite** via path traversal in `log_name`\n- Complete bypass of the security guard, as the guard only validates do-file content, not wrapper parameters\n\n### Remediation / Fix\n\n1. Apply strict allowlist validation to `log_name` (only alphanumeric, underscore, dot, hyphen; max 128 chars)\n2. Resolve and verify the constructed log path remains within the intended log directory\n3. Consider generating safe internal filenames (e.g., UUIDs) instead of accepting user-defined log names for command construction\n4. Apply similar sanitization to `dofile_path` before embedding it into Stata command strings\n\n### References\n\n- Issue: #74\n- Fix commit: https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp/commit/e6f945941ae0c7cf5e74a428e0b3dc82b396382f",
  "id": "GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644",
  "modified": "2026-06-04T21:00:42Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T21:00:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SepineTam/mcp-for-stata/issues/74"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SepineTam/mcp-for-stata/commit/e6f945941ae0c7cf5e74a428e0b3dc82b396382f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper"
}

Search criteria

Related vulnerabilities

PYSEC-2026-544

Summary

Details

Proof of Concept

Impact

Remediation / Fix

References

GHSA-4P62-HQP5-G644

Summary

Details

Proof of Concept

Impact

Remediation / Fix

References