rustsec-2026-0122
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2026-04-23 12:00
Modified
2026-05-11 13:59
Summary
Potential use-after-free due to lack of panic safety in `InlineVec::clear` and `SerVec::clear`
Details

InlineVec::clear() and SerVec::clear() in rkyv were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call drop_in_place on each, updating self.len only after the loop. If an element's Drop implementation panics during the loop, self.len is left at its original value.

A subsequent invocation of clear() on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements:

  • InlineVec::clear() is called again from InlineVec's own Drop implementation when the value is later dropped.
  • SerVec::clear() is called again by SerVec::with_capacity() after the user closure returns.

Impact

  • CWE-415 (Double Free): heap corruption when the element type is one that owns memory, such as Box<T> or Vec<T>
  • CWE-416 (Use-After-Free): memory corruption when an element is accessed following a caught panic

Both types of undefined behavior can be invoked in safe Rust, but only if unwinding panics are enabled and std::panic::catch_unwind is used.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "code-execution",
          "memory-corruption"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": "unsound"
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rkyv",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/rkyv"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "`InlineVec::clear()` and `SerVec::clear()` in `rkyv` were not panic-safe.\nBoth functions iterate over their elements and call `drop_in_place` on each,\nupdating `self.len` only *after* the loop. If an element\u0027s `Drop` implementation\npanics during the loop, `self.len` is left at its original value.\n\nA subsequent invocation of `clear()` on the same container then re-visits the\nalready-freed elements:\n\n- `InlineVec::clear()` is called again from `InlineVec`\u0027s own `Drop`\n  implementation when the value is later dropped.\n- `SerVec::clear()` is called again by `SerVec::with_capacity()` after the\n  user closure returns.\n\n## Impact\n- **CWE-415 (Double Free):** heap corruption when the element type is one that\n  owns memory, such as `Box\u003cT\u003e` or `Vec\u003cT\u003e`\n- **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** memory corruption when an element is accessed\n  following a caught panic\n\nBoth types of undefined behavior can be invoked in safe Rust, but only if\nunwinding panics are enabled and `std::panic::catch_unwind` is used.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0122",
  "modified": "2026-05-11T13:59:32Z",
  "published": "2026-04-23T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/rkyv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0122.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rkyv/rkyv/commit/5828cf5c27b664eb4432c4a93d4769e12e5e42fb"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Potential use-after-free due to lack of panic safety in `InlineVec::clear` and `SerVec::clear`"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…