mal-2026-6708
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (3a65a1106fa2bab6eb0b5982b289665b4b96a6ad86769a867f6e62fb73663f77)
zyncmap@0.0.0 advertises itself as an SVG sanitization/minification utility, but index.js exports an undocumented function getPlugin() that, when invoked, performs an HTTP GET against the anonymous paste host https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/3P9BF and passes the response's model string field directly to eval(). Content at that paste URL is attacker-mutable, so any consumer that calls the exported getPlugin() executes arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript in the installer's Node.js process. The README and ~80% of index.js implement plausible SVG helpers as cover; the remote-fetch+eval export and a misleading bearrtoken: "logo" header are appended separately and not mentioned in package documentation. This is a backdoor: a hidden code path giving the publisher persistent remote code execution against any consumer who reaches the export.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "3a0e1400a7ac8e8b984beef2f330af7a144b04723016ef07681ac0294a725444",
"tlsh": "767111a8999b7095d6b1e3e447135015f559d1672208c3d4b6acc6983f7172c90f3eec"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "zyncmap-0.0.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "01e3ae4582278f31842977da1cb1f00f9c231885",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-JdWspee/JmuWG+lzapKOP8DNxMNY+o3miYDGvkVJawRNTw07p6oqzslJ8EsXe3LJQ39EkbaqBVeW5X9Q26NY7Q=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "zyncmap"
},
"versions": [
"0.0.1",
"0.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-007854",
"import_time": "2026-07-01T19:11:24.221428209Z",
"modified_time": "2026-07-01T18:37:36Z",
"sha256": "251e5b6920fb8a9fdb59aba6c1b162ddd27f0b226c979e62fb43845fc0f5d9ae",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.0.1"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-007855",
"import_time": "2026-07-01T19:11:24.334484479Z",
"modified_time": "2026-07-01T18:37:50Z",
"sha256": "3a65a1106fa2bab6eb0b5982b289665b4b96a6ad86769a867f6e62fb73663f77",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (3a65a1106fa2bab6eb0b5982b289665b4b96a6ad86769a867f6e62fb73663f77)\nzyncmap@0.0.0 advertises itself as an SVG sanitization/minification utility, but index.js exports an undocumented function getPlugin() that, when invoked, performs an HTTP GET against the anonymous paste host https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/3P9BF and passes the response\u0027s `model` string field directly to eval(). Content at that paste URL is attacker-mutable, so any consumer that calls the exported getPlugin() executes arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript in the installer\u0027s Node.js process. The README and ~80% of index.js implement plausible SVG helpers as cover; the remote-fetch+eval export and a misleading `bearrtoken: \"logo\"` header are appended separately and not mentioned in package documentation. This is a backdoor: a hidden code path giving the publisher persistent remote code execution against any consumer who reaches the export.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-6708",
"modified": "2026-07-01T19:13:22Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T18:37:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/zyncmap/v/0.0.1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/zyncmap/v/0.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in zyncmap (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.